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Abstract 
 
Why do militaries shift their loyalty from authoritarian regimes in some instances 
of anti-regime protests and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to 
democratic change? These questions are crucial for understanding the role of the military 
in democratization, given competing expectations in the literatures on civil-military 
relations, pacted transitions, and civil resistance. They are also important for 
understanding the outcomes of protests and other nonviolent campaigns for regime 
change, a topic of increased attention in recent years. To answer them, I propose an 
argument rooted in the bases of military authority. Militaries are delegated authority by 
regimes and gain authority by virtue of their functional role in providing societal security 
and stability. However, regimes often structure delegation to protect themselves at the 
expense of military functional capacity. Their use of some coup-proofing strategies 
introduces tensions between a military’s delegated and functional authority. When mass 
anti-regime protests challenge regime legitimacy, I argue that the military is more likely 
to choose to preserve its functional authority (rather than rely on the regime’s delegated 
authority) by shifting loyalty. The likelihood of loyalty shifts is also affected by the 
protest movement and whether it is committed to nonviolence and widely supported and 
a better source of military authority. Using this argument, I explain military loyalty shifts 
and their types, defined according to the extent and quality of the military organization’s 
involvement. I then explain the relationship between types of shifts and democratization, 
 iii 
arguing that democratic change is more likely when military loyalty shifts are 
fragmented. In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to 
exercise influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified 
organizations. To test this argument, I use new data on military responses to all major 
anti-regime protest movements from 1946 to 2015. I undertake a large-n, statistical 
analysis, use methods of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and examine three 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
 
 Militaries have important effects on political change. What effects they have, 
though, is contested. The civil-military relations literature has generally held that military 
involvement in politics has a deleterious impact on democracy. The literature on pacted 
democracy, however, claims that military involvement can be key to democratization. 
Recent findings in analyses of civil resistance also suggest that military loyalty shifts are 
key to successful anti-authoritarian protests. Is military politicization a topic and hazard 
that should be avoided at all costs? Or can it sometimes lead to successful 
democratization? How can we best understand military defections and their impact on 
post-protest political change?  
The civil resistance literature has provided several examples where military 
loyalty shifts accompanied successful anti-authoritarian regime protest movements. For 
instance, military defections from President Suharto during protests in Indonesia in 19981 
and President Khan in Pakistan in 19692 both achieved regime change followed by 
democratic elections. Research on these and other civil resistance campaigns suggests 
that unarmed civilians can overthrow autocrats in part because of regime security force
                                                 
1 Mary P. Callahan, “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond,” Naval Postgraduate 
School Occasional Paper 4 (1999): 15. 
 
2 Arshad Javed Rizvi, “Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of Pakistan,” International Research 




loyalty shifts.3 Sometimes, though, protest movements do not gain military support and 
that often leads to less successful results. The Chinese military was largely loyal during 
the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, for instance, and the regime remained secure.4 
The long term impact of military support on democratization is also uncertain. In 
Pakistan, the military declared martial law prior to elections and launched a coup less 
than a decade after.5 
This empirical variation raises a number of questions that existing literatures on 
the military in politics have a hard time answering. The civil-military relations literature 
cannot explain why a military acting outside the authority delegated it by civilians 
sometimes leads to democracy. The early pacted transitions scholarship and the recent 
work on civil resistance show through their analyses of military involvement in 
democratization that this understanding of militaries in politics is missing something. 
However, while the importance of the military to civil resistance outcomes has been well 
established, only recently have scholars begun to focus on explaining the military 
                                                 
3 Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, “Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence 
State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004),” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, 
no. 3 (2006): 411-429; Zoltan Barany, “The Role of the Military,” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 
24-35; Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
 
4 B. Shelley, “Protest and Globalization: Media, Symbols, and Audience in the Drama of Democratization,” 
Democratization 8, no. 4 (2001): 160. 
 
5 Naghman Chaudhry, “Pakistan’s First Military Coup,” Naval Postgraduate School thesis (2012), 74; 
Steven I. Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan,” 
Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 208. 
 
3 
responses.6 Further, there has been little effort to understand the implications of military 
loyalty shifts for a country’s civil-military relations and democratization prospects. 
In this dissertation, I provide a new framework for understanding military 
involvement in political change that addresses these questions. I focus on two key sources 
of military authority, that delegated by the regime and that produced by its functional 
capacity. I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes 
to anti-regime protesters when regimes have threatened them. Regime failure to maintain 
popular support threatens delegated authority, and if the regime has used coup-proofing 
that threatens functional authority, the military may defect. The likelihood of military 
loyalty shifts is also affected by characteristics of the protest movement. If the movement 
is nonviolent and widely supported, it is more likely to be seen as a better partner than the 
regime for maintaining military authority. Finally, the type of military loyalty shift – in 
particular, whether the military shifts loyalty as a united or fragmented organization – 
impacts democratic outcomes. A fragmented military response is less likely to challenge 
the new civilian regime.   
The conflicting expectations of different literatures about the military’s role in 
democratization motivated this study. I set out to understand the conditions under which a 
military is more likely to use its leverage as guardian of the state to support protester-led 
                                                 
6 Holger Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes 
amid the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2015): 36-54; Terence Lee, Defect or Defend: 
Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2014); Michael Makara, “Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring,” Defense and 
Security Analysis 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-23; Julien Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military 
Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo,” Democratization 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80; Philipp 
M. Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection 
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” International Interactions 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75; Sharon 
Erickson Nepstad, “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 
(2013): 337-349. 
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regime change that results in democratization. I focus on two specific questions: 1) Why 
do militaries shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of anti-
regime protests and not others? 2) Why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic 
change? 
My findings improve our understandings of the military in politics in two ways. 
First, they spell out a novel logic for why the military (or parts of it) may shift loyalty 
from a regime during some nonviolent regime challenges. Second, they demonstrate 
reason to question the civil-military relations literature’s starting point that democracy 
requires civilian control of the military regardless of the quality of civilians. Kohn, for 
instance, argues that the normative goal is “…to make the military establishment 
politically neutral, and to prevent or preclude any possibility of military intervention in 
political life.”7 But I show that when a regime behaves in such a way as to lose popular 
support and diminish functional capacities, political judgment by the military can, under 
some circumstances, set the country on a more democratic path.  I use the rest of this 
chapter to establish this study’s place in existing work, briefly introduce my argument, 
and preview the types of evidence I have collected in support of it. 
The Military’s Political Impact and Democratization 
Research on the role of the military in political change spans a number of fields, 
including civil-military relations, democratization, and civil resistance. From above, this 
scholarly work is in agreement that the military is an important political actor, but in 
tension over whether the military can be supportive of democratic change. Civil-military 
relations scholars view the civilian control of the military necessary for democratic 
                                                 
7 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 141. 
 
5 
political systems as “…absolute and all-encompassing.”8 The pacted democracy literature 
acknowledges a military may pose challenges to democratization, but points to cases 
where the military and other elites supported democratic transitions to preserve their 
interests. Research on civil resistance demonstrates the importance of nonelites in 
political change, and that the response of militaries is often crucial for movements’ 
outcomes. Here, I further develop this theoretical puzzle. How might we understand 
military support for peaceful political change given the harmful effects military 
intervention in politics can have on democracy?  
The civil-military relations literature’s principle concern with the military in 
politics is whether or not the military is under civilian control, or the military acts within 
the authority delegated it by civilians. Civilian control of the military is defined and 
measured in a number of ways, from an absence of coups to military compliance with 
civilian orders and civilian policymaking free from military influence.9 A key claim of 
the literature is that democratic governance requires civilian control of the military, a 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organization with coercive capabilities.10 As Croissant and 
Kuehn state, “The very idea of democratic rule, understood as political participation and 
control by the governed, presupposes that democratically-elected governments and 
parliaments have the ability to decide policies without undue influence by nondemocratic 
                                                 
8 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 142. 
 
9 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211-41. 
 
10 Felipe Aguero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South 
America,” International Studies Review 42, no. 2 (1998): 383-404. 
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veto players such as the military.”11 Lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of 
democracy, including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal 
accountability.12  
Following this, democratization requires civilians control the military. Much 
research centers on how transitioning democracies establish civilian control, especially 
when militaries have exercised substantial political power in the authoritarian regimes.13 
Militaries in these contexts are accustomed to acting politically and gaining or claiming 
institutional and individual benefits.14 As powerful actors, militaries can exercise 
significant influence over transitions from authoritarianism, making it difficult for 
civilians in new democracies to establish control.15 In turn, new democracies that are 
unable to establish civilian control suffer “...stagnation and regress in democratic 
consolidation and sometimes even...democratic breakdown.”16  
Overall, the literature concludes that military involvement in politics and 
particularly the transition from authoritarianism threatens democratization. Even if the 
military does not seize power, concerns remain regarding the role of the military in 
                                                 
11 Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New 
Democracies,” Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (2009): 189. 
 
12 Paul Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military 
in Emerging Democracies,” Democratization 17, no. 5 (2010): 960.  
 
13 Elizabeth P. Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case,” Armed Forces and Society 
24, no. 4 (1998): 519-33. 
 
14 Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” 141; Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-
ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 935. 
 
15 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the 
Southern Cone (Princeton University Press, 1988). 
 
16 Chambers et al., “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in 
Emerging Democracies,” 960. 
 
7 
democracy and its consolidation: “…will [the military] obey its civilian masters or will it 
use its considerable coercive power to resist civilian direction and pursue its own 
interests?”17 The field is skeptical that the military may help to bring about regime 
change that is democratic, in contrast to the pacted transitions and civil resistance 
literatures. It is thus a foil to my research because I seek to better understand the 
conditions under which a military can support democratic change by supporting anti-
regime protesters.  
The literature on pacted transitions to democracy also demonstrates the military 
has impacts on political change. However, one of its major insights is that this impact is 
potentially positive. Scholarly analyses of third wave transitions in Latin American and 
Southern Europe conclude that splits between authoritarian regime hardliners and 
softliners can lead to negotiations between regime and opposition elites, results in 
strategic agreements, or pacts, for political change.18 In many cases, it is crucial that 
among the softliners are military officers to support liberalization against potential coup 
attempts by other regime elites.19 A military may believe its interest in a stable state with 
a functioning government is best served by a new democratic regime; “[p]aradoxically 
but predictably, democratic elections are thus often part of the extrication strategy of 
military institutions that feel threatened by their prominent role in nondemocratic 
                                                 
17 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 215.  
 
18 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
 
19 Ibid., 16-22. 
 
8 
regimes.”20 Pacts can increase a military’s willingness to support democratization and 
facilitate transitions by allowing the military to preserve its political, economic, or other 
interests during the transition and under the new regime.21  
As a powerful elite, the military can exercise great influence over pacts and the 
transition from authoritarianism.22 Yet it can also facilitate the transition, in part because 
it is an actor with a permanent institutional role, separate from any role in politics. In 
some Latin American military regimes, for example, the military gave up power and 
democratized so that it could return to the barracks.23 Militaries in those and other 
transitions came to believe democratization was acceptable, especially when the 
opposition was largely moderate and nonviolent and holding on to power would be costly 
to the institution.24 On the basis of this research, the military may be supportive of 
democratic transitions.  
The civil resistance literature recognizes the role of the military in political 
change through different means. Democratization in these analyses occurs not through 
elite-led negotiations, but mobilized citizens pressuring authoritarian regimes and elites 
                                                 
20 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 67. 
 
21 Bruce W. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military (Praeger, 
1996); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 
(1990): 1-21; Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in 
Brazil and Spain,” in Political Liberalization in Brazil: Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future edited by Wayne 
Seclher (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986): 175-215. 
 
22 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” Issues in Democratic Consolidation: 
The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (1992): 17-56. 
 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, “How Countries Democratize,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 4 (1991): 
584. 
 
24 John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead. Towards Democratic Viability: The Bolivian Experience 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Labor Movements in Transitions to 
Democracy: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 4 (1989): 445-72. 
 
9 
toward change. The military has long been recognized as an important elite in this regard. 
According to Sharp, protesters should seek to remove the authoritarian regime’s pillars of 
support, including the military, to increase their likelihood of success.25 Analyses of 
successful cases demonstrate that the military’s decision to shift support to the protesters 
is often significant to these movements’ outcomes.26 Compared to violent campaigns, 
civil resistance is more likely to achieve its aims in part because it is more likely to 
generate military loyalty shifts.27 Nonviolent campaigns are 46 times more likely to 
succeed when security force defections occur.28 This scholarship demonstrates the 
military may support democratization when it chooses to support protest movements for 
regime change.  
In sum, these literatures address the military’s role in political change but reach 
different conclusions about whether a role outside of civilian delegated authority can be 
supportive of democracy. For the civil-military relations literature, the military must be 
put under civilian control so it does not threaten the democratic transition or prevent 
democratic consolidation. Yet civilian control may not be a necessary precursor to 
democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civilian resistance literatures. 
Recognizing militaries have sources of authority other than delegated challenges the 
civil-military relations’ claim and is key to understanding why militaries sometimes 
                                                 
25 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973). 
 
26 Barany, “The Role of the Military”; Paul J. D’Anieri, “Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-
Communist Revolutions,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 331-50; Rizal Sukma 
“Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions,” in Military Engagement: 
Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions edited by Dennis Blair 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2013): 113-38. 
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support anti-regime protests, and when this support is more likely to lead to 
democratization.  
Existing Explanations of Military Loyalty Shifts 
Though relatively nascent, a body of scholarship is developing in response to the 
findings of Chenoweth and Stephan29 and others to explain military loyalty shifts during 
popular challenges to authoritarian regimes. Here I briefly organize and summarize the 
existing work, some of which I deal with in more detail in later chapters. The analyses all 
focus to some extent on the impact of regime-military relations on military loyalty. 
However, the cases they select for analysis lead to different accounts of how various 
factors explain their outcomes of interest. I draw on some of this scholarship in making 
my argument, but expand on its efforts in two ways: 1) I propose a more general 
argument for the impact of regime control of the military, based in the sources of military 
authority, and 2) I consider both the regime and the protest movement for their impacts 
on these sources of authority.30 My argument applies to and is explanatory of a wider 
range of cases and outcomes as a consequence.  
Some analyses focus on a regime’s provision of financial and political benefits 
that become uncertain during challenges to its rule to explain military loyalty shifts at the 
individual level. Regimes can incentivize loyalty, but individual soldiers will defect if 
they believe the regime is at risk of falling. Nepstad makes this argument for military 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 This aligns with Morency-Laflamme’s recent call to consider both military and opposition characteristics 
instead of one or the other in explaining military defections. Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: 
Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and Togo,” 2. 
 
11 
defections across the Arab Spring cases of Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria.31 The regime-
military relationship here primarily affects individual soldiers’ motivations for disloyalty, 
and defections occur as a series of individual loyalty shifts. However, it is unclear from 
this explanation how such defections spread and to whom, and what might explain 
variation across individual soldiers’ decisions.  
Other explanations analyze defections as loyalty shifts by particular groups within 
the military. These accounts are based largely on the Arab Spring or MENA cases, where 
regimes structure the military in ways that incentivize loyalty on the basis of identity 
group membership.32 In the face of mass protests, these militaries should exhibit in-group 
loyalty and out-group defection, especially if the uprising is along ethnic lines. Even if in-
groups are motivated to be disloyal, they will remain committed to regime strength 
because they do not have a future apart from the regime.33 This is not always the case, 
though, as demonstrated by the recent experience of Burundi. In the spring 2015 protests 
against President Pierre Nkurunziza, it was his ally and fellow Hutu, Major General 
Godefroid Niyombare, that spearheaded an attempt by dissident soldiers to prevent him 
from attempting an unconstitutional third term.34  
In some analyses, militaries (or parts of them) shift loyalty because the regimes 
have used divide and rule tactics to create incentives for loyalty among the winners. 
These regimes create loyalty ties rather than exploit existing identity links, and focus 
                                                 
31 Nepstad, “Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring.” 
 
32 Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics 
42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50. 
 
33 Makara, “Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring.” 
 
34 Tomas Van Acker, “Understanding Burundi’s Predicament,” Africa Policy Brief 11 (2015). 
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their efforts on the relatively small groups in the upper ranks that could most easily pose 
a challenge to them – generating discontent in the rest of the military. Lee argues that use 
of such strategies by President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and President Suharto 
in Indonesia led the losing factions to defect in hopes of improving their professional 
prospects and the military institution’s overall standing.35 In these explanations, a 
military shifts loyalty because of how the regime has structured the military organization 
rather than individual concerns or group identities. Defections take the form of 
significant, though often disunited, loyalty shifts.  
Finally, some analyses explain loyalty shifts by the full military, such as observed 
in Egypt 2011. Here, the focus tends to be on regime-military relations that provide for 
military autonomy. The causal mechanism is not incentives to remain loyal, but 
institutional capacity to defect. Albrecht points to segregation of the regime and military 
in explaining Egyptian defections versus Syrian loyalty (though not acknowledging that 
sections of the Syrian military did shift loyalty).36 Lutscher makes a similar ability-based 
argument, claiming that levels of force fragmentation make it easier for some militaries to 
defect.37 These accounts give little attention to military motivations for disloyalty, 
focusing instead on the ability of full militaries to defect. Such full defections, though 
                                                 
35 Terence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” Comparative Political 
Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69; Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in 
Authoritarian Asia. 
 
36 Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the 
Arab Uprisings.” 
 
37 Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection during 
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highly consequential, are relatively uncommon; a military or parts of it may shift loyalty 
in other ways.  
Overall, existing explanations for military loyalty shifts in response to anti-regime 
protests center on regime-military relations. Depending on the structure of these relations 
and the incentives they generate, the military or parts of it will be motivated and/or able 
to defect. The analyses’ specific arguments, though, depend in large part on case 
selection. This limits their explanations to particular types, and perhaps instances, of 
military loyalty shifts. Additionally, they mostly fail to address variation across protest 
movements as a potential explanatory factor. This gap is in fact the motivation for 
Morency-Laflamme’s recent study.38 In it, he argues that the decision of a military to 
defect is determined by both the regime’s control policies (in particular, its use of 
counterforces) and the opposition’s ability to provide credible promises regarding future 
military interests. Empirically, it is a comparative case study limited to loyalty in Togo 
1990-1993 and defections in Benin 1989-1990. Morency-Laflamme concludes that future 
research should apply a framework of military and opposition characteristics to additional 
cases.39  
I propose an argument that brings together the existing explanations to understand 
how the structure of regime-military relations and the characteristics of protest 
movements impact the motivations and ability of the military to shift loyalty. I start by 
recognizing that militaries respond to anti-regime protests in ways besides loyalty or 
defection, with types of loyalty shifts that involve the military organization differently. 
                                                 
38 Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin and 
Togo.”  
 
39 Ibid., 11. 
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As concerns strategies of regime control, I do not focus on one means of coup-proofing 
over another (e.g. ethnic stacking versus counterbalancing), but consider them as a whole 
for their effects on the military’s core interests and authority claims. Finally, I bring in 
the protest movement by considering it as an alternative to the regime in the context of 
challenges to the regime’s legitimacy and threats to the military’s sources of authority.  
Military Authority and Defections 
My argument follows the extant scholarship’s focus on regime-military relations, 
but is rooted in the bases of military authority as affected by the regime and protesters. 
Militaries gain authority in many ways, but two are especially consequential. First, 
militaries are delegated authority by civilian leaders, and by extension, the population. 
Second, militaries gain authority by virtue of their functional role in society, or their 
involvement in the provision of order and stability. A military has maximum authority 
when legitimate civilian leaders delegate it authority, and a secure state confirms its 
functional capabilities.  
However, civilian leaders, particularly autocrats, often structure delegation to 
protect the regime at the expense of military functional capabilities. Personnel decisions 
that reward loyalty over merit, counterbalancing using other security forces, and other 
forms of coup-proofing compromise the military’s functional capacity and introduce 
tensions between its delegated and functional authority. In other words, the military is 
delegated authority by a regime that has hurt its capabilities and threatened its functional 
authority. In these circumstances, the military’s delegated authority becomes especially 
important, yet depends on the regime’s ability to maintain its power. When the regime 
faces challenges culminating in mass protests against its rule, I argue that the military is 
15 
more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority by removing loyalty from the 
regime or shifting loyalty to the protesters.  
This logic follows existing work in arguing that regime-military relations impact 
military responses to anti-regime protests. I go further by contending that particular forms 
of regime control (such as coup-proofing) matter most because their impacts on 
functional capacity affect the military’s authority. Militaries gain authority by virtue of 
their capacity to create and maintain societal order, and thus both value and have 
institutional interests in the conditions necessary for this.40 Mass protests against the 
regime challenge its legitimacy, and thus the legitimacy of the military’s delegated 
authority. They also further call into question the regime’s support for military functional 
capacity in providing for a secure society. The military has less delegated and functional 
authority as a result of these regime-military relations in the context of mass protests, and 
is more likely to shift loyalty.  
My argument also gives special attention to the protesters, as the individuals and 
groups to which the military may shift its loyalty. Because militaries are concerned with 
both their delegated and functional sources of authority, it matters whether the protesters 
are likely to be more legitimate (and thus a different source of delegated authority) and 
better partners in providing for stability and security (and thus supportive of rather than a 
threat to functional authority). The military is most likely to defect if the protesters are 
committed to nonviolence and widely supported.  
These factors may make overall loyalty shifts more likely. However, it is clear 
from the cases noted at the beginning and of interest in the extant scholarship that 
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militaries often do not fully defect or fully remain loyal. Existing research tends to 
broadly conceptualize both defections and loyalty, lumping together all significant shifts 
and low level shifts with loyalty. The analyses of regime-military relations and defections 
thus explain a limited amount of variation in military responses to anti-regime protests. In 
this work, I leverage my argument’s various implications for military sources of authority 
and the military as an organization to explain types of military loyalty shifts.  
While military loyalty shifts are often crucial to the success of anti-regime protest 
movements, their impacts on democratization are uncertain. Specifying the possible 
military responses also helps me to explain when military shifts of support are more 
likely to lead to democratic change. For this secondary outcome of interest, I argue that 
democratization is more likely when military loyalty shifts are significant but fragmented. 
In these cases, the military acts in favor of regime change, but is less able to exercise 
influence over the transition compared to militaries that defect as unified organizations.  
My argument generates the following general hypotheses:  
Militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty from the regime when the regime has 
threatened military functional and delegated authority. 
Military loyalty shifts are more likely to lead to democratic outcomes when they 
are significant but fragmented.  
In later chapters, I further detail these hypotheses and their observable 
implications and test them through regression analysis, qualitative comparative analysis, 
and case studies.  
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Empirical Strategy and Justification 
My primary method of empirically evaluating this argument is a large-N cross-
national statistical analysis. I collected quantitative data for my independent and 
dependent variables for 154 cases of major anti-regime protests and use various 
regression techniques to test my hypotheses while controlling for potential alternative 
explanations or confounding factors.41 The 154 cases that constitute my universe of 
analysis are campaigns included in the Major Episodes of Contention (MEC) Data 
Project.42 They are the dataset’s Category 4 episodes, defined as coordinated campaigns 
with more than 1,000 observed participants and the goal of removing the incumbent 
regime, from 1946-2015. Using MEC’s standards as a strategy for selecting my cases 
ensures I test my argument on a wide range of anti-regime protest movements. It also 
preempts the charge that I am only considering the sorts of protests where my argument 
might be most likely to hold. I address possible problems with this strategy in Chapter 
Three, but for now it is sufficient to note that the cases are comparable episodes of anti-
regime campaigns that vary across space and time. Further, their maximalist 
categorization means they are the type of protests to which the military is likely to 
respond, with important consequences.  
I limit my study to nonviolent campaigns, for several reasons. First, nonviolent 
and violent campaigns differ on many of the attributes I wish to hold more or less 
constant in my analysis: the nature of the challenge they pose to the regime;43 their types 
                                                 
41 The main analyses include only non-democratic cases, which number 112. 
 
42 “Major Episodes of Contention Data Project.” 
  
43 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, 42. 
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and levels of participation;44 and their participants’ strategies.45 Including violent 
campaigns would therefore complicate my analysis and conclusions. Second, my 
argument applies to nonviolent campaigns, as the sorts of regime challenges likely to 
offer the military an alternative in terms of authority. Violent campaigns by definition 
threaten societal stability and security and thus military functional authority, and so I 
would not expect loyalty shifts. In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan find that violent 
campaigns are unlikely to generate security force defections.46 While it would be 
interesting to interrogate variation in military responses across such cases, I bracket that 
research question for another study. Chenoweth and Stephan also find that defections 
have less of an impact on the success of violent compared to nonviolent campaigns;47 
consequently they are less inherently interesting in this context.  
The results of the regression analyses suggest support for my argument and its 
empirical expectations. Measures of coup-proofing increase the likelihood of defections, 
as do measures related to the protest movement. The effects of these variables are greater 
when I interact them, with each other (to assess conditional effects) and with other factors 
that make the regime’s threats to military functional capacity more evident, such as recent 
military defeat. The results also support my hypotheses related to types of military loyalty 
shifts: greater threats to military functional authority are associated with higher level 
loyalty shifts, mediated by the effects of coup-proofing on the military organization and 
the role of the protest movement. Lastly, though military loyalty shifts have only small 
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effects on democratization outcomes independent of campaign outcomes, fragmented 
shifts consistently have a more positive impact than others.  
I also use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to test my argument for military 
loyalty shifts. Regression analyses of my full set of cases allows me to establish 
relationships between my independent and dependent variables and compare their 
strengths to standards of statistical significance. As I detail in Chapter Two, however, my 
hypotheses imply that contingent combinations of variables produce loyalty shifts. 
Basically, I argue that regime control strategies combine with protester characteristics to 
produce threats to military authority, and these relationships are context-specific in their 
effects on loyalty shifts. QCA uses Boolean algebra to assess such combinations and 
determine conditions’ necessity and sufficiency for the outcomes. The results are in line 
with my theoretical expectations, and make clear the strengths of a conjunctural approach 
to analyzing causation. QCA is also appropriate for small- to medium- numbers of 
observations. I use QCA after applying additional scope conditions to my universe of 
cases, resulting in an especially comparable subset. 
 Lastly, I evaluate evidence for my arguments for loyalty shift and their impacts on 
democratization through three case studies that I introduce below.  
Introduction to the Case Studies 
 Chapters Six through Eight are case studies of major anti-regime protests in Mali 
1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990, and Peru 2000. They are tests of my theory because I 
focus on the independent variables’ causal relationships with the dependent variables, 
while identifying and examining mechanisms.48 I selected the three cases because they 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 301. 
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exhibit diverse values on the main explanatory variable of threats to military functional 
authority. Through them, I test my argument across the range of variation in these 
threats.49 The outcomes in the first stage of analysis – types of military loyalty shifts – 
become diverse values on the explanatory variable for democratization outcomes. Case 
studies involve in-depth research that leverages a variety of descriptive evidence for 
causal inference.50 My observations for each case demonstrate the effects of regime 
control and protester characteristics on military authority, and the military organization 
on democracy, in ways I cannot measure or infer using probabilistic statistics or Boolean 
analysis. 
I summarize the main explanatory variable’s values, or the levels of threat, as well 
as other relevant information across the cases in Table 1. In brief, threats to military 
functional authority were greatest in Mali, where President Moussa Traore’s coup-
proofing compromised military capacities as evident in its loss to the Tuareg rebels. This 
case therefore demonstrates how this level of threat can bring about united defections in 
response to large protests. The Malian military leadership was then able to influence the 
democratic transition through its role in the interim government. 
The nature of threats to military functional authority were similar in Bangladesh 
under President Hussain Muhammad Ershad and Peru under President Alberto Fujimori. 
Both regimes exhibited personalist control, valuing regime security through personal 
loyalty over military institutional concerns. This coup-proofing strategy weakened the 
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military organizations and generated discontent among the non-favored factions. In 
response to anti-Ershad protests, the Bangladesh military fragmented, with mostly junior 
officers shifting loyalty against some senior generals. It remained disunited and out of 
politics in the years after the regime’s fall. In Peru, Fujimori’s control did not extend into 
the military’s efforts in the rural conflict against the Shining Path. Threats to military 
functional authority were least in this case because the Peruvian military was functionally 
effective. It had some authority on which to draw during the anti-Fujimori protests, and 
only a small section of low-ranking officers and the rank and file shifted loyalty. The 
military overall had little role in Fujimori’s overthrow and the subsequent political 
transition.  
The protest movements in the three cases do not have much independent effect on 
the types of loyalty shifts. This in line with the findings of the other methods, protest size 
in particular moderates the impact of levels of threat to military functional authority. 
Large protests likely helped to bring about united defections in Mali, and might have 
influenced the military responses in Bangladesh and Peru. However, the key factor for 
the outcomes is functional threat level. In the course of research, I also uncovered 
potential confounding variables. I note them here but ultimately conclude they do not 
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Table 1. Summary of case study arguments and findings 
  Mali Bangladesh Peru  
Value on IV 
Great threats to 
military functional 
authority (ICP, PCP, 
recent loss) 
Medium threats to 
military functional 
authority (PCP) 
Low threats to 
military functional 
authority (PCP but 







Large, but major 
divisions 












and senior military 
officials' involvement 
Outcome 1 United defections 
Fragmented high level 
shifts 












Other cases besides these three might also have qualified as diverse types, 
according to Seawright and Gerring’s standards. I selected these three according to 
criteria for influential cases as well. Within influential cases, they are crucial and least 
likely because I use them to test whether “…the hypothesized relationship between X and 
Y holds even though background factors (Z) predict otherwise.”51 The cases involve 
powerful militaries outside of civilian control that might not at first glance be expected to 
support popular and nonviolent political change and democratization. They are also cases 
for which there is sufficient information for research, but less has been written on 
military responses and their importance for protest movements and political change.52 
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52 This is in contrast to, for example, the anti-Suharto campaign in Indonesia, the People Power Revolution 
in the Philippines, the Color Revolutions, and the Arab Spring cases. 
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Theoretical and Methodological Contributions 
This work brings together the literature on civil-military relations, 
democratization, and civil resistance. It seeks to further our understanding of when a 
military is more likely to support anti-authoritarian regime protesters and support 
democratization. The military’s role in political change and democratic transitions has 
long been considered by the democratization literature, but not in the context of anti-
regime protests, and in a mostly indirect way by the civil resistance literature. Further, 
recent interest in military involvement in the Arab Spring and military intervention in a 
number of Third Wave democracies has generated a new wave of civil-military relations 
research.53 I look to contribute to this large and growing body of work.  
I particularly look to challenge some of the civil-military relations field’s major 
claims. Unlike the democratization and civil resistance literatures, which acknowledge 
the military’s potential in supporting political change, the civil-military relations 
literature holds that a politically active military undermines civilian control and the 
prospects for democracy. The field is unable to explain why a military acting outside its 
delegated authority can be supportive of democracy, given that the principle of civilian 
control is “…civilians have a right to be wrong.”54 My research demonstrates that in the 
context of major protests against an illegitimate authoritarian regime, some forms of 
military action can increase the likelihood of democratization. Further, the nature of 
authoritarian regime control varies and impacts military responses to protests. Militaries 
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that remove support from such regimes are acting politically, yet may also be supporting 
democracy.  
I argue that the authority delegated to a military from the regime is ultimately 
rooted in the population, and that there is a distinction between this delegated authority 
and a military’s functional authority. This distinction opens up the possibility that a 
military acting outside its delegated authority and in favor of its functional authority can 
lead to democratic political change. Through this argument, I develop and defend a more 
nuanced view of the various impacts militaries have on politics – following evidence 
from work on elite-and mass-led democratization that the military’s role can be crucial. 
In doing so, I answer why a military might shift support from the regime to a protest 
movement, and when these shifts might lead to democracy, against the expectations that a 
military acting against regime control is consistently problematic for democratization.  
I test my primary argument against three forms of evidence: large-N statistical 
analysis; medium-N qualitative comparative analysis; and case studies. This combination 
is valuable, given the relatively small number of observations in my universe of cases and 
the need to both establish correlations and trace causality. They are also appropriate for 
my argument. The statistical analysis allows me to assess the overall strength of my 
explanatory variables’ relationship to the dependent variables. The qualitative 
comparative analysis is fitting for the combinatorial nature of the causal conditions and 
the outcomes. Finally, the case studies support the large-N and mid-range findings by 
examining in more detail how variation in the regime’s threat to military functional 
authority explains the extent of the military’s shift of support to the protest movement, as 
well as how its response impacted post-campaign democracy.  
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As part my research, I developed a new dataset that collects and codes military 
responses to all cases of mass anti-regime protests from 1946 to 2015. I describe the 
categories of the response variable and my coding rules later in the dissertation. This 
approach to understanding military loyalty shifts greatly expands the available data on 
military defections, broadly conceptualized, and was necessary for the empirical 
evaluation of my argument.  
Policy Implications 
Over the last decade, observers of democracy such as Freedom House have 
expressed concern with a global decline in democratic rights and pace of democratic 
expansion.55 At the same time, nonviolent campaigns for political change, though more 
common, have been less likely to succeed.56 Given the finding that successful campaigns 
are more likely than other forms of contention to lead to peaceful and stable 
democratization, and the positive relationship between military loyalty shifts and 
campaign success, this work has important implications for popular demands for 
democracy. Understanding why some militaries may be more likely to shift their loyalty 
from authoritarian regimes and how the form this shift takes impacts campaign success 
and democratization is valuable knowledge for those engaged in civil resistance and those 
who seek to support them.  
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A related trend also of interest to policymakers is the decline in the number of 
military coups.57 This development is viewed positively by observers of democracy and 
civil-military relations. Coups are the clearest and most dramatic indicator of an absence 
of civilian control of the military, and can be especially threatening to liberalizing or 
newly democratic regimes. However, these observers may fail to recognize that a military 
choosing to remain loyal to a civilian, authoritarian regime, in the context of major anti-
regime protests, is also a form of military political action. A military in this situation may 
remain under civilian control, but in doing so support the regime’s efforts to repress and 
frustrate the protesters’ demands for democratic change. My research’s theoretical 
contributions challenge this narrow understanding.  
National governments and regional and international organizations have been 
deliberate in their efforts to reduce the likelihood of coups, by refusing to recognize 
governments put in power by coups or halting aid or other benefits to militaries involved 
in coups.58 Perhaps a better understanding of defections, as another form of military 
political action, can provide an additional point of leverage for these actors over the 
military with the goal of promoting democracy. My empirical findings show that military 
action in this form – military support of protesters, through particular types of military 
loyalty shifts – is important to democratization. 
                                                 
57 Duncan McCargo, “Are Military Coups Going Out of Style?”, Institute for Advanced Study, 
https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2016/mccargo-coups. 
 
58 Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 44, 
no. 4 (2014): 799-825; Jonathan Powell et al., “Combating Coups d’etat in Africa, 1950-2014,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 51, no. 4 (2016): 482-502. 
27 
Roadmap for the Dissertation 
In Chapter Two, I develop my argument for military defections. I also describe 
the main outcome of interest, types of military loyalty shifts, and explain how my 
argument for general defections applies to shifts as they vary in terms of the military 
organization’s involvement. I test the resulting hypotheses using statistical analyses of 
quantitative data in Chapter Three. I test the argument as one of necessary and sufficient 
conditions through qualitative comparative analysis in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five, I 
present the argument for the impact of types of military loyalty shifts on democratization 
outcomes, and then assess the empirical evidence for it with quantitative analyses. 
Chapter Six through Eight are the case studies of Mali, Bangladesh, and Peru. I conclude 
the dissertation with Chapter Nine. 
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CHAPTER TWO: AUTHORITY THREATS AND MILITARY DEFECTIONS 
 
In this chapter, I provide an argument for why some militaries shift their loyalty 
from authoritarian regimes to anti-regime protest movements. The argument also 
attempts to explain the type of military shifts of support. In other words, it provides 
answers to two questions: overall, why does a military shift support from the regime; and 
why do shifts vary in the extent and quality of the military organization’s involvement? 
As introduced in the previous chapter, I will make the case that militaries are more likely 
to respond to protests with loyalty shifts, or defections, when a regime has threatened the 
sources of military authority (which link to societal stability and security) and anti-regime 
protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority.  
This argument applies to a range of military loyalty shifts. Scholarly attempts at 
understanding military defections generally are important and relatively underdeveloped. 
However, observers have described a variety of behaviors as defection-like in analyses of 
military responses to anti-regime protests: military defections in the form of neutrality 
during the anti-Milosevic campaign in Serbia,59 soldiers’ rebellion and then a coup by 
                                                 
59 Mark R. Thompson, “Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October,” Journal of Democracy 15 no. 
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junior officers as part of the Carnation Revolution,60 and a military that was active in 
persuading the king to give up power in Nepal in 2006.61 I contend that it is necessary to 
re-conceptualize military defections on the basis of the extent and quality of the military 
organization’s disloyalty. My argument’s focus on military sources of authority has a 
number of implications that I leverage to explain different types of military loyalty shifts.  
I develop the argument in the following sections. First, I explain my overall 
argument for why a military will be more likely to shift its loyalty from the authoritarian 
regime in response to anti-regime protests. Second, I define the main outcome of interest 
in this study – types of military loyalty shifts – including the concept’s theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings. I also compare this outcome to those in the existing defections 
scholarship. Lastly, I draw on my general argument to explain the types of military 
loyalty shifts.  
General Argument 
 Militaries, as guardians of the state, have two primary sources of authority – the 
authority delegated to them by civilian leaders (and by extension, the population) and the 
authority tied to their functional role in providing for societal security. Military delegated 
authority is the authority allowed them by civilians to carry out their missions as 
specialists in violence.62 Civilians delegate militaries both the coercive power and 
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responsibility to provide security. Military functional authority is the authority that is 
produced when militaries carry out their missions competently.63 Civil-military relations 
involves the delegation of authority to a military organization that gains functional 
authority when it uses its expertise efficiently.64    
Militaries have maximum authority when they are delegated authority by a 
legitimate government and that authority provides them the capacity to protect society. 
The military’s primary missions (for which civilians delegate it authority) are national 
defense and internal order, but national security may come to involve defense of the 
broader public interest, as well.65 The outcomes of a military’s two sources of authority 
working in the same direction – a legitimate government and effective military – is 
therefore a stable and secure society, which is the military’s ultimate interest.  
Militaries’ interest in their capacity to create order holds regardless of level of 
military “professionalism”, or whether or not the military is grounded in the Western 
civil-military experience.66 Non-Western militaries have long been an area of attention 
                                                 
63 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Robert L. Peabody, “Perceptions of Organizational 
Authority: A Comparative Analysis,” Administrative Science Quarterly 6, no. 4 (1962): 425-426. 
 
64 Avant, “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil-Military Relations,” 375-388. 
 
65 Martin C. Needler, “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power,” Latin American Research Review 10, 
no. 3 (1975): 67-72. 
 
66 “Military professionalism” is a difficult concept to define and its meaning and relation to civilian control 
is the subject of a longstanding debate within the civil-military relations literature (see for example 
Huntington and Janowitz’s conflicting understandings). A “professional” military need not remain 
politically neutral. Rather, “professionalism” can refer to “...the appointment of more competent 
commanding officers, the widespread emergence of spirit de corps, and the development of much greater 
cohesion among the ranks of officers and soldiers” (Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and 
Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 1 (2000): 81). 
Importantly, I do not assume all militaries have these characteristics. I do assume (drawing on existing 




for their involvement in the political and economic development of their respective 
countries.67 Analyses of them generally start with the claim that militaries want societal 
stability. Needler, for example, posits an “institutional interest” argument to explain 
military behavior in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.68 A military’s purpose is 
to produce external and internal security, and fulfilling it can motivate support for, or 
overthrow, of the civilian regime.69  
The creation of order by militaries may involve them playing a functional role in 
society that goes beyond professionalism in external defense.70 From Stepan, militaries 
sometimes also use their expertise to provide for “…internal security and national 
development.” This “new professionalism” role and the authority it generates is common 
in developing countries and present even in developed countries during periods of 
instability. Militaries thus gain functional authority by playing a functional role that 
involves a variety of missions to keep the state secure. Sometimes they fight wars against 
external enemies; other times they engage in domestic development to reform society. 
Because militaries are concerned with stability and security, as organizations they 
seek the delegated authority necessary to perform their functional roles. Their corporate 
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interests involve power, resources, and autonomy. Their specific interests tie to these 
general ones and include the integrity of the military organization; control over military 
rules, education, and personnel decisions; and sufficient military budgets and reasonable 
defense policies.71 As Geddes claims, these interests allow militaries to maintain their 
status, by providing for military effectiveness in their core duties.72 They create the 
conditions for security from internal and external threats and positively impact military 
standing in society. 73 In other words, their fulfillment supports military capacity which 
generate military functional authority.  
Military organizational interests maintain their capacity to provide stability and 
gain functional authority, and are shared by all members. Though some individual 
soldiers may have different, additional interests – like material enrichment – these are 
secondary because they depend on the military’s survival as an organization. Soldiers, as 
part of the military profession, value the military’s organizational interests at least as 
much as other, more narrow concerns.74 Military hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness, 
professional autonomy, and sufficient resources matter not because they are fully realized 
in every military but because they are closely tied to a military’s interests and authority.  
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Yet, a military relies in large part on civilians for its interests. Civilian authorities 
delegate authority to militaries to carry out their functions and guard against threats. 
Some forms of authority delegation support military capacity and functional authority; 
others hurt them. Authoritarian regimes are likely to employ forms that have mixed 
effects because they face two major threats to their rule: control over non-elites and 
power-sharing with other elites. Power-sharing, which involves delegating authority to 
the military, is especially difficult, and historically, authoritarian leaders are most at risk 
of being ousted by military coups.75 Regimes need militaries with enough authority to 
guard against outside threats but not so much that they threaten their rule. This, often 
termed the civil-military problematique,76 applies particularly to authoritarian regimes 
because of the nature of the threats to their rule.  
As a result of this trade off, some regimes seek to structure this delegation and 
overall regime-military relations in ways that the military is less threatening to them. 
These sorts of strategies are often termed “coup-proofing”. They take various forms, all 
with the goal of protecting the regime from military coups. Regimes could provide the 
military additional resources, in hopes of discouraging military disloyalty.77 However, 
resources may increase military coercive capabilities and the likelihood of a successful 
coup, if attempted.78 Regimes consequently tend to concentrate on decreasing military 
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coup propensity by ensuring the loyalty of key personnel and/or obstructing their ability 
to seize power. 
Strategies that establish personal ties of loyalty between the leader and the 
military aim to link the military’s fate to the leader’s security. They primarily involve the 
regime making personnel decisions on the basis of loyalty rather than merit or other 
institutional considerations.79 Accordingly, the regime may stack with military with 
coethnics80 or other loyalists; frequently rotate those in positions of command; purge 
officers, especially those who are competent;81 or divide the military into competing 
factions.82  
 Some regimes form new security forces to counter the military, a strategy known 
as institutional coup-proofing.83 Regimes seek to prevent coups using these “…numerous, 
mutually suspicious rival forces that check and balance one another.”84 The new forces, 
or counterforces, are often primarily composed of loyalists, identity or otherwise.85 In the 
institutional coup-proofing research the particular mechanism through which 
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counterforces prevent coups varies by case and analysis; they generally center on their 
competing interests, which the military must overcome to seize power,86 and the 
coordination problems they create, making plotting and carrying out coups more 
difficult.87 In sum, coup-proofing strategies aim to generate loyalty on the part of sections 
of the military or other security forces and to reduce the threat of disloyalty by other 
sections.  
Regimes that coup-proof thus attempt to balance between delegating the military 
enough authority to fulfill its duties, which may enhance military functional authority, 
and not so much that the military threatens the regime. This is a tough balance to strike, 
and further, research demonstrates that delegating authority through some forms of coup-
proofing has damaging effects on military capabilities and functional authority. Coup-
proofing that involves personal control aimed at guaranteeing loyalty weakens the 
military organization, reducing military effectiveness.90  It puts loyal rather than capable 
personnel in positions of authority, compromises the military hierarchy, and divides the 
military institution. Regimes therefore reduce the risk of coups by reducing military 
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autonomy, strength, and unity – corporate military interests that impact a military’s 
ability to provide for stability and security or play its functional role in society.91  
Institutional coup-proofing undermines military effectiveness, first by producing 
coordination problems. Scholars have found that having a higher number of counterforces 
both makes military coordination more difficult and hurts military performance in civil 
and interstate conflicts.92 Institutional coup-proofing also redirects resources from the 
military to the counterforces, jeopardizing force quality. This “infuriate[s] regular 
military officers”93 and may actually lead to coup attempts.94 Even in the absence of 
conflict, and in addition to causing coordination problems, institutional coup-proofing 
challenges a key interest of the military: its monopoly on the use of force within the 
state.95 In sum, by delegating authority in ways that hurt military institutional interests, 
coup-proofing strategies hurt military capacity and functional authority.  
When military corporate interests (and by extension, military capabilities and 
claims to functional authority) are threatened, militaries often act to protect or enhance 
them. This claim is supported by classic civil-military relations analyses, including 
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Nordlinger97 and Finer.98 According to Needler, explanations of coups must look to the 
“…collective and institutional interests of members of the armed forces themselves.”99 
It is also borne out by recent research that argues coup-proofing is difficult because 
militaries will recognize such regime efforts to diminish their power and move against 
them.100 In terms of the above logic, coup-proofing strategies are regime power grabs of a 
particular kind – through them, the regime attempts to control the military in ways that 
serve the regime’s concerns yet have damaging effects on military functional authority. 
These effects will be more visible following military defeat, and more serious when 
societal stability and security is at risk – such as during challenges to the regime.  
As the source of military delegated authority, regimes also rely on claims to 
authority to justify their positions of power. Authoritarian regimes are not put in power 
through free and fair elections but claim the right to rule based on lineage, religion, or a 
particular political ideology.101 Often these claims take the form of “consequentialist 
arguments”, where autocrats focus on the benefits their rule produces in terms of 
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prosperity and wellbeing.102 The degree of regime authority impacts what a regime has 
available to delegate to the military. The regime’s delegation of authority using coup-
proofing strategies introduces tensions between the military’s delegated and functional 
authority. When the military’s functional authority has been diminished – as a result of 
regime-military relations, and perhaps evident in the military’s failure to maintain 
stability and security – its delegated authority becomes particularly important.  
Yet, delegated authority depends on continued support for the regime from the 
population. Mass protests against the regime challenge its legitimacy and reduce its 
authority. Mass protests are societal unrest of a particular, popular kind that further call 
into question the regime’s support for military functional authority in providing for a 
secure society. The regime is at least partly at fault for the instability, and has already 
threatened military functional capabilities. As the regime fails to maintain its claims to 
authority, the military has less delegated and functional authority.  
Research on military regimes in Latin America supports the claim that a military 
will respond when regime illegitimacy threatens military authority. O’Donnell contends 
that militaries intervened in politics in Cuba, Argentina, and other countries when popular 
discontent with the regime threatened societal security.103 The Argentinian military, for 
example, took power in 1966 to restore social order after the civilian government failed 
to address popular unrest resulting from economic crisis.104 In similar instances of 
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popular discontent due to governance failures, militaries have felt justified in seizing 
power.105 Other classic analyses of military coups make related points, arguing that 
militaries are more likely to attempt coups when regimes are ineffective and 
illegitimate,106 when military organizational interests are at risk,107 and during periods of 
social instability.108  
In response to protests, a regime may attempt to delegate some of its remaining 
authority to the military in hopes of ending the popular challenge. If the regime first uses 
other security forces, it will expect the military to remain loyal and be ready to support it 
when needed.109 This support often comes in the form of repression of the protesters. 
However, as DeMerrit points out, leaders and their agents of repression can have 
different incentives.110 A similar logic follows from a military’s two sources of authority. 
While protests challenge the regime and the military, military loyalty may further 
compromise both its sources of authority. Support of the regime will not restore the 
functional authority the military has lost due to coup-proofing. Support of the regime may 
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be within its delegated authority, but will ultimately be costly as its source is the 
population.  
The military is more likely to opt to preserve its functional authority – rather than 
rely on the regime’s delegated authority – in these circumstances. This decision can lead 
to loyalty shifts, from the regime to the protesters. Challenges to the regime’s authority 
that confront a military whose functional authority is already diminished and that are 
popular and nonviolent put the military’s delegated authority further in tension with the 
authority derived from its key functional role. This tension opens up the possibility that 
the military may support the protesters as an alternative.  
While military loyalty shifts may be more likely when regimes threaten military 
functional authority, they also depend on whether protest movements are supportive of 
military authority. Protest movements are a better source of delegated authority and less 
threatening to functional authority if they are committed to nonviolence, moderate, 
organized, and have broad membership. Regime challengers that use violence threaten 
societal security and the military’s functional authority. Conversely, research has found 
that nonviolent movements are more likely than other forms of regime contention to 
encourage defection by regime supporters because they are less threatening.111  
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Protest movements also vary in size, with important implications for military 
authority. Larger protests indicate that the regime is highly illegitimate, the movement 
has popular support, and the support comes from diverse social groups and interests.112 
Large protests also signal that the movement is more likely to succeed and the regime is 
at risk of falling. This helps to motivate and coordinate military shifts of support to 
protesters. In research on coups, large protests increase the likelihood of coup attempts by 
helping a military determine the level of societal support for regime change, a key 
determinant of success.113 Further, ending the challenge when protests are large will 
require greater military support of the regime, and put military sources of authority more 
in tension. The above discussion and this logic brings me to my two general hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing 
strategies that threaten military functional authority.  
Hypothesis 2: Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to 
nonviolence and large in size.  
It follows from the first hypothesis that the more the regime has threatened 
military functional authority, the more likely are military loyalty shifts. Authoritarian 
regimes vary in how they structure their authority, including relations with the military, 
and one way of understanding this variation is through regime type. The regime type 
literature classifies regimes according to how regimes get support and exercise authority, 
and on the basis of these differences, explains a number of political outcomes. As 
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concerns military relations, the types of regimes vary in their control of political 
appointments through which they can promote those they trust and security organs with 
which they can punish dissent.114 Regimes whose leaders have higher levels of more 
personal control use it to support their own security. According to the above logic, they 
do so at the expense of military functional authority.  
Personalist regime leaders are likely to employ a form of coup-proofing that 
weakens the military by prioritizing loyalty when delegating authority. They rely on 
smaller coalitions and exercise power as individuals, through personal bonds. Smaller 
coalitions mean the leader is better able to monitor those close to him or her, and to 
ensure their fate is linked to the leader’s survival.115 This sort of control of the military is 
likely to involve non-meritocratic personnel decisions and divide and rule tactics. As a 
result, the military organization is weak and factionalized, with parts of it tied to the 
leader personally and others excluded from the regime coalition and its benefits.  
Hypothesis 1a: Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms 
of control threaten military functional authority.  
Single-party regimes are less likely to coup-proof through personal loyalty ties. In 
these regimes, the leader shares authority with the party and exercises power through its 
organization. Elites are promoted as they rise through the ranks of the party. The regime 
tends to co-opt dissenting factions within the ruling party because the leader cannot rely 
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on his or her own authority to rule.116 This structure of authority relations is paralleled in 
the regime’s control of the military. The leader does not tie the military to himself 
personally; instead using standardized, mostly meritocratic promotion systems.117 
Leaders also do not create intra-military competition by relying on core factions of 
loyalists. Consequently, militaries in single-party regimes are stronger organizationally 
and have some autonomy from the regime and its leader.  
Hypothesis 1b: Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their forms 
of control do not threaten military functional authority.  
Military regimes are by definition headed by military officers, yet they too face 
threats to their security from the rest of the military. Their ubiquity during the 1970s and 
1980s resulted in a wealth of research on the relations between militaries as governments 
and militaries as institutions. Like personalist regimes, military regimes and their leaders 
exercise power through small coalitions.118 However, because these coalitions are made 
up of military officers, coup-proofing is less likely. Leaders will not structure the military 
in ways that damage it as an institution because officers in the coalition can hold them 
accountable.119 Leaders are themselves part of the military, and so coup-proofing will 
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ultimately hurt their interests, too. Military regimes are also less invested in holding on to 
power,120 and will likely be in line with the military in response to a popular challenge.  
Hypothesis 1c: Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of 
control do not threaten military functional authority.  
Given its focus on military capabilities, this argument generates additional 
observable implications and hypotheses for testing. The impacts of regime-military 
relations on military functional authority and military loyalty shifts are especially clear 
when a military has recently been involved in conflict. If the conflict ended in military 
defeat, or another outcome short of military victory, the military’s functional authority 
will be in question. In these circumstances, militaries are more likely to link their poor 
performance in conflict to coup-proofing, given the organizational problems those 
strategies create. Defeat also increases coalition members’ incentives to reevaluate the 
leader’s competence.121  
Hypothesis 3: In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military 
was recently defeated in conflict.  
Ongoing violent conflict may also bring the damaging effects of coup-proofing on 
the military organization into light. However, though conflict could strain regime-military 
relations, the threat will focus the military and it will be less likely to consider or 
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coordinate political change.122 Defeating an enemy requires concentration of state power 
and support for the regime and status quo.123 A specifically domestic violent conflict 
threatens the state and is unambiguously threatening to military functional authority 
because of the instability it generates. The military will focus on deploying its capabilities 
to defeat it, reducing the likelihood of loyalty shifts. Anti-regime campaigns that are 
primarily violent will similarly lead militaries to unite with regimes to counter them.124  
Hypothesis 4: Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing 
conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge.  
I graphically summarize the preceding discussion and logic of my hypotheses 
regarding general military loyalty shifts below, in Figure 1. Next, I address competing 
expectations for the effects of coup-proofing on militaries. Then I consider alternate 
explanations of defections which helps to motivate my discussion of this study’s 
outcomes of interest.  
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Figure 1. General argument for military defections
 
 
Competing Expectations for the Effects of Coup-Proofing 
Above, I argued that the regime’s use of coup-proofing strategies increases the 
likelihood of military disloyalty during anti-regime protests by threatening military 
functional authority. Protest movements that are supportive of military authority will 
further increase the likelihood of loyalty shifts. According to the scholarship on military 
coups, however, military loyalty shifts in the forms of coups involve both disposition and 
ability, and coup-proofing is supposed to reduce both.125 This general claim raises a 
question for my argument: if coup-proofing prevents coups, why does it not prevent 
defections? Key to answering this question is accounting for the context of mass protests. 
Before doing that, I more directly address the literature’s claims.  
The coup scholarship contends some coup-proofing strategies reduce military 
disposition for disloyalty. These involve control over military personnel decisions to 
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structure the military in ways that loyalists with incentives to support the regime are in 
key positions.126 Other strategies aim at reducing the military’s ability. Soldiers need to 
coordinate to launch coups, so regimes establish barriers to communication and 
commitment. They use divide and rule tactics to play military factions off of each other. 
They develop counterforces with competing incentives, so that some soldiers will resist a 
coup attempt.127 These counterforces also help to monitor and punish coup plots. In sum, 
regimes attempt to reduce military disposition and ability to coup by tightly controlling 
the military while delegating it less authority with which it could pose a challenge.128  
Research on the actual effectiveness of coup-proofing is inconclusive. Marcum 
and Brown find that personalist regimes, though more likely to coup-proof, are not less 
likely to experience coup attempts relative to other regime types.129 Some analyses of 
counterbalancing show it reduces the ability of coup plotters and lessens the risk of coup 
attempts.130 Bohmelt and Pilster modify this conclusion slightly, finding a curvilinear 
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(2016): 1-30; see also Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 
(1999): 211-41; Pilster and Bohmelt, “Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1969-
99”; Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the 
Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 4 (2012): 
355-72; Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat”; Quinleven, “Coup-
proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East.” 
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128 Brown, Fariss, and McMahon, “Recouping after Coup- Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness 
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(2016): 256-82. 
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relationship between the number of counterforces and coup attempts.131 In this analysis, 
the most effective regime strategy is to have two armed organizations, because coup 
launchers would have to challenge the coercive capacities of another security 
organization before seeking power. Others, however, challenge this relationship and 
support a linear, more-counterforces-is-better view, though admitting the overall 
quantitative research has produced inconsistent findings.132  
In contrast to the scholarship’s expectations, my logic suggests coup-proofing 
strategies should generate military disloyalty. Coup-proofing, as a form of delegated 
authority, creates discontent and motivates defections because of its impacts on military 
capabilities and functional authority. Coup-proofing that relies on personal loyalty 
weakens the military organization’s autonomy and hierarchy. Coup-proofing through 
counterforces challenges coordination but does not necessarily reduce military loyalty 
shifts because they are unlikely to require the same level of coordination as military 
seizures of power. Further, these threats to military functional authority occur in the 
context of threats to regime legitimacy and military delegated authority. The military may 
be more likely to shift loyalty in response to protest movements as a result. The particular 
forms of coup-proofing the regime uses and the character of the protests might affect the 
type of military loyalty shifts, though, and I take up this point next.  
                                                 
131 Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and 
Coup Outcomes,” International Interactions 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-62. 
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Alternate Explanations of Defections 
Military defections from the regime in response to mass anti-regime protest 
movements are different than military seizures of power through coups, which means 
arguments that apply to coups may apply differently to defections. But observers and 
scholars often use the term defections for military responses that are quite dissimilar. This 
point has not been sufficiently acknowledged by the extant scholarship, and so many of 
the competing explanations of military loyalty shifts are actually explanations of different 
military behaviors. In the following section I detail what I view as the main source of 
disagreement and offer my argument for types of military loyalty shifts as one way to 
deal with it.  
Though much research on the topic remains to be done, existing studies seem to 
divide between arguments that defections are more likely when the military is 
institutionalized (i.e. less coup-proofed, with the key mechanism being autonomy from 
the regime), and that they are more likely when the military is more coup-proofed (the 
key mechanism being divide and rule tactics and the intra-military competition they 
generate). In the first set, militaries defect because they have a future apart from the 
regime, as an independent institution.133 In the second, militaries, specifically “losing” 
                                                 
133 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative 
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57; Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 
(2012): 127-149; Risa Brooks, “Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the 
Ben Ali Regime in January 2011,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 205-220; Derek 
Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 39, 




factions, defect because removing the regime also removes their rivals within the 
military.134  
The two arguments’ competing logics put them at odds. While the first can 
explain why, for example, the full Egyptian military defected from Mubarak in 2011, it 
has difficulty explaining how the split between junior and senior officers in the 
Philippines helped to bring about defections by the junior officers from Marcos during 
the 1986 People Power revolution. The second is useful for understanding why 
marginalized Indonesian officers acted against Suharto in 1998, but cannot explain the 
same behavior against Ben Ali by the full Tunisian military in the Arab Spring. Both note 
the role of the regime’s structuring of the military in explaining disloyalty, but their 
interests in different strategies of control leads them to partial explanations of only some 
outcomes.  
Makara goes some ways in bringing the two logics together by specifying the 
military institutionalization argument and making the case that some control strategies 
affect military motivations while others affect military opportunities.135 This distinction 
parallels that made in the coup scholarship. According to Makara, a military is more 
likely to defect when it is it both motivated by intra-security apparatus competition and 
autonomous from the regime. Though this research is an important contribution, it too 
has limitations, starting with its limited case selection of the Arab Spring militaries. Its 
outcome of interest is defections, broadly defined, which are present in Egypt and Tunisia 
                                                 
134 Terence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule,” Comparative Political 
Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69. 
 
135 Michael Makara, “Rethinking Military Behavior during the Arab Spring,” Defense and Security 
Analysis 32, no. 3 (2016): 209-23. 
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but not in Bahrain and Syria – though loyalty shifts by non-Alawite officers and other 
soldiers in Syria numbered in the thousands and came to significantly impact the course 
of the anti-Assad campaign.136 More generally, this argument has trouble explaining 
loyalty shifts by significant parts of militaries that are not autonomous from the regime.  
I follow Makara that some regime structures of control and coup-proofing 
strategies make loyalty shifts more likely, but go further by arguing different forms of 
regime control make some types of loyalty shifts more likely than other types. These 
effects depend in large part on the impacts of regime control on military authority and 
organization, with protest movements playing an important moderating, and at times 
independent, role. In other words, the military response depends on the form of regime 
coup-proofing and the characteristics of the protest movement challenging the regime – 
because of their impacts on military authority and the military organization.137  
A recent contribution that accounts for the role of both coup-proofing and 
protester characteristics in explaining defections is Morency-Laflamme.138 He argues that 
campaigns will be more likely to generate defections when they can offer credible 
promises about respecting future military interests. Such promises only matter when the 
military has been coup-proofed – specifically, when the regime has created 
                                                 
136 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Nonviolent Resistance in the Arab Spring: The Critical Role of Military-
Opposition Alliances,” Swiss Political Science Review 17, no. 4 (2011): 485-91. 
 
137 This latter point is similar to the argument of Bou Nasif, where coup-proofing impacts the military’s will 
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Predetermined the Military Elite’s Behavior in the Arab Spring,” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 
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counterweights to it. Then, factions that trust the campaign’s offers will defect. I follow 
Morency-Laflamme’s call to bring these two strands of arguments together, especially 
given the almost complete lack of attention to the protesters in existing work. I also 
extend his effort significantly, beyond a comparison of two cases (Benin 1989-1990 and 
Togo 1990-1993). This allows me to look at the effects of various forms of coup- 
proofing, and to explain other types of loyalty shifts.  
In the next section, I introduce my “type of loyalty shift” dependent variable. 
Conceptualizing and measuring types of military loyalty shifts helps me adjudicate 
between alternate explanations for military defections during protests. The defections 
outcome the existing scholarship attempts to explain is in fact often different types of 
military disloyalty. These types have different explanations, and I present my argument 
for them in the final section of this chapter.  
Conceptualizing Military Disloyalty 
The above hypotheses are expectations about when militaries are more likely to 
defect versus remain loyal. One contribution of this dissertation is my re-thinking 
defections as a binary outcome to better account for the variety of observed military 
responses to major anti-regime protest movements. These responses are observably 
different and thus empirically interesting, but also likely explained by different logics and 
to have different implications for post-protest political change (the focus of Chapter 
Five). Thus, I use two outcomes of interest in this dissertation.  
The first outcome, defections, refers to significant loyalty shifts by most of the 
military. This conceptualization lines up with most scholarly and popular understandings 
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of defections.139 The second outcome, type of loyalty shift, disaggregates military 
defections and classifies them according to the extent of the military organization’s 
involvement, in terms of number and rank. In addition to significant shifts of support, it 
captures low level shifts by small groups of the rank and file or lower-ranking officers. 
When a significant portion of upper-ranking officers shift loyalty, I differentiate 
categories based on whether the shift was fragmented or united, and in this sense, the 
quality of support shifted to the protest movement.  
Below, I display the types as a continuum. I detail these categories and their 
coding rules in Chapter Three. 
Figure 2. Types of military loyalty shifts 
 
 
In sum, type shift captures military responses to protests that span from loyalty to 
low level shifts to high level defections. Disaggregating defections into various categories 
allows me to explain, using my argument and new cross-national data, why some 
militaries remain loyal, parts of some militaries are disloyal, divided upper ranks shift 
loyalty, or the full military defects and offers its support to the protesters. The defections 
variable aggregates this range into two categories - mostly loyal and significant shifts of 
loyalty - and is an outcome that reflects my general logic for the impact of threats to 
military authority on disloyalty.  
                                                 
139 This conceptualization and measurement of defections has only rarely been applied cross nationally for 
the purposes of large-N analysis, and has relied on the NAVCO data nearly exclusively.  
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Explaining Types of Military Loyalty Shifts 
The above, general argument about defections is useful for explaining types of 
military loyalty shifts because of the implications that the forms of regime control have 
for military authority as well as the military organization. While coup-proofing generally 
threatens military functional authority and thus generates military discontent, some forms 
compromise the military organization by weakening and dividing it. In the context of 
different protest movements, then, some strategies will make loyalty shifts by the rank 
and file more likely than the upper ranks. Others will affect the loyalty of a faction of 
high ranking officers but not that of the senior leadership closest to the regime. The type 
of loyalty shift depends on the forms threats to military functional authority take, 
combined with the characteristics of the protest movement. I preview the logic of this 























Figure 3. Argument for types of military loyalty shifts 
 
 
Most simply, the greater the threats to military functional authority, the more 
likely are high level loyalty shifts. These threats can take the form of large amounts of 
regime coup-proofing, or moderate coup-proofing in the presence of recent military 
defeat. A regime coup-proofs to reduce military motivations and abilities for coups. 
However, no regime can completely guard itself against disloyalty, even by members of 
the ruling coalition.140 That is, military factions closest to the regime benefit from their 
loyalty. But they and the rest of the military will recognize when forms of regime 
delegated authority hurt military functional authority. Their power and positions 
ultimately depend on the military as an organization and its capacity and effectiveness. In 
                                                 




the context of major anti-regime protests, the military organization’s interests and 
authority are at stake – especially if the military leadership fears loyalty shifts at lower 
levels. Even militaries with divided upper ranks may defect because of the threats to 
military authority.  
Hypothesis 5: Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the 
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.  
When threats to military functional authority come primarily in the form of 
institutional coup-proofing by the regime, united defections will be more likely. 
Institutional coup-proofing negatively impacts military performance in conflict.141 When 
it involves the regime’s creation of forces like presidential guards and paramilitaries, it 
also challenges the military’s monopoly on the use of force, a key military interest.142 
Institutional coup-proofing thus threatens military functional authority and generates 
military discontent.  
Importantly, institutional coup-proofing does not necessarily prevent the 
coordination necessary for united defections. Lutscher143 extends Bohmelt and Pilster’s144 
argument regarding counterbalancing and coups to explain defections. He claims that 
defections are more likely when the security apparatus is either minimally or highly 
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divided, because of the effect of counterforces on a military’s ability to shift loyalty. 
Though Lutscher’s logic is different, his finding that more counterforces make defections 
more likely is consistent with my argument’s expectations. However, he does not 
disaggregate defections such that he can analyze the effects of institutional coup-proofing 
on types of loyalty shifts.  
Institutional coup-proofing motivates disloyalty but does not compromise the 
military organization or damage the military hierarchy. The upper ranks will be able to 
direct the rank and file in shifting the full military’s loyalty. Low level shifts alone will 
be unlikely, though, even if low ranking officers and the rank and file are discontent.145 
These ranks run the risk of being sanctioned by their superiors in the military hierarchy, 
or the counterforces that presumably have capabilities for monitoring and punishment.  
Hypothesis 5a: Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level 
loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts.  
Personalist coup-proofing has different implications for types of military loyalty 
shifts. Because these strategies threaten military functional authority, they increase the 
military’s motivations for disloyalty. But when regimes prioritize personal ties and divide 
and rule by strengthening some factions and weakening others, the military organization 
is more likely to be disunited. Regimes may achieve loyalty from the upper ranks or a 
faction of it while increasing discontent and thus the likelihood of loyalty shifts among 
the lower ranks or other factions. The military hierarchy has been compromised, so high 
ranking officers are less able to monitor and direct the rank and file, allowing for more 
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low- level loyalty shifts. The upper ranks may also shift loyalty, but their response will be 
less coordinated.  
Hypothesis 5b: Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts, 
but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections.  
Finally, large and nonviolent protest movements are an alternative source of 
authority for coup-proofed militaries and so might be expected to increase the likelihood 
of high level loyalty shifts. Threats to military functional authority do not have to be as 
great in these cases, because such protests have positive implications for order and 
stability, and the legitimacy of military delegated authority. A compromised military 
organization may also not be as consequential, as the protests will provide further 
motivation for disloyalty and help to coordinate the military factions – for shifts to the 
protesters as an alternative.  
Hypothesis 6: If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and 
nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.  
This discussion provides theoretical expectations for types of loyalty shifts and 
helps to clarify some of the confusion generated by the existing scholarship and 
summarized earlier. In the context of threats to military functional authority, military 
loyalty shifts can occur whether the military is institutionalized and autonomous or 
factionalized and weak. The loyalty shifts will just involve the military differently. 
Regime coup-proofing has implications for military authority and the military 
organization, with some forms making low level, fragmented high level, or united 
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defections more likely. The protest movement’s characteristics further impact the 
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts.  
Conclusions and Introduction to the Quantitative Analysis 
This chapter argues that militaries are more likely to respond to protests with 
loyalty shifts when a regime has threatened the sources of military authority and anti-
regime protesters are a more promising partner in restoring this authority. Specifically, 
authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies hurt 
military capabilities and threaten military functional authority. Major anti-regime protests 
challenge regime legitimacy and the legitimacy of military delegated authority, putting 
these sources of authority in tension. The military may choose to protect its functional 
authority by shifting loyalty from the regime. This is more likely when the protest 
movement is large and nonviolent and thus more supportive of military authority.  
Unlike existing arguments, my argument’s logic explicitly applies to types of 
military loyalty shifts via its implications for military authority and the military 
organization. Higher level loyalty shifts are more likely when the military’s functional 
authority has been more threatened. Yet some forms of coup-proofing compromise the 
military organization, increasing military discontent but making full and united 
defections less likely. Even in those instances, though, challenges to regime legitimacy 
that are especially large and nonviolent can bring about significant loyalty shifts.  
The next chapter assesses support for my argument by testing its hypotheses 
against a new dataset of military responses to anti-regime protest movements. To 
preview, I find preliminary evidence for my expectations of the effects of the regime and 
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protest movement on military loyalty shifts. In later chapters, I use qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) to more directly assess my argument as a combination of 
causal factors leading to various outcomes. I also examine three cases – Bangladesh 
1990, Mali 1991, and Peru 2000 – that vary along the levels of threat to military 





CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
 
The argument I have introduced suggests that a military will shift loyalty away 
from the regime and to protesters when military sources of authority are in tension and 
the protesters are a better partner in restoring both. The type of military loyalty shift 
depends on the degree to which the regime threatens the military’s functional authority 
and its effects on the military organization. It also depends on the protest movement’s 
size and commitment to nonviolence. The logic of this argument generated a number of 
hypotheses. 
I test these hypotheses through large-N statistical analysis, using new 
quantitative data, in this chapter. This method provides preliminary support for the 
relationships my hypotheses propose. The coup-proofing and protester characteristics 
variables’ independent and conditional effects are in the direction I expect, and as 
potential threats to military authority, they have meaningful impacts on the likelihood of 
defections and military loyalty shifts. My number of observations is fairly small for 
probabilistic regression techniques, though. This reduces the statistical power of my 
study, potentially weakening the statistical significance of my findings. I focus largely 
on the findings in substantive terms as a result. I also end the chapter with a discussion 




I start by describing the cases and units of analysis and defining the main 
variables, including the military response dependent variable, type shift. Then, I describe 
the research strategy. I display and discuss the results for my tests related to defections, 
followed by those for types of loyalty shifts, and conclude by summarizing my findings, 
pointing to this analytical technique’s strengths and weaknesses, and introducing the 
QCA. 
Universe of Cases, Unit of Analysis, and Operationalization of Variables 
My universe of cases for the quantitative analysis is major episodes of 
nonviolent anti-regime campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by the Major 
Episodes of Contention (MEC) Dataset.146 My unit of analysis is country-campaign, and 
outcome of interest is military response. I do not include all campaigns identified by 
MEC, though. I first drop those in countries without militaries.147 Some occurred in 
countries that could be considered democratic, according to their Polity IV scores or 
regime type classification in the years prior. This matters for my argument because the 
authority democratic regimes delegate to their militaries is derived from sources 
independent of a particular leader or party. During popular regime challenges, that 
source of military authority will be more secure. I thus drop democracies, defined as a 
                                                 
146 This project, under the direction of Dr. Erica Chenoweth, is ongoing and the data has not been publicly 
released. See more at: http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention-
1.html. 
 
147 That is, all cases identified in MEC and are countries with militaries. For example, the 2003- 
2004 protest movement in Haiti is identified by MEC, but Haiti did not have a military during this period 
(Yamine Shamsie, “Building ‘Low-Intensity’ Democracy in Haiti: The Contribution,” Third World 
Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1097-1115) and so I exclude it. I list and describe other such cases in my case 
narratives, in the Appendix. Also, nine cases are ongoing in 2015, and I exclude those. 
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Polity IV score above six (a conventional threshold).148 The preceding logic also leads 
me to drop Soviet Republic cases.149 The authority the Republics delegated to their 
militaries was ultimately rooted in the Soviet government, to which they were 
subordinate. Finally, I drop Slovakia (1989-1992) and Slovenia (1989-1990) because 
they were not independent states at the time of their campaigns. Altogether, this 
generates 112 observations. However, one of the main independent variables, 
institutional coup-proofing, has a limited temporal coverage. The below analyses are 
consequently of cases from 1970 to 2015, which number 98. 
As described in the previous chapter, I use two dependent variables in this study: 
one, defections, and two, type of military loyalty shifts (type shift). Conceptually, 
defections measures the presence of military loyalty shifts, while type shift measures 
loyalty shifts according to the extent and quality of the military organization’s 
involvement. Type shift differentiates among low level, high level, fragmented, and 
united loyalty shifts, specifically. I coded both variables by constructing a new dataset of 
military responses to all campaigns in countries with militaries identified by MEC 
(n=161).150 
To code the dependent variable for each case, I conducted research using a 
combination of primary and secondary sources, relying largely on academic journals but 
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149 This includes Belarus 1988-1991, Estonia 1987-1991, Kyrgyzstan 1990-1991, Latvia 1989-1991, and 
Lithuania 1988-1991. 
 
150 The MEC dataset has a defections variable, defect_sec. It is coded at the campaign level of analysis and 
defined as “Security forces defect/fail to cooperate with target regime” (MEC codebook, author’s copy). 
Because the MEC project uses a different research and coding process, defect_sec and defections are only 




consulting with news and other reports when secondary sources were inconclusive. I 
triangulated these sources to make an informed and detailed coding decision, which I 
describe and justify using case narratives. These narratives are found in the Appendix. 
In finalizing the categories and coding rules for my type shift variable, I 
considered alternate conceptualizations, including those offered by other scholars. 
Sharon Nepstad, for example, has theorized a “spectrum of security force responses.”151  
This spectrum and its categories are shown in Figure 1. Basically, Nepstad defines and 
differentiates the categories according to the level of military cooperation or 
noncooperation with regime orders, as an indicator of the level of security force support 
for the state versus the civil resisters.  
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of security force responses to civil resistance. Nepstad 2015, 128. 
 
Rather than levels of military cooperation with regime orders, however, I am 
interested in the number and rank of the military involved in the shifts. From my 
argument, I expect this variation to be explained by different logics and to have different 
impacts on post-protest political outcomes. Military noncooperation is also difficult to 
classify empirically, particular at the lower levels of shirking or selective compliance. It 
can be hard to determine whether the regime gave orders, and if the observed military 
behavior was in response to those orders.   
                                                 
151 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 128. 
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Accordingly, I developed my own categories and coding rules for the type 
shift variable. I briefly summarize them below and display their variation across the 
universe of cases in Figure 2. 
Loyal: No part of the military shifts loyalty, and the military represses or 
otherwise follows regime orders, indicating its support of the regime. 
Neutral: No part of the military shifts loyalty, but the military does not actively 
support the regime. 
Low level loyalty shifts: There is dissent at low levels of the military, among the 
rank and file or lower-ranking officers, involving a group of individuals or at most a few 
units. The dissent typically takes the form of becoming unreliable to military or civilian 
leaders or temporarily joining with the protesters. 
Fragmented high level shifts: A significant part of the military, including some 
middle- or high-ranking officers, removes support from the regime. This occurs either 
in sections, with one exhibiting continued loyalty to the regime or disagreement with 
the decision of the other to shift loyalty, or in a widespread but fragmented manner, 
with no clear direction from military leadership. 
United defections: The full military removes support from the regime, often 
with a statement or declaration from the military leadership. There is no observable 
disagreement within the military over this decision. At times, the shift is accompanied 







Figure 2. Types of loyalty shifts across the universe of cases 
 
Reviewing the Hypotheses 
The argument I develop in Chapter Two results in the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Defections will be more likely if the regime has used coup-proofing 
strategies that threaten military functional authority.  
Hypothesis 1a: Defections will be more likely in personalist regimes, because their forms 
of control threaten military functional authority. 
Hypothesis 1b: Defections will be less likely in single-party regimes, because their 
forms of control do not threaten military functional authority. 
Hypothesis 1c: Defections will be less likely in military regimes, because their forms of 
control do not threaten military functional authority. 
Hypothesis 2: Defections will be more likely if the protest movement is committed to 















Hypothesis 3: In regimes that coup-proof, defections will be more likely if the military 
was recently defeated in conflict. 
Hypothesis 4: Defections will be less likely if the military is involved in an ongoing 
conflict or the regime is facing a violent challenge. 
Hypothesis 5: Greater levels of threat to military functional authority will increase the 
likelihood of higher level loyalty shifts. 
Hypothesis 5a: Institutional coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of high level 
loyalty shifts (and especially united defections), but not low level loyalty shifts. 
Hypothesis 5b: Personalist coup-proofing will increase the likelihood of all loyalty shifts, 
but low level and fragmented high level more than united defections. 
Hypothesis 6: If the regime has used coup-proofing, protest movement size and 
nonviolence will increase the likelihood of high level loyalty shifts.  
 
Before I describe the data, below is a summary table of my argument’s main 















I measure my main explanatory variable, coup-proofing, in two ways. First, I use 
a measure of institutional coup-proofing. This form likely spans all regime types and so 
has effects independent of those proxied by regime type measures.152 Hypothesis 5a 
posits a relationship between this particular form and loyalty shifts. Following the extant 
literature,153 I operationalize institutional coup-proofing as the level of counterbalancing, 
measured as the number of effective armed organizations and calculated as an index of 
ground-based regular militaries and ground-based forces parallel to the army.154 I get 
data on the level of counterbalancing from Bohmelt and Pilster,155 and calculate my 
measure, EffectiveNumber, by averaging the number of effective armed organizations 
(including the regular military) in a country during the five years prior to the 
                                                 
152 According to Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On 
the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 4 
(2012): 355-72, non-democracies generally are more likely than democracies to institutional coup-proof. In 
the Appendix, I use descriptive statistics to show the level of institutional coup-proofing is quite similar 
across regime types. 
 
153 Philipp M. Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on 
Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” International Interactions 42, no. 2 (2016): 350-75; 
Pilster and Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between 
Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” 355-72. 
 
154 This measure is developed from the Military Balance data published yearly by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, a source that has been heavily criticized for its inconsistencies and errors (Aaron 
Belkin, United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2005), 156; Todd S. Sechser and Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The 
Army You Have: The Determinants of Military Mechanization, 1979-2001,” International Studies 
Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2010): 941). Tobias Bohmelt and Ulrich Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-
Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes,” International Interactions 41, no. 1 (2015): 158-82 and 
Pilster and Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between 
Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” 355-72 account for many of these issues, and refine and 
expand the data. Though the measure has been accepted as an indicator of institutional coup-proofing for a 
number of peer-reviewed studies, results using it (as ICP) should be interpreted with caution. This is an 
additional reason that I measure coup-proofing in two ways. 
 





campaign.156 In my analysis, EffectiveNumber ranges from 1 to 3.614155.157 Lutscher 
claims that the number of organizations, or the level of security force fragmentation, has 
a curvilinear relationship with military defections, and uses the original variable, a 
squared term, and a measure of deviation from the equilibrium of two armed 
organizations in his analysis.158 I do the same. However, following normality tests, I 
also calculated the square root, and end up using this measure (ICP) because it results in 
the most normal data distribution. It is also the only operationalization of ICP that ever 
reaches statistical significance in my models. (I discuss what this finding means for 
Lutscher’s argument in the conclusion.) 
I also measure coup-proofing using regime type, drawing on my argument that 
generated Hypotheses 1a through c. For measures of regime type, I rely primarily on the 
“Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions” data from Geddes et al. (GWF).159 The 
                                                 
156 Another way of measuring institutional coup-proofing might have been change in the EffectiveNumber; 
that is, the creation of counterforces in the years prior to the campaign. However, my argument posits that it 
is counterforces’ existence that matters, as a threat to functional authority which in the context of protests 
leads to loyalty shifts. Also, given the likelihood of measurement errors in the data, I think it is preferable 
to consider the number of counterforces averaged across multiple years rather than the change from one 
year to the next. 
 
157 To illustrate EffectiveNumber’s counts and corresponding organizations, I offer a couple of examples. A 
case with 1 effective armed organization is Uruguay prior to 1984-1985. I have not found supporting 
evidence for those years, but the CIA reports that as of 1985 Uruguay’s defense forces included an army, 
navy, air force, and maritime police, and two police units (The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1985)). Mali pre-1990-1991 had the highest number of effective armed organizations. 
Again, I have not found evidence for this, but in 1993 Mali’s security forces included the army, air force, 
gendarmerie, the Republican Guard, and the police. Both the gendarmerie and the Republican Guard were 
under the Defense Department (“Mali Human Rights Practices, 1993,” U.S. Department of State, January 
31, 1994, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Mali.html).  
158 Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection 
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 350-75. 
 
159 Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A 
New Data Set,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313-31. I update this data through 2015 using 
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categorization of regime type in this dataset is useful my purposes: it captures the 
differences in decisionmaking across regimes, based on the leadership group’s interests 
and the leader’s exercise of power.160 The regime type coding is determined by the 
substantive characteristics of the leadership group, as well as how much the group can 
actually constrain the leader.161 
GWF’s dataset uses and updates the regime type classification of Geddes.162 It 
codes regimes as dominant/single party rule (party), rule by the military as an 
institution (military), or rule by personalist dictators (unconstrained by either a strong 
party or unified military) (personal), among others.163 In my analyses, the other 
categories, as well as the categories the effects of which I am not testing with that 
model, form a base regime type. In other words, I assess the effects of the regime type 
variables I include in each model relative to all other, excluded regime types. I code 
each case according to its regime type in the year prior to the start of the campaign.164 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jonathan Pinckney, “Expanding GWF Data,” unpublished dataset (2016) and my own research. Details are 
provided in the Appendix. 
 
160 One concern might be that some regime types are more likely to experience campaigns, and that the 
factors responsible for that relationship are unobservable characteristics driving any relationships between 
regime type and loyalty shifts. However, as shown in the Appendix, the campaigns in my dataset are fairly 
evenly distributed across regime types, particularly those of explanatory interest (i.e. personal, party, and 
military). 
 
161 Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 314-5. 
 
162 Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of 
Political Science 2 (1999): 115-44. 
 
163 Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 317. 
 
164 In 23 cases, regime type changes in the five years prior to or during the campaign. I created an indicator 




The GWF data attempts to differentiate between regimes where power is 
concentrated in an individual, whether military or civilian, and regimes where military 
rule is “collegial.”165 This differentiation is the basis for their coding of personalist 
versus military regimes. However, in the course of my research I encountered some 
regimes coded by GWF (using a typology that groups similar regimes together) as 
military-personal that seemed more personalist than military. In such cases, the regimes 
were controlled less by the military as an institution and more by a military strongman. 
For this reason, I used Svolik’s Institutions in Dictatorships data to recode as personal 
(PCP) the regimes GWF codes as military, when classified by Svolik as military-
personal (rather than military-corporate).166 This change affected 8 cases (4 of which are 
non-democracies) and also resulted in a new military regime variable that excludes the 
re-coded cases (military). 
As for the independent variables related to the protest campaign, I again use the 
MEC data. It codes a variable for the highest recorded participation in the campaign. It 
has many missing values, though, so I supplement its measures with a campaign size 
estimate variable from the NAVCO 2.0 Data Project.167 Following Chenoweth and 
Stephan,168 I log these numbers and then divide them by the log of the country’s 
                                                 
165 Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set,” 319. 
 
166 Milan Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
For example, Geddes et al. and Svolik both code Pakistan 1967 as military-personal. 
 
167 Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 415-23. 
 
168 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 




population size at the start of the campaign to generate a measure of campaign per 
capita (size).169 MEC also includes a binary indicator of whether the campaign had a 
radical flank, which I use to measure the campaign’s commitment to nonviolence. 
While all campaigns included in my universe of cases rely primarily on nonviolent 
methods, some campaigns include incidental violence, and nearly a third do as shown 
by the descriptive statistics in the Appendix. I reverse MEC’s coding so that “1” is the 
absence of a radical flank (nonviolence).170 
To measure loss, I use the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) Conflict 
Termination Dataset v.2-2015.171 I code this variable if the case-country government 
lost an interstate or internal conflict in the 3 years prior to the start of the campaign, and 
define loss broadly as non-victory. In the UCDP data, this includes loss, ceasefire, or 
peace agreement outcomes (i.e. not win, low activity, or actor ceases to exist). The 
broad definition is necessary to encompass any outcome short of defeat of the enemy; 
                                                 
169 NAVCO uses an indicator variable for campaign size, with each category as a range. I recoded its values 
as number of participants and found MEC and NAVCO disagree on approximately 25 cases. I use 
NAVCO’s measures for these cases, and its lower bounds as the number. Given these complications (and 
the challenges associated with counting the number of participants in a campaign), I advise caution in 
interpreting size and its effects. I return to this point in the results below.  
 
170 I also include an indicator for institutionalized opposition, from V-Dem (Michael Coppedge, John 
Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. 
Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. 
Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine 
Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, 
Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson, “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset 
v7.1,” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (2017)), according to the same logic. Perhaps the existence 
of an opposition party provides the protest movement some institutional support, and is perceived as more 
moderate and less threatening to order and stability and military authority than demonstrators in the streets. 
However, I do not find any relations between this variable, opposition, and defections or types of loyalty 
shifts.  
 
171 Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination 




even so, it produces only 11 observations. Loss is rare in this dataset, which may affect 
its statistical relationships with the dependent variables.  
I also use this UCDP dataset for my variable indicating ongoing conflict 
(ongoing), or the presence of a conflict during the campaign in which the case-country 
government was a party. I measure ongoing conflict a second way – using the violsim 
variable from the MEC dataset, which I rename violent. This variable is coded when a 
violent campaign occurred independently from but simultaneously to the nonviolent 
campaign.172 
Control Variables 
I include a number of control variables, or variables that likely impact either 
loyalty shifts or the explanatory variables and could confound my results. The only 
existing statistical analysis of military defections using quantitative data is Lutscher,173 so 
I follow his lead in terms of control variables. I include some of his controls already, as 
explanatory variables: military regime (military) and conflict, measured as loss, ongoing, 
and violent following my argument’s expectations. Others that both Lutscher and I 
include are: GDP per capita, military expenditure and personnel, regime leader’s years in 
power, and level of democracy. 
 First, I control for GDP per capita. I calculate this measure (GDP per capita, 
logged) by averaging a country’s GDP per capita over the five years prior to the start of 
the campaign. I primarily use the World Bank’s data, but consult Gleditsch on 20 cases 
                                                 
172 MEC codebook, author’s copy, 3. 
 
173 Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection 




on which the World Bank is missing information.174 According to Powell, poor economic 
performance reduces regime legitimacy, and could make military political interventions 
more likely.175 It could also increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. Second, also 
drawing on Powell, I control for the financial support of the military, or a country’s level 
of military expenditure divided by its number of military personnel. I calculate this 
variable indicating soldier quality (soldier quality, logged) from the Correlates of War 
National Material Capabilities (v5.0) data176 and use an average of these measures over 
the five years prior to the campaign. According to Powell, the higher this number, the 
more likely the military should be to support the status quo, or remain loyal to the 
regime.177 
I also control for the number of years the regime leader has been in power 
(incumbent, logged), using the Archigos dataset from Goemans et al.178 This is different 
than regime duration; as Geddes et al. find, the average time to regime failure is about 
double the time to leader ouster, or 14 years.179 My use of regime type as an explanatory 
                                                 
174 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (2002): 712-24. The 
World Bank is in constant 2010 dollars, while Gleditsch is in constant 1996 dollars. I rescale the Gleditsch 
observations by multiplying them by an index of 1996 values divided by 2010 values (from the Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States). 
 
175 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat.” 
 
176 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers, ed. Bruce M. Russett. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 
1972), 19-48. 
 
177 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’etat,” 1017-40. 
 
178 Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A Dataset 
of Political Leaders,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 (2009): 269-83. 
 




variable follows my argument that it is the regime’s characteristics that matter for coup-
proofing. Still, it is possible that leaders who have been in power longer have been better 
able to implement and use coup-proofing strategies or other forms of military control. It 
is also possible, as Lutscher notes, that a military is less likely to support a leader if he is 
a lame duck, or going to leave power soon anyway.180      
I control for the level of democracy using the V-Dem dataset. 181 I code this for 
each case by calculating the average polyarchy score in the five years prior to the 
campaign (dem level, logged). In the V-Dem data, polyarchy is an index that measures 
achievement of the ideal of electoral democracy. Military loyalty shifts might be less 
likely in more democratic regimes for a couple of reasons: democracies have more 
regime legitimacy, and they engage in less coup-proofing.182 However, because I only 
analyze non-democracies, the higher this measure, the closer the regime is to anocracy. 
From Powell, coups are more likely in anocracies than democracies or nondemocracies – 
because democracies are more legitimate, and nondemocracies can prevent them.183 
                                                 
180 Cited by Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on 
Defection during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 350-75: Henry E. Hale, “Regime Cycles: Democracy, 
Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 58, no. 1 (2005): 140; Holger Albrecht, 
“Revolution or Coup d’Etat? The Role of the Military in Egypt,” in Revolution and Regime Change in 
Egypt, eds. Holger Albrecht and Thomas Demmelhuber (Baden-Baden: Homos, 2013), 69. Regime leaders 
in some cases leave power in the five years prior to or during the campaign. Because I am interested in the 
effects of regime type rather than individual leadership, I do not indicate when a leader has been in power 
fewer than five years (though his or her time in power is measured by lincumbent. I do create an indicator 
variable for when regime leadership changes during the campaign (leaderchange, coded for 24 cases). 
Including it in the models does not change the overall results. 
 
181 Coppedge et al., “V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v7.1.” 
 
182 Pilster and Bohmelt, “Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between 
Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations,” 355-72. 
 




Military loyalty shifts may also be more likely. Including this control allows me to 
account for either impact of democracy level on disloyalty.  
Lutscher also includes a dummy variable for voluntary recruitment, as a military 
that is voluntarily recruited might be more likely to repress or remain loyal to the regime 
than one that is conscripted.184 However, the Military Recruitment Data Set, 185 which 
provides this variable, is missing a significant number of observations. Consequently, I 
only use it in simple, bivariate regressions, where I find it has no impact. These tests are 
in the Appendix. 
Unlike Lutscher, I also control for whether the country experienced a military 
coup in the five years prior to the campaign. I use Powell and Thyne’s updated coup data 
to code this variable, coup.186 Longstanding research shows that a history of military 
intervention in politics leads to more military intervention in politics.187 Thus, a recent 
coup may increase the likelihood of military loyalty shifts. It may particularly increase 
the likelihood of fragmented or disunited shifts, given that coups are often undertaken by 
middle-ranking or junior officers188 or are the product of military factional rivalry.189 
                                                 
184 Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection 
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 362. 
 
185 Nathan W. Toronto, “Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2014,” available at 
http://www.nathantoronto.com/academicresearch. 
 
186 Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 2 (2011): 249-59.  
 
187 John B. Londegran and Keith T. Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power,” 
World Politics 42, no. 2 (1990): 151-83. 
 
188 William R. Thompson, “Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes,” Comparative Political 




Tables 2 and 3 below contain summary statistics of all of the independent and 
control variables.  
Table 2. Summary statistics: binary independent and control variables 
Variable 0 1 Personal  Party Military Other 
Regime Type 
  
36 38 23 13 
Nonviolence 32 80 
    Loss 99 10 
    Conflict 77 32 
    
Viol Campaign 78 34         
 
Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous independent and control variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
ICP 96 1.932995 0.6018629 1 3.614155 
Size 97 0.6611237 0.1208322 0.3780322 0.9207059 
Dem Level 111 0.2543 0.1304003 0.0718359 0.6949281 
Incumbent 111 3870.252 3152.003 0 12236 
GDP per capita 108 3489.935 3354.155 232.25 18095.26 
Soldier Quality 109 8489.819 7629.897 147.8844 42163.1 
 
Methods 
I employ two estimation strategies, depending on my outcome of interest. I use 
probit regression to determine the probability of defections, a binary variable. I use 
multinomial logistic regression for type shift because it is a nominal variable.190 I use 
multinomial logit regression rather than ordered logistic regression because I do not 
consider the categories of loyalty shifts to be ordered by rank. In tests using multinomial 
logistic regression, I combine the loyal and neutral categories to form the omitted 
                                                                                                                                                 
189 Patrick J. McGowan, “African Military Coups d’etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends, and Distribution,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003): 339-70. 
 
190 Multinomial logit regression is preferable to alternative models unless there is a very large-N, according 
to Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby, “Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of 
Choice Models for Voting Research,” Electoral Studies 23, no. 1 (2004): 107-22. 
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baseline category (n=60, or 54% of the dataset). This reflects my interest in explaining 
types of military loyalty shifts versus no loyalty shift, which includes military neutrality. 
The coefficient estimates should be interpreted as the effects on the log-odds of a type of 
military loyalty shift relative to military loyalty/neutrality, for a one unit increase in the 
predictor. I cluster robust standard errors around country, as some countries have multiple 
cases. 
Before presenting my multivariate results, I present some cross-tabulations of the 
independent and dependent variables as a means of describing the data and assessing 
non-probabilistic relationships. In Table 4, I show the mean EffectiveNumber or level of 
institutional coup-proofing (ICP) across defections and types of loyalty shifts. It appears 
that ICP is higher in militaries that defect, and higher for united defections than the other 
shifts. The variation in defections and loyalty shifts across regime types in Table 5 is also 
suggestive; defections and loyalty shifts occur often in personalist regimes, while shifts in 
party regimes are rare. The variation in military regimes is less clear.  
Table 4. Summary statistics for ICP across outcomes 
  Mean Std Dev Min Max 
No Defections 1.889617 0.5787084 1 3.162959 
Defections 2.02395 0.6480771 1 3.614155 
Loyal/Neutral 1.882559 0.5621013 1 3.149361 
Low Level 1.917845 0.6650199 1 3.162959 
Fragmented High Level 1.921999 0.665045 1 3.162959 










Table 5. Variation in outcomes across regime types 
  Personal Party Military Other Total 
No Defections 19 (25.7%) 32 (43.2%) 13 (17.6%) 10 (13.5%) 74 (100%) 
Defections 17 (47.2%) 6 (16.7%) 10 (27.8%) 3 (8.3%) 36 (100%) 
No Shift 13 (22.4%) 26 (44.8%) 10 (17.2%) 9 (15.5%) 58 (100%) 
Low Level 6 (37.5%) 6 (37.5%) 3 (18.75%) 1 (6.25%) 16 (100%) 
Fragmented 8 (40%) 2 (10%) 8 (40%) 2 (10%) 20 (100%) 
United 9 (56.25%) 4 (25%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.25%) 16 (100%) 
 
Table 6 shows that mean campaign per capita, or the measure of protest 
movement size, is larger in cases where militaries defect or shift loyalty versus remain 
loyal. From Table 7, most instances of loyalty shifts occur when the protest movement is 
nonviolent, though that seems to also hold for instances of loyalty. In all, the shape of the 
data seems to fit my expectations, prior to the addition of covariates and measurement of 
statistical significance. 
Table 6. Summary statistics for size across outcomes 
      Mean Std Dev Min Max 
No Defections 0.6566305 0.1270985 0.3780322 0.9207059 
Defections 0.6702504 0.1083313 0.4408454 0.8354856 
Loyal/Neutral 0.6418224 0.1282201 0.3780322 0.9207059 
Low Level 0.7158629 0.1073814 0.5323344 0.8927312 
Fragmented High Level 0.680569 0.1034155 0.4465078 0.8354856 
United Defections 0.6585559 0.1161367 0.4408454 0.8267764 
 
Table 7. Variation in outcomes across nonviolence measure 
  Nonviolence   
 
0 1 Total 
No Defections 21 (27.6%) 55 (72.4%) 76 (100%) 
Defections 11 (30.6%) 25 (69.4%) 36 (100%) 
No Shift 13 (21.7%) 47 (78.3%) 60 (100%) 
Low Level 8 (50%) 8 (50%) 16 (100%) 
Fragmented High Level 6 (30%) 14 (70%) 20 (100%) 




I begin by testing the hypotheses generated from my argument about military 
disloyalty, or Hypotheses 1 through 4. I display the models with control variables here, as 
they are the most theoretically and empirically interesting. The models without control 
variables are in the Appendix, but I note in the text when they differ substantially from 
the results with controls. These results are also limited to the subset of MEC campaigns 
described above. Analyses of these cases offer the most valid tests of my argument for 
the effects of threats to military functional and delegated authority on military loyalty 
shifts, though at the expense of number of observations and thus the tests’ statistical 
power. As previously noted, I report the results for the full dataset in the Appendix. 
I first test Hypothesis 1, or the effects of coup-proofing on defections. Model H1-
H1a is also a test of H1a, or the independent effect of personalist regimes. The results in 
Table 8, “H1-H1a” support H1 and H1a: coup-proofing in its institutional and personalist 
forms threatens military functional authority and increases the probability of defections. 
Some of the control variables also have their expected effects. The regime leader’s 
incumbency and a recent coup positively impact defections, while greater financial 
support of the military makes defections less probable. Surprisingly, higher GDP per 
capita is positively associated with defections. The level of democracy does not seem to 
matter either way.   
This first model is additive, meaning it estimates the independent effects of the 
variables. I also interact them and show the results in Table 1, under “Interaction.”191 
                                                 
191 In models with an interaction term, the main effects of the interacted variables may not be meaningful 
and should be interpreted with caution.  
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Here, I am interested if their effects are conditional: if PCP has greater effects on the 
probability of defections in the presence of ICP, and vice versa, because together they are 
more threatening to military functional authority. The interaction term is positive but not 
statistically significant. In the model without control variables, it is statistically 
significant, with a p-value of .046. 
Table 8. Models of coup-proofing and defections 
  H1-H1a Interaction    
ICP 2.808*** 2.134*   
 
(0.7280) (0.8620) 
PCP 1.132** -0.9250 
 
(0.3920) (1.7110) 
Dem Level 0.7710  0.6520  
 
(1.4420) (1.4290) 
Incumbent 0.898** 0.862**  
 
(0.2990) (0.2930) 
GDP per capita 0.749** 0.734**  
 
(0.2570) (0.2510) 
Soldier Quality -1.146** -1.129**  
 
(0.3520) (0.3470) 
Coup 1.542** 1.469**  
 
(0.5230) (0.5140) 





Constant -8.069** -6.803*   
  (2.8240) (2.7110) 
Observations 94 94 
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.296 
AIC 100.726 101.86 
BIC 121.072 124.75 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Despite the absence of statistical significance in Table 8, it is possible that the 
variables’ conditional relationships with defections exist over part of the covariate space. 
To investigate this, I calculate each variable’s marginal effects at substantively 
meaningful values of the other – specifically, at personalist and non-personalist regimes 
and ICP as an EffectiveNumber (of armed organizations) of 1, 2, and 3 - and display the 
results in Figure 3. PCP and ICP both have greater effects on the probability of defections 
in the presence of the other. Militaries that have been coup-proofed through personalist 
control and the use of counterforces are more likely to defect than militaries that have 
been coup-proofed through either form alone. Specifically, the probability of defections 
increases to between .57 and .83 in personalist regimes with one or two counterforces. 
Figure 3. Marginal effects of coup-proofing on the probability of defections  
 
Note: All of the marginal effects are statistically significant besides PCP=0/EN=1. 
 
Next, I test Hypotheses 1b and c, or the effects of other regime types on 
defections. This follows from my argument that single-party and military regimes control 
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their militaries in ways less threatening to military functional authority. I test these 
hypotheses separately from H1 and H1a because I am interested in the effects of each 
regime type relative other regime types, including personalist. I do include ICP, since 
single-party and military regimes may use institutional coup-proofing and I want to 
assess the regime types’ independent effects. Both single-party and military regimes are 
negatively associated with defections, but only single-party’s association is statistically 
significant (Table 9). This supports H1b more than H1c. While single-party regimes 
seemingly control their militaries in ways that do not threaten military functional 
authority, decreasing the probability of defections, the structure and exercise of power in 
military regimes cannot be said to impact defections. ICP remains positive and significant 
























Table 9. Models of other regime types and defections 
  H1b    
Party Regime -1.270**  
 
(0.4050) 












GDP per capita 0.667**  
 
(0.2440) 
Soldier Quality -1.048**  
 
(0.3500) 
Coup 1.436**  
 
(0.5070) 
Constant -7.882**  
  (2.8190) 
Observations 94 
Pseudo R2 0.307 
AIC 100.659 
BIC 123.549 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
I test Hypothesis 2, or the relationship between protester characteristics and 
defections, and display the results in Table 10. In an additive model including size and 
nonviolence (“H2”), I find that neither the size of the campaign nor the absence of a 
radical flank (commitment to nonviolence) has a significant, positive impact on the 
probability of defections. (Their interaction also has no impact. I show this in the 
Appendix.) PCP and ICP maintain their effects in this model. However, my argument 
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overall contends that a military will be more likely to shift loyalty when the regime has 
threatened its sources of authority and the protesters are an alternative. In other words, 
Hypothesis 2 implies the effects of coup-proofing and protester characteristics on 
defections are conditional on each other. As such, I first interact the two protester 
variables with the coup-proofing variables. None of the interaction terms are significant, 
as I show in the Appendix. In a combination of these models, though, I calculate a three-
way interaction between PCP, ICP, and size, and display the results under “Interaction” 
in Table 5. (I also interacted PCP and ICP with nonviolence, but the resulting conditional 




























Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and 
conditional on coup-proofing 
  H2 Interaction    
Size 0.1450  -25.3730 
 
(1.2360) (13.9060) 
Nonviolence -0.4650 -0.4350 
 
(0.3310) (0.3330) 
PCP 1.182** -10.4320 
 
(0.4200) (11.6660) 
ICP 2.409** -10.4040 
 
(0.7450) (6.4450) 
Dem Level 0.5940  0.9440  
 
(1.4450) (1.4070) 
Incumbent  0.953** 1.032**  
 
(0.3260) (0.3620) 
GDP per capita  0.775** 0.853**  
 
(0.2860) (0.2960) 
Soldier Quality -1.1760** -1.271**  
 
(0.3780) (0.4140) 























Constant -7.6330** 9.6130  
 
(2.7970) (8.9910) 
Observations 90.00  90.00  
Pseudo R2 0.31  0.34  
AIC 99.87  104.37  
BIC 124.86  139.36  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Three-way interactions are challenging to interpret, so I also create two graphs: 
the marginal effects of the interaction between ICP and size when the regime is not 
personalist (Figure 4), and of the same interaction when the regime is personalist (Figure 
5). In calculating marginal effects, I use ICP’s values at EffectiveNumber 1, 2, and 3, as 
above, and protest movement size at small, medium, and large values of campaign per 
capita (.40, .65, .90).  
The conditional effects of these two-way interactions in non-personalist regimes 
and personalist regimes is evident in their different shapes. In substantive terms, the 
probability of defections is greater with more counterforces and larger protests, and the 
effects of counterforces and protests are greater in personalist regimes. High levels of 
threat to military functional authority, in the context of medium and large protests, have a 
large effect on the probability of defections – increasing their predicted probability to 





















Figure 4. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in non-personalist regimes 
 
Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; 
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size. 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects of ICP and size on defections in personalist regimes 
 
Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; 
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=2/Large Size; EN=3/Large Size. 
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I next test for the effects of recent military defeat (loss) on defections. My 
argument and specifically Hypothesis 3 expects that coup-proofing will have a larger 
effect on defections in the presence of military defeat. I first test for a relationship 
between loss and defections, and find none, as shown in Table 11. Next, I test H3 more 
directly by interacting loss with the coup-proofing variables (“Interaction”). The 
interaction terms are not significant, but when I calculate their substantive effects I find 
that in personalist regimes with two counterforces, recent military loss increases the 
probability of defections from .518 to .938, and in personalist regimes with three 
counterforces, recent military loss increases the probability of defections from .875 to 
.999. This information is displayed in Table 12. Militaries that have been coup-proofed 
























Table 11. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing 
  Loss Interaction 
Loss 0.0600  3.289  
 
(0.5420) (2.805) 
ICP 2.805*** 2.570* 
 
(0.7250) (1.195) 
PCP 1.126** -0.175 
 
(0.3870) (2.148) 
Dem Level 0.7700  0.695 
 
(1.4340) (1.437) 
Incumbent 0.899** 0.925** 
 
(0.3030) (0.304) 
GDP per capita 0.745** 0.770** 
 
(0.2470) (0.268) 
Soldier Quality -1.142*** -1.173** 
 
(0.3420) (0.363) 
Coup 1.540** 1.552** 
 
(0.5240) (0.558) 










Loss x PCP  -8.334 
  (5.312) 
PCP x ICP  0.907 
  (1.562) 
Constant -8.070** -7.825** 
  (2.8390) (2.962) 
Observations 94 94 
Pseudo R2 0.289 0.317 
AIC 102.713 107.422 








Table 12. Predicted probability of defections in coup-proofed militaries, by whether or 
not have recently been defeated in conflict 
  No loss Loss 
Personalist regime with 1 counterforce 
(EN=2) 0.518 0.938 
Personalist regime with 2 counterforces 
(EN=3) 0.875 0.999 
 
Lastly, I test Hypothesis 4 and show the results in Table 13. Ongoing conflict 
measured as violsim does have a statistically significant effect on the probability of 
military defections, though in the opposite direction than expected. However, this 
positive relationship disappears when controlling for coup-proofing and protester 
characteristics, in the “Full Model.” The presence of an ongoing conflict or violent 
campaign does not seem to concentrate the military in a way that makes it more 
supportive of the status quo and thus less likely to defect. Neither does civil conflict 






















Table 13. Models of ongoing conflict and defections 
  Ongoing Violent Full Model 




  Dem Level 0.2380  0.1490  0.3160  
 
(1.1490) (1.1420) (1.3780) 
Incumbent 0.473* 0.504** 0.951**  
 
(0.1870) (0.1840) (0.3170) 
GDP per capita 0.2090  0.2380  0.765**  
 
(0.1560) (0.1550) (0.2860) 
Soldier Quality -0.476** -0.498** -1.174**  
 
(0.1560) (0.1580) (0.3680) 
Coup 0.8700  0.9080  1.838**  
 
(0.4750) (0.4660) (0.6210) 
Viol Campaign 
 





















   
(0.3530) 
Constant -1.8950 -2.3170 -7.548**  
  (2.0640) (2.0200) (2.8400) 
Observations 103 103 90 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.153 0.333 
AIC 129.005 124.606 99.282 
BIC 147.448 143.049 126.78 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
To summarize this section, I find support for my argument’s expectations that 
coup-proofing (ICP and PCP alone and together) increases the probability of military 
defections. I also find that single-party regimes and their forms of military control matter 
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for military defections, making them less probable. I do not find evidence that the 
protester characteristics independently impact defections. However, when I consider the 
conditional effects of size, it seems that larger protests increase the probability of 
defections in the presence of coup-proofing (personalist regimes with counterforces). I 
find a similar conditional relationship between military loss and defections. Coup-
proofed militaries that have been defeated recently are much more likely to defect. The 
overall results are interesting, especially when I explore them substantively. These threats 
to military functional authority and the protest movement as an alternative matter for 
defections, even when controlling for the influence of other factors.  
 With some support for my hypotheses on general defections, I move on to test 
those that propose a relationship between coup-proofing and protester characteristics and 
type of military loyalty shifts. In Table 14, I show the results of my tests of Hypotheses 
5a and 5b – the independent effects of the forms of coup-proofing on types of loyalty 
shifts. I find some support for both. ICP increases the likelihood of high level but not low 
level shifts. Counterforces threaten the military, leading to loyalty shifts by the upper 
ranks. The lower ranks may be unable to shift loyalty because they risk punishment by 
these counterforces or their superiors. PCP has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on all shifts, and especially fragmented high level. In terms of control variables, the 
longer the regime leader has been in power, the more likely are high level shifts. A recent 
military coup increases the likelihood of military disloyalty, but only of the disunited type 
– perhaps because of the deleterious effects of coups on the military organization. 
Surprisingly, greater soldier quality is only negatively and statistically significantly 
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associated with fragmented high level shifts. This may indicate that financial support of 
the military does not prevent all loyalty shifts, just those by a weakened military 
organization. The impacts of higher GDP per capita are also limited to fragmented high 
level shifts, but in the opposite direction than expected. The level of democracy is weakly 
associated with low level shifts.  
Table 14. Model of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
PCP 1.933* 2.869*** 2.111*   
 
(0.8770) (0.8630) (0.9140) 
ICP 2.2290  5.865** 5.443*** 
 
(1.8510) (1.9180) (1.5870) 
Dem Level -5.185* -1.5030 1.4820  
 
(2.3230) (4.7940) (3.6010) 
Incumbent 0.3180  2.060* 1.203*   
 
(0.4310) (0.8560) (0.5480) 
GDP per capita 0.3120  2.139** 0.6000  
 
(0.3840) (0.7740) (0.5070) 
Soldier Quality 0.1050  -2.540** -1.4250 
 
(0.7660) (0.9670) (0.8570) 
Coup 2.358* 4.548** 1.3710  
 
(1.1400) (1.4110) (1.3510) 
Constant -9.9430 -21.452* -11.917*   
  (6.3870) (8.5000) (5.1890) 
Observations 94 
  Pseudo R2 0.246 
  AIC 218.519 
  BIC 279.558     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Next, I test Hypothesis 5 directly by interacting coup-proofing with loss. Here, 
threats to military functional authority are greatest, and high level loyalty shifts should be 
especially likely. In Table 15, I specifically interact PCP with loss; I report the absence of 
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results for the interaction between ICP and loss in the Appendix. (This may be a product 
of the data, given the rareness of loss.) As shown by the interaction terms, loss increases 
PCP’s effects on all types of loyalty shifts, when controlling for ICP. 
Table 15. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Loss 0.0960  -0.4020 -13.732*** 
 
(0.9670) (1.3280) (1.6680) 
PCP 1.7170  2.817** 1.7390  
 
(0.8770) (0.9210) (0.9580) 
Loss x PCP 15.315*** 14.776*** 29.732*** 
 
(1.3930) (1.6390) (1.9520) 
ICP 2.2020  5.842** 5.278*** 
 
(1.8020) (1.9650) (1.5760) 
Dem Level -4.7240 -1.5350 1.5270  
 
(2.4640) (4.9460) (3.3920) 
Incumbent 0.3320  2.047* 1.286*   
 
(0.4390) (0.8540) (0.5570) 
GDP per capita 0.2600  2.163** 0.6020  
 
(0.3930) (0.8000) (0.4870) 
Soldier Quality 0.1110  -2.557* -1.3850 
 
(0.7660) (0.9960) (0.8240) 
Coup 2.356* 4.585** 1.6060  
 
(1.1420) (1.4570) (1.4250) 
Constant -9.7670 -21.332* -12.641*   
  (6.4420) (8.3960) (5.2830) 
Observations 94 
  Pseudo R2 0.264 
  AIC 226.301 
  BIC 302.6     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
However, when I calculate the marginal effects of PCP at substantively 
meaningful values of loss (0 and 1), they are only statistically significant for united 
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defections. This finding is shown graphically in Figure 6: a military that has been coup-
proofed using personalist forms is more likely to defect as a united organization when it 
has recently been defeated in conflict. Here, its threatened functional authority is 
especially evident. 
Figure 6. Marginal effects of PCP and military loss on united defections 
 
 
Next, I evaluate support for Hypothesis 6, or the effects of the protest movement 
on types of loyalty shifts. So far, I have only considered the role of threats to military 
functional authority – without considering how the protest movement as an alternative 
might further impact a military’s response. I first assess the variables individually. Then, 
I use interactions to test the overall argument for high level loyalty shifts: militaries that 
have been coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty through united defections when 
protests are large and nonviolent. Conversely, lower levels of coup-proofing, or coup-
proofing with smaller protests not necessarily committed to nonviolence, may impact the 
likelihood of lower level loyalty shifts. 
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I find support for H6 as well as other hypotheses with the additive model (Table 
16). As concerns H5a and 5b, when controlling for protester characteristics, ICP 
independently increases the likelihood of high level but not low level shifts. Personalist 
coup-proofing increases the likelihood of all shifts, but fragmented high level and low 
level more than united defections, perhaps because of its effects on the military 
organization.192 Size only has a positive, statistically significant effect on low level shifts 
– without taking into account any interactions with coup-proofing, anyway. Larger 
protests may be more likely to require the involvement of the rank and file and low-
ranking officers, and thus provide them motives and opportunities to disobey regime 
orders or join the opposition movement.193 Nonviolence does not seem to matter, at least 
not as measured and included here. From the summary statistics in Table 2, MEC codes 
most of the protest movements in this dataset as nonviolent (67%), so perhaps 










                                                 
192 These findings are further borne out when I do individual probit regressions for types of loyalty shifts, 
as binary outcomes. I report the full results in the Appendix, but summarize them here. On low level shifts, 
PCP has a positive and weak effect (p-value .083), while ICP’s association is far from statistically 
significant. For fragmented high level shifts, PCP has a positive and strong effect (p-value .007). ICP also 
has a positive effect, but statistically, it is not significant (p-value .071). For united defections, PCP is 
positive but not statistically significant, while ICP is positive with a p-value of .022. 
 
193 Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in 
Authoritarian Regimes,” Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52. 
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Table 16. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-
proofing 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 10.138*** 3.5970  3.1900  
 
(3.0760) (2.6160) (3.8550) 
Nonviolence -0.8500 -1.0370 -0.9670 
 
(0.8330) (0.8280) (0.8850) 
ICP 2.9200  5.576** 5.508**  
 
(1.8710) (2.0220) (1.6990) 
PCP 3.048** 3.561** 2.630*   
 
(1.0710) (1.0920) (1.1890) 
Dem Level -4.7060 -2.5890 1.0370  
 
(2.8740) (4.9360) (4.7730) 
Incumbent 0.1610  2.119* 1.268*   
 
(0.2640) (0.9940) (0.5700) 
GDP per capita 0.1650  2.227* 0.7020  
 
(0.5020) (0.8810) (0.5740) 
Soldier Quality -0.1960 -2.722* -1.6320 
 
(0.7140) (1.1550) (0.8860) 
Coup 1.6030  4.941** 1.5950  
 
(0.9610) (1.6430) (1.4930) 
Constant -12.627* -22.143** -12.882*   
  (6.2840) (8.5870) (5.4970) 
Observations 90 
  Pseudo R2 0.306 
  AIC 211.506 
  BIC 286.5     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
In the model shown in Table 17, I interact ICP and size. (I interact the other 
combinations of coup-proofing and protest movement variables and find that their 
interaction terms and marginal effects are insignificant or not meaningful. I include the 
results in the Appendix. Nonviolence as measured does not seem to matter for loyalty 
shifts, and large protests may be unable to generate united defections by a military whose 
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organization has been damaged by personalist coup-proofing.) I am interested in whether 
higher levels of ICP combined with large protests will increase the likelihood of united 
defections. At first glance, I find additional support for H5b and the effects of PCP. 
Personalist coup-proofing threatens military functional authority but also negatively 
impacts the military organization, having greater effects on low level and fragmented 
shifts than united defections.  
For H6, the interaction term of ICP and size is negative and statistically 
significant on low level shifts. Its negative coefficient along with size’s positive 
coefficient seems to indicate that as ICP get larger, the positive effect of size on the 
likelihood of low level shifts gets smaller. When I calculate the marginal effects at the 
variables’ substantively meaningful values, few are significant but generally align with 
my argument. I show the results in the Appendix and summarize them here: the predicted 
probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests when there are no 
counterforces. Size is explanatory of low level shifts, but only at low levels of ICP. The 
presence of more counterforces seems to reduce the ability of the rank and file and low-














Table 17. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on 
ICP 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 44.200* -7.1010 -34.9000 
 
(17.5580) (17.6110) (27.0280) 
Nonviolence -0.7920 -1.0470 -1.0740 
 
(0.8250) (0.8620) (0.9170) 
ICP 20.914* 0.4660 -11.9830 
 
(8.5290) (8.9090) (12.5600) 
PCP 3.146** 3.704*** 2.469* 
 
(1.0480) (1.1080) (1.1860) 
Size x ICP -24.630* 8.4070 27.8550 
 
(12.1650) (13.0000) (19.7730) 
Dem Level -4.9080 -2.4200 2.3940 
 
(2.8640) (5.5460) (4.3830) 
Incumbent 0.1340 2.227* 1.325* 
 
(0.2900) (1.0410) (0.5340) 
GDP per capita 0.1400 2.325* 0.7940 
 
(0.5250) (0.9250) (0.5670) 
Soldier Quality -0.1990 -2.851* -1.824* 
 
(0.7150) (1.2410) (0.9270) 
Coup 1.1150 5.337** 1.8140 
 
(0.8050) (1.8130) (1.5770) 
Constant -37.163** -16.3530 11.1730 
  (13.1170) (14.1930) (17.3440) 
Observations 90 
  Pseudo R2 0.328 
  AIC 212.681 
  BIC 295.175     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
The interaction term on united defections is not statistically significant, but the 
variables have marginal effects. It is clear, based on Figure 7, that the effect of each on 
the predicted probability of the outcome is conditional on the values of the other. Further, 
these effects of ICP and size are statistically significant at their highest values. United 
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defections are up to 84 percent likely when the regime uses two counterforces and the 
protests are large. Here, the military’s functional capabilities and authority are threatened 
by the existence of other security forces. That the protests involve large numbers of the 
population indicates to the military that the movement for regime change is widely 
supported, and a new government may be more legitimate. 
Figure 7. Marginal effects of ICP and size on united defections 
 
Note: The marginal effects are statistically significant at EN=2/Medium Size; 
EN=3/Medium Size; EN=3/Large Size. 
 
Lastly, I calculate the marginal effects of PCP on the predicted probability of each 
outcome (holding the other covariates at their means) and display them in Figure 8. As 
suggested by the coefficients and signs, personalist coup-proofing increases the 
probability of fragmented high level shifts most, followed by low level shifts, with only a 
small effect on united defections. This supports my expectations – because militaries that 
have been personalist coup-proofed are more likely to shift loyalty, yet are 
organizationally weakened and may struggle to defect as united organizations.  
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Figure 8. Marginal effects of PCP on types of loyalty shifts 
 
 
These final statistical results and substantive effects provide support for my 
overall argument regarding the relationship between threats to military functional 
authority and types of military loyalty shifts, and the protest movement as affecting 
military disloyalty by being more supportive of military authority. Large protests increase 
the likelihood of united defections by a military that has been coup-proofed because they 
indicate the opposition movement is widely supported and perhaps more legitimate than 
the regime that has threatened military functional authority. Large protests also increase 
the likelihood of low level shifts, at least when there are few counterforces to monitor and 
punish disloyalty at this level. Coup-proofing through personalist control primarily 
affects fragmented shifts because of its impacts on the military organization in addition to 
its threats to military functional authority. I discuss these findings’ contributions and 




To summarize, militaries that have been coup-proofed do appear more likely to 
shift loyalty from authoritarian regimes in response to anti-regime protest movements, 
and the positive effects of coup-proofing on defections are stronger when the military has 
recently been defeated in conflict or when the protest movement is large in size. 
Militaries that have been coup-proofed are also more likely to shift loyalty at higher 
levels, but different forms of coup-proofing have different effects. Personalist coup-
proofing makes low level and fragmented high level shifts (and to a lesser extent, united 
defections) more likely, and my argument suggests this is because of its impacts on the 
military organization. Institutional coup-proofing makes high level shifts and especially 
united defections more likely, but has no effect on low level loyalty shifts. This is 
probably because the presence of more counterforces makes it difficult for small numbers 
of the rank and file or low ranking officers to shift loyalty without being detected or 
punished. Low level shifts are more likely during large protests, perhaps because such 
protests are likely to involve these sections of the military and provide them the 
motivation and ability to act. Finally, large protests increase the effect of institutional 
coup-proofing on united defections. 
 In this chapter, then, I used quantitative data and regression analyses to generate 
preliminary support for my argument’s empirical expectations. These findings come 
about through statistically significant relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables. The explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester 
characteristics (in particular, size) have the hypothesized effects on defections and types 
 
 104 
of loyalty shifts. The relationships hold even when accounting for the influence of other, 
potentially confounding factors. This method – regression analysis – is particularly useful 
for demonstrating the independent effects of the variables, such as personalist and 
institutional coup-proofing, for which I have specific sub-hypotheses. It is also capable of 
testing for the conditional effects of variables. The results confirm that the coup-proofing 
and protester characteristics’ effects are stronger when considered together, and that they 
interact differently for the types of loyalty shifts. The models with interactions pose 
challenges for my analysis, though, given that the terms are either statistically 
insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. Including them also reduces the 
statistical degrees of freedom in an already small set of cases/number of observations. 
 This evidence altogether provides backing for my overall argument that militaries 
are more likely to shift loyalty to the protesters when the regime has threatened military 
sources of authority and the protesters offer an alternative. Greater threats to military 
functional authority increase the likelihood of high level shifts, as does regime coup-
proofing along with large protests. The regime’s forms of military control matter for 
military authority and thus loyalty. This is further demonstrated by the negative 
relationship between single-party regimes and defections. The protest movement is also 
important – as the military’s ultimate source of delegated authority, and the regime 
challenge to which it responds. The protests’ characteristics affect whether and how the 
military shifts loyalty. But protest size and nonviolence are not sufficient for explaining 
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military disloyalty, particularly at higher levels. The military must be facing threats to its 
functional authority, too.194 
 This evidence also challenges the existing scholarship on defections. Though 
small, it offers some key propositions: military loyalty shifts are more likely when the 
regime has used a) identity-based ties;195 b) divide and rule tactics;196 c) either no 
counterforces or many counterforces;197 or d) counterforces, and the opposition is 
credible.198 I find support for the analyses’ general intuition, that coup-proofing by the 
regime increases the likelihood of defections. However, I challenge any of these singular 
explanations by finding that they vary depending on the type of loyalty shifts. I organize 
them into a more coherent whole with my argument on military sources of authority. I 
also bring in the protest movement and show that protester characteristics (in particular, 
size) meaningfully condition the effects of coup-proofing on military disloyalty. 
 As a transition to the next chapter, I address the shortcomings of the above 
analysis. First, the data has some issues. As I mentioned above, the data on institutional 
coup-proofing and protest size are spotty and may be mismeasured or unreliable. I also 
                                                 
194 This is against the expectations of Chenoweth and Stephan, who find that the probability of defections 
increases as campaign membership increases (Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict, 48). 
 
195 Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics 
42, no. 3 (2010): 333-50. 
 
196 Terence Lee, “The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the 
Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-69; 
Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2014). 
 
197 Lutscher, “The More Fragmented the Better? The Impact of Armed Forces Structure on Defection 
during Nonviolent Popular Uprisings,” 350-75. 
 
198 Julien Morency-Laflamme, “A Question of Trust: Military Defection During Regime Crises in Benin 
and Togo,” Democratization 25, no. 3 (2018): 464-80. 
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recognize that my other coup-proofing variable – personalist regime type – is a very 
imperfect proxy measure of the actual coup-proofing strategies in which I am interested. I 
believe the variable captures important aspects of regime exercise of authority, that vary 
across regime types. But I cannot point to the variable and its effects in my models and 
know exactly what part of “personalist regime” is doing the explanatory work. 
Fortunately, there are ongoing efforts to improve data on these concepts. One 
exciting project is De Bruin’s Security Force Dataset, which collects data on coup-
proofing in more clearly defined and disaggregated forms.199 MEC is also ongoing and 
perhaps its updated version will have new data on campaign membership. I look forward 
to the release of these datasets so that I can see if my findings using the coarser measures 
hold, and to generate new insights regarding my argument and its observable 
implications. 
 Finally, all probabilistic statistical analyses encounter the same issues: the 
possibility of omitted variable bias and endogeneity, and the challenge of drawing causal 
inferences from correlational data. The first set of issues are in some ways compounded 
here because of my relatively small sample size. In the qualitative case study chapters I 
better evaluate the causal mechanisms. First, though, I use Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis to assess my argument’s propositions as combinations of causal conditions, 
using a smaller number of especially comparable cases. The relationships I have 
hypothesized are more complicated than the linear, additive ones regression analysis 
assumes. QCA’s strengths as a technique allows me to build on the preliminary evidence 
                                                 









CHAPTER FOUR: QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Because I have a relatively small number of cases and my argument concerns 
factors related to regime-military relations and the protest movement that combine to 
produce threats to military functional authority, in this chapter I use another method to 
assess empirical support: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This method is 
recommended when the number of cases is less than 100, because probabilistic 
statistical analyses and results could be unstable and underpowered. QCA is also a 
configurational rather than regression approach, so it can assess the multiple causal 
pathways or combinations of conditions that lead to an outcome. Using logical inference 
or Boolean analysis, it produces configurations that describe the data and suggest causal 
relations. 
To review, I argue that militaries will be more likely to shift loyalty when the 
regime has compromised their functional capacities and the protest movement is an 
alternative source of military authority. It follows that both regime coup-proofing and 
protester characteristics matter. In conjunctural terms, regime coup-proofing and a large 
and nonviolent protest movement combine as different levels of threat to military 
authority that produce different military responses. Because the variables matter for 
their impacts on military authority, they may be substitutable and conditional. For 
example, regime coup-proofing in both its institutional and personalist forms may 
threaten military functional authority and increase the likelihood of defections. But 
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nonviolent. Further, other variables such as military loss may not have independent 
effects on defections but could increase their likelihood if the military has been coup-
proofed. 
In the previous chapter, I presented preliminary evidence for my argument and 
the hypothesized relationships using quantitative data and regression techniques. I also 
acknowledged that approach’s shortcomings. The models without interactions assume 
the variables’ relationships are linear and additive – that the more independent variables 
present, the more likely the dependent variable - and not true tests of my theoretical 
expectations. When I added interactions to the models, the terms were either 
statistically insignificant or substantively difficult to interpret. The additional terms also 
reduced the statistical degrees of freedom in an analysis of an already relatively small 
number of cases. Lastly, loyalty shifts likely occur as a result of multiple causal 
processes, but such complexity is challenging to unravel using regressions. 
I use QCA to explicitly evaluate my argument and hypotheses in terms of 
conjunctural causation that is contextual, where causal factors may substitute for each 
other. In particular, I generate findings for necessary and/or sufficient conditions and 
sufficient combinations of conditions, for each of the outcomes. This differs from 
testing whether independent variables have statistically significant positive or negative 
effects on the dependent variable while controlling for other factors. Rather, it is a 
means to assess how causal conditions combine to produce an outcome. I find that the 
explanatory factors related to coup-proofing and protester characteristics matter because 
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they combine, in multiple ways, to affect military functional and delegated authority 
and thus cause military loyalty shifts. 
Brief Introduction to QCA as a Method 
In the social sciences, theories often imply or expect equifinality (i.e. multiple 
causal pathways to the same outcome) or multicausality (i.e. many causal factors matter 
for an outcome). Such theories are difficult to evaluate empirically, and especially using 
probabilistic statistics. A classic example to illustrate the shortcomings of such analyses 
is explaining why an employee was fired from her job. She could be fired for 
committing various infractions, each being enough: skipping work, stealing from the 
copyroom, lying to her boss. In regression analysis, the relationship between these 
factors and the outcome is modeled such that the more infractions she commits, the 
more likely she will be fired. QCA enables researchers to conclude that these factors or 
conditions are in fact causally equivalent: the presence of each is sufficient for her 
firing.200 An outcome can result from different factors or combinations of factors. 
QCA was designed to assess the causal contributions of different conditions to 
an outcome. It takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, aiming to “allow systematic cross-case comparisons, while at 
the same time giving justice to within-case complexity.”201 Its focus on causal 
complexity aligns it with qualitative research, but its ability to examine evidence across 
                                                 
200 This is a common illustration, but here I draw on Chan’s use of it. Steve Chan, “Explaining War 
Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1 (2003): 49-66. 
 
201 Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, eds., Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative 




a larger set of cases means it can identify more generalized relationships. Given these 
features, it is useful for analysis of small to medium-N sets of data.202 
QCA’s main weakness is that is does not provide estimates of the statistical 
significance and magnitude of independent variables’ effects on the dependent 
variable.203 Social scientists such as Braumoeller (2015) have criticized QCA for this 
reason and others.204 However, the QCA program I use below allows me to calculate 
solutions’ coverage and consistency, which provide parameters of fit and indicate 
empirical relevance. I employed regression methods in the previous chapter to analyze 
and assess the variables’ statistical relationships. These approaches together provide 
support for my argument’s empirical expectations. 
This Chapter’s QCA Strategy 
The primary goal of QCA is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the outcome.205 Necessary conditions are those that are shared by cases with the same 
outcome, while sufficiency is determined by investigating whether cases with the same 
conditions also have the same outcomes.206 In QCA, the researcher creates a truth table 
                                                 
202 Benoit Rihoux, “Case-Oriented Configurational Research Using QCA (Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis)”, in Oxford Handbook of Political Science: Methodology edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, 
Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 423. 
 
203 However, as Chan points out, estimating the statistical effects of independent variables may be 
problematic if the “relevant causal processes are not mutually exclusive.” Chan, “Explaining War 
Termination: A Boolean Analysis of Causes,” 63. 
 
204 Bear F. Braumoeller, “Guarding Against False Positives in Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Political 
Analysis 23, no. 4 (2015): 471-487. Specifically, he says that QCA is vulnerable to type I error and multiple 
inference. 
 
205 Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000). 
 





with all possible combinations of conditions and outcomes and the cases that fit them. 
She then analyzes the truth table for combinations sufficient for the outcome and 
assesses the findings in terms of the hypothesized causal relations. In this chapter, I 
follow these steps using a Stata package, fuzzy. It produces solution terms for the 
sufficient configurations by performing various tests with standards that I specify. 
I use the same data that I did for the regression analyses. Following my 
discussion in Chapter Three, I do not include democratic, Soviet Republic, or non-
independent cases. QCA does not allow for “control variables,” so I apply a number of 
scope conditions to further restrict my dataset to cases that are especially comparable. 
Specifically, I include only post-Cold War cases that did not experience a coup in the 
five years prior to the campaign, as these two factors were theoretically interesting and 
at times statistically important controls in the previous chapter.207 This reduced dataset 
has 58 cases. In sum, I analyze two medium-n datasets of conditions and outcomes: one 
of countries that are independent, non-democratic, and non-Soviet Republic; and one of 
countries that are also post-Cold War with no recent coups.  
Most of the conditions are dichotomous variables; in QCA terms, they are 
calibrated as crisp sets. I calibrate the two continuous variables, EffectiveNumber and 
size, as crisp sets as well. I do this because I am interested in the effects of presence of 
institutional coup-proofing (ICP) versus absence of ICP, and large campaigns (SIZE) 
versus small campaigns. Dichotomous variables and crisp sets measure differences in 
type rather than degree. As I detail below, I define the specific set membership scores 
                                                 





(i.e. whether an observation is coded 1 or 0) depending on the particular outcome of 
interest. Importantly, though, I define membership and code observations based on my 
argument and knowledge of the cases, rather than by relying on “internal criteria” like 
mean or mode.208 
Empirical Propositions 
Here I list the empirical propositions I test with QCA. They are essentially the 
hypotheses from Chapter Two, but more explicitly identify the presence or absence of 
conditions, in particular combinations, under which the outcome is likely to occur. The 
key defines the conditions’ abbreviations. In standard QCA notation, “*” denotes “and”, 
“+” denotes “or”, upper-case letters denote the presence of a condition, and lower-case 
letters denote the absence of a condition. 
Key: 
ICP = institutional coup-proofing  
PCP = personalist coup-proofing  
SIZE = protest movement size 
NV = protest movement nonviolence (or absence of a radical flank)  
OPP = institutionalized opposition (see footnote 170 in Chapter Three)  
LOSS = recent military loss 
VIOL = ongoing violent conflict 
Defections = ICP * SIZE * NV + PCP * SIZE * NV + ICP * OPP + PCP * OPP 
Interpretation: Defections are likely in cases with coup-proofing (either form) 
                                                 
208 Charles C. Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 30. 
 
 114 
and large, nonviolent protests, or coup-proofing (either form) and an 
institutionalized opposition. 
Low level loyalty shifts = icp * PCP * loss * medSIZE + icp * PCP * loss * medsize * 
VIOLSIM  
Interpretation: Low level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coup-proofing (not 
institutional coup-proofing), medium-sized (or larger) protests, and no recent military 
loss, or personalist coup-proofing (not institutional coup-proofing), small protests and no 
recent military loss but ongoing violent conflict. Protest movement nonviolence will not 
matter. 
Fragmented high level loyalty shifts = PCP * modICP * loss * medSIZE + PCP * 
modICP * loss * NV + PCP * icp * medSIZE * NV 
Interpretation: Fragmented high level shifts are likely in cases with personalist coup-
proofing, moderate institutional coup-proofing, and medium-sized (or larger) or 
nonviolent protests, or personalist coup-proofing and medium-sized (or larger), 
nonviolent protests. 
United defections = ICP * PCP * lgSIZE * NV + ICP * PCP * OPP + ICP * LOSS * 
SIZE * NV + PCP * LOSS * SIZE * NV + ICP * LOSS * OPP + PCP * LOSS * OPP 
Interpretation: United defections are likely in cases with both forms of coup-proofing (or 
one form and military loss) and large, nonviolent protests (or an institutionalized 
opposition). 
My goal with QCA is to uncover the combinations of conditions under which 
defections and types of military loyalty shifts occur. As suggested by Schneider and 
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Wagemann,209 I also analyze the conditions under which the outcomes do not occur. I 
take each outcome in turn in the following sections. 
Findings: Defections 
First, I analyze defections. I start with the conditions I expect to be most 
explanatory for the outcome and use the full set of cases (i.e. independent non-
democracies, non-Soviet Republics). Because I am interested in the effects of any amount 
of institutional coup-proofing and large campaigns, I assign ICP a score of 1 if the 
effective number of armed organizations is greater than 2, and SIZE a score of 1 if the 
campaign per capita is greater than .7.210 
Before assessing the conditions’ combinations, I test if any of them is individually 
necessary for defections. Necessity is a high bar, and following Ragin, I set the minimal 
consistency benchmark for necessity at a level of .9.211 I use fuzzy to produce a 
sufficiency and necessity matrix and display it in Table 1. Sufficiency scores are in the 
upper left, and necessity in the lower right. The matrix shows that no conditions qualify 
as necessary for defections. The closest is NV, at .677. In terms of the overall dataset, 
though, NV is present in 70 percent of the cases, so it is unsurprising that it is almost 
                                                 
209 Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide 
to Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 
210 An effective number of two means there is at least one ground based force parallel to the regular 
military. A campaign per capita of .7 is higher than the mean (.659), and is roughly equivalent to a non-
logged campaign size divided by total population value of .006. In case terms, the campaign against the 
military dictatorship in Thailand in October and November 1973 was roughly this size, with approximately 
250,000 participants relative to a population of just over 4 million. It was considered a “massive student 
protest” (Frank C. Darling, “Student Protest and Political Change in Thailand,” Pacific Affairs 47, no. 1 
(1974), 15) that included a “large sector of the citizenry” (Clark D. Neher, “Stability and Instability in 
Contemporary Thailand,” Asian Survey 15, no. 12 (1975), 1103). 
 
211 Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science. 
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always present in defections. As for sufficiency, PCP scores highest with .469. This 
condition is the one that individually is most sufficient for defections. 
Table 1. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for defections outcome 
  Defections ICP PCP SIZE NV OPP 
OPP 0.321 0.434 0.415 0.377 0.642 1.000 
NV 0.339 0.387 0.371 0.371 1.000 0.548 
SIZE 0.455 0.364 0.273 1.000 0.697 0.606 
PCP 0.469 0.344 1.000 0.281 0.719 0.688 
ICP 0.389 1.000 0.306 0.333 0.667 0.639 
Defections 1.000 0.452 0.484 0.484 0.677 0.548 
 
Next, I examine the configurations’ consistency with sufficiency for the 
outcomes, or the degree to which the configurations are sufficient for defections. The 
fuzzy program analyzes the truth table and evaluates the combinations of conditions that 
are sufficient for the outcome, using various tests and standards. I set a consistency 
threshold of .75, the minimal value suggested by Ragin. This produces a complex 
solution of six configurations. It is likely that some conditions are irrelevant, so fuzzy uses 
inferential logic/Boolean algebra to simplify or reduce the results. This yields a “final 
reduction set” or solution of five configurations, as well as measures of coverage and 
consistency. I show the results in Table 2. 
Table 2. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (full dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
ICP*pcp*SIZE*nv*opp 1.000 0.032 0.032 
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.097 0.097 
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.097 0.065 
ICP*PCP*NV*opp 1.000 0.065 0.032 
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV 1.000 0.097 0.065 
Total coverage = 0.323 




The solution consistency is 1.000, meaning that all cases with these 
configurations have defections. (Consistency is analogous to model fit in a regression 
analysis.) The total coverage is quite low, at .323. The configurations leave many cases of 
defection unexplained; they are not very empirically relevant. Though disappointing, this 
result is perhaps unsurprising, given that so far I have included only the main conditions 
and am using the full set of cases. 
Rather than interpret these results, I scope the dataset to post-Cold War cases with 
no recent coups, to reduce the influence of other factors. Using the same processes as 
above, I get four configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000 and better coverage of 
.538. I show them in Table 3. The first insight from the solution is that PCP is present in 
every configuration. This means that in the presence of PCP, the other conditions’ 
combinations are causally equivalent. Against my expectations, the other form of coup-
proofing, ICP, is not individually important. But that neither PCP alone nor PCP and ICP 
together are sufficient for defections supports my overall argument that coup-proofing 
must be combined with either large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition 
for this outcome. The only configuration in which SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms 
of coup-proofing are present, with NV. 
Table 3. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.231 0.231 
PCP*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.154 0.077 
ICP*PCP*NV*opp 1.000 0.154 0.077 
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV 1.000 0.154 0.077 
Total coverage = 0.538 




Lastly, I attempt to achieve a higher coverage score – or explain more cases of 
defections - by adding other conditions. Specifically, I add VIOL (expecting it to be 
absent in cases of defection) and PARTY (expecting it to be either absent, or present in 
combination with ICP and large, nonviolent protests).212 The fuzzy analysis produces 
nine configurations that reduce to six. Together, they have a consistency score of 1.000 
and coverage of .692. Including the additional conditions does explain more cases. They 
also make the configurations more complex and interpretation of them challenging. I 
show the results in Table 4. In brief, however: PCP is again nearly always present. The 
only configuration in which it is absent includes PARTY (with NV and OPP, but not 
ICP surprisingly). SIZE/NV and OPP again seem to substitute for each other. Further, if 
NV is present but SIZE and OPP are absent, both forms of coup-proofing must be 















                                                 
212 From Chapters Two and Three, single-party regimes are less likely to experience defections, when 
controlling for institutional coup-proofing. Though these regimes do not use personalist coup-proofing, 




Table 4. Sufficient configurations for defections outcome (reduced dataset with 
additional conditions) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party 1.000 0.077 0.077 
ICP*PCP*size*NV*viol*opp*party 1.000 0.077 0.077 
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party 1.000 0.077 0.077 
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party 1.000 0.077 0.077 
icp*pcp*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY 1.000 0.154 0.154 
ICP*PCP*size*nv*OPP*party 1.000 0.231 0.231 
Total coverage = 0.692 
   Solution consistency = 1.000       
 
In sum, then, coup-proofing and protester or opposition characteristics combine in 
various ways to produce defections. For these cases, personalist coup-proofing and either 
large, nonviolent protests or an institutionalized opposition must be present for defections 
to occur. Defections may occur in party regimes, but only when protests are nonviolent, 
there is an institutionalized opposition, and a violent campaign is ongoing. Perhaps a 
violent campaign generates military discontent with the regime in ways similar to coup-
proofing. It is important to remember that the defections outcome groups both types of 
high level shifts together, even though they are likely explained by different causal 
processes. I assess such differences below, but first analyze the conditions under which 
defections do not occur. 
 Findings: No Defections 
I follow an abbreviated version of the above steps to get a basic explanation of the 
absence of defections. I limit my reporting of findings to those for the main conditions 
and the reduced set of cases. Using the .75 threshold, the conditions result in 15 
configurations that reduce to six. The solution has a coverage score of .805 and 
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consistency of 1.000. It seems that these combinations of conditions explain the absence 
of defections well. Coup-proofing (specifically ICP) is present in only one configuration. 
OPP, NV, and SIZE are present in varying combinations, but absent coup-proofing, they 
are sufficient for no defections (not sufficient for defections). 
Table 5. Sufficient configurations for no defections outcome (reduced dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
ICP*pcp*NV*OPP 1.000 0.098 0.049 
icp*pcp*opp 1.000 0.171 0.073 
pcp*size*OPP 1.000 0.268 0.122 
icp*size*NV 1.000 0.341 0.049 
size*NV*OPP 1.000 0.341 0.073 
icp*SIZE*nv 1.000 0.098 0.073 
Total coverage = 0.805 
  Solution consistency = 1.000     
 
Findings: Low Level Loyalty Shifts 
I follow the same steps for the other outcomes, starting with low level loyalty 
shifts. I score ICP and SIZE differently because I expect low level shifts to be unlikely 
in cases with any amount of institutional coup-proofing, and likely in cases with at least 
medium-sized protests. I calibrate ICP as a fuzzy set by standardizing the continuous 
measure. I assign SIZE a 1 if campaign per capita is greater than .65.213 From the 
empirical proposition above, I add conditions for military loss (LOSS) and ongoing 
violent campaign (VIOL). I do not expect LOSS to matter but add it to begin 
                                                 
213 This is close to the mean value of campaign per capita and corresponds to a case such as Kyrgyzstan’s 
Tulip Revolution in spring 2005. Around 20,000 protesters participated in the campaign, relative to a 
population of 5.16 million, for a campaign per capita of .004. According to analysts, the campaign did not 
generate as much participation as similar movements in neighboring countries, and its success owed more 
to state weakness than “extremely large demonstrations” (Mark R. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in 
Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives 
on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007)).  
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differentiating solutions for low level versus high level shifts. I do not have clear 
expectations for VIOL. Violent conflict is likely to involve the rank and file, though, so 
perhaps its presence will have an effect. 
Using these conditions, I test for sufficiency and necessity with a matrix that I 
show in Table 6. No conditions are necessary, though SIZE, at .727, comes close. A 
medium-sized (or larger) protest movement is almost necessary for low level loyalty 
shifts. No condition is close to sufficient; LOSS scores highest, but only .222. 
Table 6. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for low level loyalty shifts outcome 
  Low level ICP PCP LOSS SIZE NV VIOL 
VIOL 0.188 0.566 0.344 0.156 0.562 0.750 1.000 
NV 0.094 0.476 0.375 0.094 0.562 1.000 0.375 
SIZE 0.154 0.530 0.288 0.115 1.000 0.692 0.346 
LOSS 0.222 0.513 0.444 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.556 
PCP 0.182 0.427 1.000 0.121 0.455 0.727 0.333 
ICP 0.121 1.000 0.314 0.103 0.615 0.680 0.404 
Low level 1.000 0.492 0.545 0.182 0.727 0.545 0.545 
 
I examine the configurations’ sufficiency, again applying the .75 consistency 
threshold. Running this test in fuzzy produces a complex solution of five sets, which 
logically reduce to three. The solution consistency is .929, and total coverage .333. The 
results are in Table 7. At first glance it is evident that ICP is either absent or missing in all 
of the solutions, as expected. PCP is not always present; when it is absent, either LOSS, 
SIZE, and NV are present (with VIOL absent), or SIZE and VIOL are present (with 








Table 7. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (full 
dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*NV*viol 0.767 0.083 0.083 
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.167 0.167 
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.083 0.083 
Total coverage = 0.333 
   Solution consistency = 0.929       
 
I scope my dataset before interpreting the results further. For these cases, seven 
configurations consistent with sufficiency at .75 reduce to three, plus a set of two 
alternates. As shown in Table 8, the consistency is now 1.000, but the coverage 
improves very little. Overall though this is an improvement. ICP is again absent or 
missing in the configurations. PCP is often present; when it is absent, SIZE and VIOL 
are present, and LOSS and NV are absent. SIZE is almost always present. VIOL is 
present in every configuration – for low level shifts to occur, it is therefore important 
that a violent conflict is ongoing. This is interesting, especially since the factor was not 
statistically significant in my regression analyses. Perhaps VIOL provides the rank and 
file motivation or opportunity for disloyalty in the context of protests. In sum, it seems 
that low level loyalty shifts are likely under conditions of ongoing violent conflict along 
with either medium-sized (or larger) protests or personalist coup-proofing. Protest 











Table 8. Sufficient configurations for low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.125 0.125 
PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL 1.000 0.125 0.125 
PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.125 0.125 
Total coverage = 0.375 
   Solution consistency = 1.000 
   And one of: 
   icp*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL 
   icp*PCP*SIZE*nv*VIOL       
 
The findings support my expectations in some ways but not others. Low level 
shifts are likely to occur when protests are at least medium-sized and a violent conflict is 
ongoing. Perhaps the probable involvement of the rank and file or low ranking officers in 
such protests and conflict provides them the motivation and opportunity to shift loyalty. 
In terms of coup-proofing, the shifts are unlikely under institutional coup-proofing, and 
somewhat likely under personalist coup-proofing in the context of other conditions. 
Overall, the low coverage scores indicate this outcome might be partly explained by 
factors that I am not considering, that are perhaps less structural and even more context 
specific. 
Findings: No Low Level Loyalty Shifts 
I show findings for the absence of low level loyalty shifts in Table 9, following an 
analysis with the theoretically informed conditions on the reduced set of cases. 27 
configurations have consistency scores higher than .75. They reduce to eight, resulting in 
a solution with coverage of .948 and consistency of .926. In terms of insights, one 
configuration includes PCP and SIZE, but ICP, NV, and VIOL are also present. Low 
level loyalty shifts are unlikely to occur when PCP and SIZE are absent, or when they are 
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present along with other conditions. In the latter configurations, the cases may be higher 
level loyalty shifts. 
Table 9. Sufficient configurations for no low level loyalty shifts outcome (reduced 
dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
ICP*PCP*SIZE*NV*VIOL 1.000 0.022 0.022 
icp*loss*size*viol 0.891 0.198 0.056 
pcp*loss*SIZE*viol 1.000 0.196 0.109 
LOSS*size*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.043 0.043 
pcp*loss*NV 0.950 0.413 0.130 
pcp*NV*viol 1.000 0.217 0.043 
loss*NV*viol 0.905 0.413 0.027 
loss*SIZE*NV 0.889 0.348 0.021 
Total coverage = 0.948 
   Solution consistency = 0.926     
  
Findings: Fragmented High Level Shifts 
Next up for analysis is fragmented high level shifts, and from the above I expect 
a combination of personalist coup-proofing, moderate ICP, and medium-sized or 
nonviolent protests to be sufficient. Personalist coup-proofing alone may be sufficient if 
it is accompanied by protests that are both medium-sized (or larger) and nonviolent. 
Accordingly, I assign ICP a score of 1 when the effective number of armed 
organizations is greater than 2.25, and SIZE a score of 1 when campaign per capita is 
larger than .65.214 I first produce a sufficiency and necessity matrix (Table 10). NV is 
close to necessity, at .722, but does not meet the benchmark of .9. PCP has the highest 
                                                 
214 For ICP, this is a higher threshold than previous calibrations. It indicates that on average, cases have 




consistency score, .242. After determining that no conditions are individually necessary 
or sufficient, I move on to assessing the configurations’ sufficiency. 
Table 10. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for fragmented high level loyalty shifts 
outcome 
  Fragmented ICP PCP LOSS SIZE NV VIOL 
VIOL 0.219 0.375 0.344 0.156 0.562 0.750 1.000 
NV 0.203 0.266 0.375 0.094 0.562 1.000 0.375 
SIZE 0.212 0.327 0.288 0.115 1.000 0.692 0.346 
LOSS 0.222 0.333 0.444 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.556 
PCP 0.242 0.242 1.000 0.121 0.455 0.727 0.333 
ICP 0.200 1.000 0.320 0.120 0.680 0.680 0.480 
Fragmented 1.000 0.278 0.444 0.111 0.611 0.722 0.389 
 
At the consistency threshold of .75, the fuzzy program returns five 
configurations that reduce to four. They are shown in Table 11. The consistency of the 
solution is 1.000, and the coverage is .278. Somewhat surprisingly, PCP is not present 
in all of the configurations. VIOL may substitute for it, given that it is present in both 
configurations that PCP is absent. As expected, cases with PCP, SIZE, and NV (and 
absent ICP) are cases with fragmented high level shifts, but LOSS is present too, and 
the cases are few in number. The only configuration in which both forms of coup-
proofing are present also has NV and VIOL and an absence of LOSS. While VIOL was 
not a statistically significant independent variable in Chapter Three, it seems to be an 










Table 11. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome 
(full dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*pcp*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL 1.000 0.056 0.056 
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*viol 1.000 0.056 0.056 
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL 1.000 0.056 0.056 
ICP*PCP*loss*NV*VIOL 1.000 0.111 0.111 
Total coverage = 0.278 
   Solution consistency = 1.000       
 
Now I do the analysis with the scope conditions. However, because fragmented 
high level shifts so often occur in cases that have recently experienced military coups, I 
cannot drop cases according to that indicator. I instead add it as a condition for post-
Cold War cases. This produces three configurations, with a consistency score of 1.000 
and coverage of .375 (Table 12). COUP is present in every configuration. In the 
presence of COUP, the combinations of the other conditions are causally equivalent. 
Together, PCP, SIZE, and NV (and COUP, with LOSS absent) are sufficient for some 
fragmented high level shifts, as expected. Similar to the above, VIOL may substitute for 
PCP, and the presence of both forms of coup-proofing is combined with NV, VIOL, 
and COUP, and an absence of LOSS (as well as SIZE). 
Table 12. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome 
(reduced dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP 1.000 0.125 0.125 
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP 1.000 0.125 0.125 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP 1.000 0.125 0.125 
Total coverage = 0.375 




Lastly, I add OPP, to see if doing so might explain more cases. I do not expect it 
to be necessary for fragmented high level shifts, but it might substitute for campaign size 
and nonviolence in the presence of moderate coup-proofing. I keep COUP as a condition. 
Five configurations are consistent with sufficiency at .75, and five configurations are part 
of the reduction set shown in Table 13. The addition of OPP increases solution coverage 
by quite a lot, to .714. These results suggest that the forms of coup-proofing substitute for 
each other – fragmented high level shifts may occur under PCP or (moderate levels of) 
ICP, but at least one must be present. When both are present, so are conditions indicating 
the protest movement as an alternative. Recall though that SIZE here is measured broadly 
and refers to medium-sized (and larger) protests. Also, institutionalized opposition is 
present only when there has been a recent coup. Perhaps coups’ detrimental effects on 
military organizations outweigh the effects of an institutionalized opposition on military 
sources of authority that could otherwise generate united defections. As above, when PCP 
is absent, VIOL is present. This may indicate that ongoing violent conflict divides the 
military or fragments the military response in ways comparable to personalist coup-
proofing. 
Table 13. Sufficient configurations for fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome 
(reduced dataset with additional condition) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*COUP*OPP 1.000 0.143 0.143 
ICP*pcp*loss*size*nv*VIOL*COUP*OPP 1.000 0.143 0.143 
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*coup*opp 1.000 0.143 0.143 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP*OPP 1.000 0.143 0.143 
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*coup*opp 1.000 0.143 0.143 
Total coverage = 0.714 




Findings: No Fragmented High Level Shifts 
To assess the conditions under which fragmented high level shifts do not occur, I 
perform the steps with the main conditions (including COUP) on the reduced set of cases. 
This produces 28 solutions that reduce to 15, with a coverage of .821 and consistency of 
.979. The solution is complicated, but from Table 14 yields a few insights. PCP is mostly 
absent, but when it is present, it is often combined with ICP or LOSS, which I would 
expect to produce united defections (i.e. not fragmented high level). No configurations 
include the presence of PCP, SIZE, and NV, which also supports my expectations. Many 
are simply the absence of the main conditions – personalist coup-proofing (and its 

























Table 14. Sufficient configurations for no fragmented high level loyalty shifts outcome 
(reduced dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
ICP*pcp*loss*size*NV*VIOL*COUP 1.000 0.018 0.018 
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*coup 1.000 0.018 0.018 
ICP*pcp*LOSS*size*NV*viol*coup 1.000 0.018 0.018 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*viol*coup 1.000 0.018 0.018 
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*coup 1.000 0.018 0.018 
icp*pcp*SIZE*NV*viol*coup 1.000 0.071 0.018 
PCP*loss*SIZE*nv*VIOL*coup 1.000 0.036 0.036 
icp*PCP*LOSS*nv*VIOL*coup 1.000 0.036 0.036 
ICP*pcp*loss*SIZE*nv*COUP 1.000 0.054 0.054 
icp*pcp*loss*viol*coup 1.000 0.214 0.089 
icp*pcp*loss*nv*viol 1.000 0.161 0.018 
icp*loss*size*NV*viol 0.917 0.196 0.018 
pcp*loss*SIZE*NV*coup 1.000 0.179 0.054 
icp*loss*size*NV*coup 0.933 0.250 0.000 
icp*loss*NV*VIOL*coup 1.000 0.179 0.018 
Total coverage = 0.821 
   Solution consistency = 0.979       
 
Findings: United Defections 
To finish, I analyze united defections. I expect them to occur under conditions of 
moderate to high levels of ICP (an effective number greater than 2.25), personalist coup-
proofing, and large protests (campaign per capita greater than .7) that are nonviolent, with 
military loss and an institutionalized opposition combining or substituting in various 
ways. This follows from my argument that united defections, as the highest level of 
military loyalty shifts, are explained by major threats to the military’s functional 
authority together with a protest movement that is committed to nonviolence and widely 
supported. I test for necessity and sufficiency among the individual conditions. As shown 
by the matrix in Table 15, NV and OPP score highest for necessity, at .643. In terms of 
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sufficiency, all conditions score fairly low, but the highest is PCP at .250, followed 
closely by ICP at .240. 
Table 15. Sufficiency and necessity matrix for united defections outcome 
  United ICP PCP LOSS SIZE NV OPP 
OPP 0.170 0.283 0.415 0.075 0.377 0.642 1.000 
NV 0.145 0.274 0.371 0.097 0.371 1.000 0.548 
SIZE 0.212 0.242 0.273 0.152 1.000 0.697 0.606 
LOSS 0.222 0.333 0.444 1.000 0.556 0.667 0.444 
PCP 0.250 0.250 1.000 0.125 0.281 0.719 0.688 
ICP 0.240 1.000 0.320 0.120 0.320 0.680 0.600 
United 1.000 0.429 0.571 0.143 0.500 0.643 0.643 
 
I test these conditions’ combinations for consistency with sufficiency for united 
defections. Four configurations meet the .75 threshold, and they remain after performing 
the reduction. Overall, they have a consistency score of 1.000 and coverage of .357. At 
first glance and in contrast to fragmented high level, PCP is always present. ICP often is; 
when it is absent, LOSS (as an additional threat to military functional authority) and OPP 
or SIZE and NV are present. OPP and SIZE/NV are substitutable. These findings align 
with my expectations fairly well, but the configurations do not explain many cases. 
Table 16. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (full dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.071 0.071 
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*NV*OPP 1.000 0.071 0.071 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.143 0.143 
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.071 0.071 
Total coverage = 0.357 
   Solution consistency = 1.000       
 
I examine the configurations’ consistency scores on the reduced set of cases. This 
produces five configurations, with a fairly good coverage of .667, relative to those 
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previously. The findings in Table 17 are similar to the above. PCP is again present in 
every configuration, and when ICP is absent, LOSS and OPP are present or SIZE and NV 
are present. The most explanatory of the configurations (with a coverage score of .222) 
has both forms of coup-proofing and an institutionalized opposition; in this context, an 
institutionalized opposition substitutes for large and nonviolent protests. LOSS is present 
in some configurations. 
Table 17: Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced 
dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.111 0.111 
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.111 0.111 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.222 0.222 
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*OPP 1.000 0.111 0.111 
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.111 0.111 
Total coverage = 0.667 
   Solution consistency = 1.000       
 
Lastly, I add the ongoing violent conflict (VIOL) condition as well as a 
condition for party regimes (PARTY) to see how they might combine with the others to 
produce united defections. On the smaller set of cases, the test for sufficiency produces 
eight configurations that reduce to six. Overall, they have a very high coverage score of 
.899, with consistency at 1.000 (Table 18). These conditions explain united defections 
very well, and combine in ways almost identical to above. Both forms of coup-
proofing, large and nonviolent protests, and military loss (as well as ongoing violent 
conflict) are sufficient for united defections. All of these conditions need not be present, 
though; personalist coup-proofing combined with large and nonviolent protests also 
produce united defections, if there is no ongoing violent conflict. Institutional coup-
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proofing is not necessary, but can produce united defections when personalist coup-
proofing and an institutionalized opposition are present. United defections also occur in 
party regimes in the context of nonviolent protests, institutionalized opposition, and 
ongoing violent conflict.  
Table 18. Sufficient configurations for united defections outcome (reduced dataset with 
additional conditions) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*opp*party 1.000 0.111 0.111 
icp*PCP*LOSS*size*nv*VIOL*OPP*party 1.000 0.111 0.111 
ICP*PCP*loss*SIZE*NV*viol*OPP*party 1.000 0.111 0.111 
ICP*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*NV*VIOL*opp*party 1.000 0.111 0.111 
icp*pcp*loss*NV*VIOL*OPP*PARTY 1.000 0.222 0.111 
ICP*PCP*loss*size*nv*OPP*party 1.000 0.222 0.111 
Total coverage = 0.889 
   Solution consistency = 1.000       
 
Findings: No United Defections 
The analysis of the absence of united defections results in 21 configurations that 
reduce to eight, shown in Table 19. The solution’s coverage score is .886 and its 
consistency score is .975. Of the configurations, the two that are most explanatory 
(coverage of .273) include only one form of coup-proofing, an institutionalized 
opposition but small protests, and no loss or violent conflict. In no configurations are 
both forms of coup-proofing present, or one form and military loss with large, nonviolent 
protests/an institutionalized opposition. In sum, these findings support my expectations 






Table 19. Sufficient configurations for no united defections outcome (reduced 
dataset) 
    Coverage   
  Consistency Raw Unique 
icp*PCP*LOSS*SIZE*nv*opp 1.000 0.023 0.023 
pcp*loss*SIZE*NV*opp 1.000 0.091 0.091 
pcp*LOSS*size*NV*opp 1.000 0.045 0.045 
ICP*pcp*size*nv*OPP 1.000 0.045 0.045 
icp*PCP*loss*OPP 1.000 0.273 0.114 
PCP*loss*size*NV 1.000 0.250 0.091 
icp*pcp*loss*size 0.923 0.273 0.182 
icp*pcp*loss*nv 1.000 0.136 0.045 
Total coverage = 0.886 
   Solution consistency = 0.975       
 
Conclusions 
This chapter provides additional empirical support for my argument through 
application of a second analytic technique, one that is well-suited to my theoretical 
expectations and cases: QCA. I have now used multiple methods to assess the validity of 
my findings and reach tentative conclusions regarding my causal claims. In Ragin’s 
terms, I have “explore[d] alternative ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between 
ideas and evidence.”215 I am more confident in the results as a consequence, given that 
both QCA and regression analyses have strengths and weaknesses. 
Using QCA in particular, I demonstrated that the outcomes of interest in this 
study cannot be explained by a single factor or even a single combination of factors. 
Military defections and loyalty shifts are complex phenomena. In the regression analyses, 
coup-proofing and protester characteristics independently affected loyalty shifts and 
varied in terms of the statistical significance of their associations. But as explanatory 
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factors they also combine and substitute in different ways to affect overall military 
authority, as I would expect from my argument. I now have a better understanding of the 
causal processes that produce the outcomes, particularly in the medium-N set of cases. 
 More specifically, I confirmed that military sources of authority are important for 
explaining military loyalty shifts. General loyalty shifts, or defections, occur when the 
regime has threatened military functional authority and the protest movement or 
opposition is an acceptable alternative. Fewer threats to military functional authority may 
lead to low level shifts when the lower ranks are motivated – by personalist coup-
proofing, or large protests – and there is opportunity because of an ongoing violent 
conflict and an absence of counterforces to monitor and punish disloyalty. Fragmented 
high level shifts are likely when a military with a recent history of coups or compromised 
organization faces threats to its functional authority, and the opposition is medium-sized 
or nonviolent protests or institutionalized. Finally, the highest level shifts, united 
defections, require greater threats to functional authority plus a large, nonviolent, or 
institutionalized opposition. Overall, the high consistency scores of the configurations 
confirm that these combinations are highly associated with the outcomes. But, the low 
coverage scores indicate there are cases that the conditions do not explain, and other 
factors that matter. 
The combinations of conditions and their relations of necessity and sufficiency 
support my theoretical claims. I cannot infer causal relations from them, though, because 
I cannot assess causal processes using QCA. I also cannot account for those factors I did 
not measure quantitatively and cross-nationally, even though I was able to eliminate the 
influence of some extraneous factors by using a more comparable set of cases. Following 
 
 135 
the next chapter and my quantitative analysis of the impact of types of loyalty shifts on 
democratization, I use three case studies to better establish the causal mechanisms linking 
the conditions and outcomes. I trace how forms of regime coup-proofing actually threaten 
military functional capabilities, and how the protest movement does or does not support 
overall military authority. In the context of the movement’s challenge to the regime, the 




CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF MILITARY LOYALTY 
SHIFTS ON DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
In 1989, students, teachers, and civil servants in Benin began a pro-democracy 
strike that continued on-and-off for the next year. While a minority remained loyal to the 
authoritarian regime of President Mathieu Kerekou, large sections of the military 
removed their support. By the end of 1989, Kerekou was forced to agree to a National 
Conference, and in 1990, the body stripped him of his power and installed a new 
executive. At the start of 1991 the transitional government held successful elections, 
beginning a process of democratization.216 Sudanese protesters were similarly successful 
in overthrowing autocrat President Muhammad Numeiri in 1985. Student protests were 
followed by a general strike and culminated in large demonstrations. The military’s 
leadership shifted loyalty from the regime and then established a military council to 
oversee the transition. General elections were held a year later, but in 1989 Colonel Omar 
al-Bashir seized power and continues to rule as dictator.217 
 So far in this dissertation, I have focused on when and why militaries shift loyalty 
in response to anti-regime protest movements. The above examples and scholarly 
research demonstrate that military loyalty shifts frequently play an important role in such 
movements. The research also shows that successful movements can overthrow autocrats 
                                                 
216 Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, “The Military and Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin 
and Togo,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 28, no. 2 (2000): 210-229. 
 
217 Kamal Osman Salih, “The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy,” The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 28, no. 2 (1990): 199-224. 
 
 137 
and usher in regime change and democracy. But when does military support for anti-
regime protests also support democratization as it did in Benin? Beyond the link between 
military defections and movement outcomes, we know little about how military responses 
to anti-regime protests matter for future political outcomes. 
In this chapter, I present an argument for the effects of types of military loyalty 
shifts on post-protest movement democracy. It draws on the theoretical puzzle I identified 
in the introduction, or the conflicting expectations over the role of the military in politics. 
The literature on civil-military relations claims that civilian control of the military is 
necessary for democratization. This would lead us to expect a politically active military – 
such as the one in Benin – to have damaging effects on democracy. The democratization 
literature, particularly that on pacted transitions, finds that military involvement (through 
cooperation with other elites) can help to bring about democracy. Yet that is not always 
the case, as this failed in Sudan. While the civil resistance literature has demonstrated the 
importance of military defections for the success of anti-regime campaigns, it has yet to 
focus on whether this works to support political change. 
Following these literatures’ key insights, I argue military loyalty shifts in response 
to anti-regime protests can be supportive of political change, but that some types are 
more supportive of democratization than others. Loyalty shifts by a unified military 
organization allow the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and 
challenge the establishment of civilian control. Loyalty shifts that are fragmented indicate 
a weaker military that will have less influence over the transition, making post-campaign 
democracy more likely. This logic follows from my explanation of military loyalty shifts 
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that draws in part on the relations between authoritarian regimes and militaries. Regime 
control strategies may threaten military functional authority as well as weaken the 
military organization. Regimes’ use of coup-proofing thus affects both the likelihood and 
quality of the military’s loyalty shifts, with implications for civilian control and 
democratization following mass, nonviolent protests. 
 I use this theoretical framework to generate two hypotheses that I test through 
statistical analyses of my quantitative data. I find support for my expectations, even after 
controlling for campaign outcomes and other determinants of democratization, as well as 
partially accounting for possible endogeneity between military response and 
democratization. In what follows, I review the literature on the role of militaries in 
democratic change, present my argument for the effects of types of military loyalty shifts, 
and describe my empirical strategy and the evidence the analyses provide. I close with a 
discussion of this research’s implications and shortcomings, in part as a transition to my 
examination of the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between military shifts 
and democratization using the case studies in the next chapters. 
Understanding the Military’s Role in Democratization 
In earlier chapters, I developed an argument for why militaries shift loyalty in 
response to anti-regime protest movements. I leveraged my general argument to also 
explain types of military loyalty shifts, following my contention that militaries defect or 
shift loyalty in various ways. My motivation for explaining military loyalty shifts is the 
demonstrated link between their presence during protests and the success of such protests 
in overthrowing authoritarian regimes. Implicit in this link and in my discussion of them 
is that militaries’ support of pro-democracy protesters also supports democratization. In 
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the introduction I questioned whether civilian control is a necessary precursor to 
democratic change, given the findings of the pact and civil resistance literatures. In this 
chapter I directly interrogate the claim that loyalty shifts support democratization, but 
first review the competing expectations of the literatures and the theoretical puzzle they 
generate. 
The military is an important actor in processes of political change, and so has had 
a prominent position in research on democratization. Much of this research came about as 
a result of the Third Wave of democratization across Latin American and Southern 
Europe, where “…scholars inquired when and under what circumstances leaders of 
military regimes would abdicate and initiate a transition to democracy.”218 Yet frequent 
military seizures of power through coups and ongoing military prerogatives leading to 
democratic backsliding over the same period led scholars of civil-military relations to 
focus on the deleterious effects militaries can have on new democracies. The impact of 
the military on democratization outcomes thus remains uncertain; as Kuehn notes in his 
recent introduction to new research on the topic, it can be midwife or gravedigger of 
democracy.219 
Militaries can be supportive of democratization through elite-led agreements, 
according to research on Third Wave democratic transitions. O’Donnell and Schmitter,220 
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Przeworski,221 Burton, Gunther, and Higley,222 and Mainwaring,223 among others focus 
on the processes leading from a breakdown in the authoritarian regime to negotiations for 
political change leading to a new democratic system. These analyses stress the 
interactions among elite actors during the contingent and uncertain transition from 
authoritarian rule, in which the military was often heavily involved, to democracy. In 
successful transitions, elites strategically decide to pursue liberalization, opening the way 
for democratization. 
The military was an important elite actor in many Third Wave transitions and 
scholarly explanations of them. Many of the countries that underwent transitions had 
been military regimes, and the military’s decision to give up power to civilians was 
necessary for political change. In other, non-military regimes, militaries had the capacity 
and resources to affect democratization. On the basis of this research, prior to a transition, 
the military must be included in or tolerant of an authoritarian regime’s decision to 
liberalize. During the transition, the military, as a powerful institution with coercive 
capabilities, may exercise greater influence than other, pro- or anti-democracy actors.224 
Because the military is such a key player, its support of democratization can be 
crucial for political change. For instance, one form of particularly successful Third Wave 
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transitions involved agreements among the military and elites that made democratization 
more acceptable by guaranteeing the military’s future interests.225 In some cases, these 
“pacts” between military softliners and the civilian opposition led to democracy.226 In 
others, “…military leaders took the lead, at times in response to opposition and popular 
pressure, in bringing about the change in regime.”227 More generally, this research 
suggests that the military can support democratization by initiating political change and 
making transition processes possible. 
Yet, as a powerful actor with organizational interests, the military can also 
threaten new democracies and democratic consolidation. This is a key claim of the civil 
military relations literature. In democracies, civilians must control government policy 
decisions, including those concerning the military.228 Military intervention in politics 
challenges civilian policymaking. Military involvement in democratic transitions, in 
particular, interferes with the establishment of civilian control and impedes civilian-led 
democratization.229 A more normative claim of the literature follows: the role of the 
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military during and after the transition should be minimized so that civilians are able to 
create and manage the institutions and rules of a new democratic regime. 
Military involvement in politics takes various forms, from direct military 
intervention in politics, with coups as the extreme, to military influence over political 
decisionmaking.230 In all, a lack of civilian control generally means that the military is 
not secondary to democratically-elected leaders and their appointed officials. As 
Chambers et al. explain, civilian control is “…that distribution of decision-making power 
in which civilians alone have authority to decide on national policies and their 
implementation.”231 A lack of civilian control threatens all aspects of democracy, 
including elections, political rights, civil rights, and horizontal accountability.232 This 
logic suggests, counter to the above, that a politically active military will be harmful to 
democratization. 
In sum, democratization and civil-military relations scholars point to the 
importance of militaries in politics and political change, but reach different conclusions 
regarding their impact on democracy. Militaries sometimes act to bring about a transition 
from the authoritarian regime, but in doing so can exercise influence over the transition 
processes and outcomes.233 Specifically, in the transition period, powerful militaries can 
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expand their autonomy, claim institutional privileges, exercise decision-making authority, 
veto particular policies – and remain outside civilian control going forward.234 A military 
may support democratization by partnering with pro-democracy actors, but its active role 
during the transition can hurt the civilian control that is critical to consolidating 
democracy. 
Military Political Roles in the Context of Anti-Regime Protest Movements 
The civil resistance literature has shown the military can play a supportive role in 
a different form of political change, and this dissertation aims to understand when this is 
more likely. Classic analyses of democratic transitions pay little attention to civil society 
or nonelite actors, but recent research has focused on the importance of civil resistance 
for democratization with military loyalty shifts as a key determinant of campaign success. 
Transitions driven by civil society are more effective at promoting democracy than those 
controlled by elites.235 While both violent and nonviolent action can bring down 
authoritarian regimes, nonviolent action is more likely to force regime change that leads 
to democracy.236 Lastly, nonviolent movements have a positive effect on short- and long-
term democracy regardless of campaign success.237 
                                                 
234 Muthia Alagappa, ed., Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives (East-
Wester Center, 2001); Aurel Croissant, “From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian 
Democratization,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 156-178. 
 
235 Petter Grahl Johnstad, “Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How Transition Mode 
and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy,” Peace and Change 35, no. 3 (2010): 464-82; Adrian 
Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, How Freedom is Won: From Civil Resistance to Durable Democracy 
(New York, NY: Freedom House, 2005).  
 
236 Mauricio Rivera Celestino and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? 
Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 385-
400. 
 
237 Jan Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil 
 
 144 
To recall from earlier, military support through defections from the authoritarian 
regime makes the success of nonviolent campaigns 46 times more likely.238 In marked 
contrast, military defections have no effect on the success of violent movements.239 
However, despite defections’ importance, the link between them and other political 
outcomes is uncertain. The insights from the democratization and civil-military relations 
literatures lead to conflicting expectations. Militaries can support democratization in 
cooperation with other elites. They are also crucial to the success of anti-regime protest 
movements; yet, in these contexts, democracy is “…only one potential outcome.”240 In 
what follows, I draw on my explanation of types of military loyalty shifts to develop a 
logic for how the types differently impact democratization. Some forms of regime control 
threaten the sources of military authority and compromise the military organization. 
Loyalty shifts therefore reflect to some extent military organizational strength or 
weakness, with implications for the military’s role in politics. 
Authoritarian Regime Control and the Quality of Military Loyalty Shifts 
When militaries respond to mass nonviolent protests by shifting support to the 
protesters, their disloyalty to the regime may be supportive of political change and 
democratization. But military defections and successful anti-regime movements do not 
always end in democracy. Understanding this variation requires attention to my 
explanation of types of military loyalty shifts, and particularly my focus on military 
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sources of authority. To review: I argue that militaries are more likely to shift loyalty 
when the authoritarian regime, through coup-proofing, has threatened military functional 
capacities and the military’s functional claims to authority. Militaries may be able to rely 
on their delegated authority, but mass protests challenge regime legitimacy, and this 
source of military authority, too. 
Authoritarian regimes that control their militaries using coup-proofing strategies 
threaten military functional authority. These strategies also affect the military 
organization, which helps to explain the types of military loyalty shifts – in particular, 
whether loyalty shifts involve high- ranking officers, and whether they are united or 
fragmented. Forms of coup-proofing that structure the military primarily on the basis of 
personalized control weaken the military organization, making low level and fragmented 
high level shifts more likely than united defections. Forms such as institutional coup-
proofing that increase military discontent but do not divide the military organization 
increase the likelihood of united defections, especially when the protest movement is 
large. I find support for this argument in Chapters Three and Four. 
The ways militaries respond to anti-regime protest movements, ranging from 
loyalty to united defections, is therefore explained by threats to military authority and 
reflects the impact of regime control strategies on the military organization. A military 
that responds to protests with high level but fragmented shifts is relatively weak. This 
type of disloyalty may make both campaign success and democratization more likely, 
even though it amounts to military involvement in politics outside the regime’s delegated 
authority in the civil-military relations literature’s sense of civilian control. A military 
that shifts loyalty as a united military organization will support protesters without 
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positively impacting democratization, because the military leadership will be more able 
to influence the transition and, in line with the classic literature’s expectations, hurt 
civilian democracy. 
These expectations follow the logic of my earlier argument and are grounded in 
the literatures reviewed above. In general, militaries that shift loyalty to the protesters 
support political change by virtue of removing backing from the authoritarian regime, 
often leading to its collapse. Loyalty shifts that go beyond the rank and file to involve 
significant parts of the military at higher levels mean most of the military is in favor of 
regime change. These shifts make campaign success more likely,241 and similar to cases 
of military-opposition pacts, may provide the conditions for democratic transition.242 
Thus, democratization will be more likely when militaries shift significant support from 
the regime to the protesters. 
Hypothesis 1: High level military loyalty shifts positively impact democratization. 
 Conversely, military involvement in regime change may harm democratization 
because it is political involvement outside of civilian control. Civilian actors need space 
during transitions to operate free from military interference. When a military has 
influence over the transition, the establishment of civilian control by newly-elected 
civilians will be more difficult.243 As Aguero writes, “…transitions have decisively 
influenced the varying degrees to which the militaries retain or are given prerogatives in 
                                                 
241 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. 
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243 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: 





the successor regime and, in turn, the nature of civil-military relations in the new 
democracies.”244 Without civilian control, these new democracies will struggle to 
consolidate and may regress.245 
Thus, types of high level loyalty shifts likely vary in their impact on 
democratization. Those that are directed over a united organization indicate a relatively 
strong military that, while supportive of protesters, may be able to involve itself in the 
transition in ways that challenge the establishment of civilian control. Democratization 
may still occur, through the efforts of civilian protesters and opposition elites, but 
military support through its response will have less impact. In contrast, high level, 
fragmented loyalty shifts indicate a relatively weak military organization that is both 
supportive of political change and easier for the new civilian authorities to control. 
Hypothesis 2: High level, united military defections have less of an impact on 
democratization than high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts. 
This argument breaks with the existing civil-military relations literature and posits 
that militaries, though outside of civilian control, may support democratization by 
supporting popular, nonviolent calls for political change. Yet it also acknowledges the 
challenges a powerful military can pose to democratization, and makes clear that not all 
military loyalty shifts have the same post-protest impacts. I test these hypotheses below, 
using my data on military responses and regression techniques. I attempt a few strategies 
to tease out the loyalty shifts’ independent impacts on measures of democracy. I find 
                                                 
244 Aguero, “Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America,” 
385. 
 
245 Chambers, Croissant, Kuehn, and Wolf, “Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian 
Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies,” 960. 
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some evidence for Hypothesis 2, or the positive effects of fragmented high level shifts. 
These shifts’ effects become less clear when I control for other determinants of 
democratization, but remain greater than those of united defections or other shifts. 
Empirical Strategy 
Earlier, I made the case for disaggregating military defections into types of 
military loyalty shifts, in order to better understand the military organization’s 
involvement. I continue that discussion here by claiming that the way scholars have so far 
conceptualized and measured military defections is a barrier also to understanding the 
impact of militaries post-protests. Broadly categorizing military shifts of support as 
defections masks important variation in the likely role of a military in the political 
transition. Thus, I use my data on military responses and the type shift variable as the 
main explanatory factor in this analysis. 
As in Chapter Three, my universe of cases is all maximalist anti-regime, 
nonviolent campaigns from 1946 to 2015 as identified by MEC, less those that occurred 
in democracies, Soviet Republics, non-independent countries, or countries without 
militaries. I again show the results for all cases in the Appendix. The unit of analysis is 
country-campaign, which produces 112 observations. As shown in Table 1, 52.68% of 
the campaigns in the dataset were successful at achieving regime change according to 
MEC’s definitions. 
Table 1. Anti-regime campaign success 
Success Freq. Percent 
Unsuccessful 53 47.32 
Successful 59 52.68 




To review, type shift indicates the military response to the overall anti-regime 
protest movement. A military can respond with loyalty to the regime by defending it. A 
military can be neutral, and neither actively support the regime nor shift support to the 
protesters. Parts of a military’s rank and file or low ranking officers can shift loyalty. A 
military can shift loyalty at high levels but as a fragmented organization. Or, a military 
can shift loyalty through united defections. For this analysis, I keep the loyal and neutral 
categories separate, to consider the possibility that a military’s non-involvement in the 
protests impacts democratization. I show the frequencies of these categories across the 
cases in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Frequencies of categories of type shift 
 
 
As shifts of support from the regime, all military responses besides loyalty and 
neutrality might be expected to help bring about campaign success. I illustrate the 
associations between categories of type shift and campaign outcomes in Table 2. Success 
is more likely for some responses than others. Success does not necessarily result in 















regardless of campaign outcome.246 In any case, I control for campaign success in my 
analyses to ensure the relationships between loyalty shifts and democratization do not 
depend on this outcome. 
Table 2. Frequency of campaign outcomes per type shift 
type_shift Unsuccessful Successful 
Loyal 19 (35.85%) 6 (10.17%) 
Neutral 19 (35.85%) 16 (27.12%) 
Low Level 13 (24.53%) 3 (5.08%) 
Fragmented High Level 1 (1.89%) 19 (32.2%) 
United Defections 1 (1.89%) 15 (25.4%) 
Total 53 (100%) 59 (100%) 
 
In evaluating the effects of categories of type shift, I include a number of other 
factors that might also affect democratization and could confound my results. Though 
many possible determinants of democracy have been proposed, I lean on the results of 
Teorell.247 He tests social, economic, international, and agency-related factors and 
identifies those that are the most robust predictors of democratization. Some of these 
predictors act as triggers to democratization; one such trigger is peaceful demonstrations, 
the context of this study. It is the slower-moving variables that have the most explanatory 
power, though, so I concentrate on these as controls. 
Impediments to democratization include large geographic size (area, the log of a 
country’s area in 1000s of square kilometers), and economic dependency on foreign trade 
(trade, or the sum of exports and imports of goods and services expressed as a fraction of 
GDP). I calculate both from World Bank data. Other impediments are Muslim 
                                                 
246 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict; 
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populations, driven by the Arab region and accounted for by region dummies, and fuel 
exports (also from the World Bank). Sustainers of democratization include 
socioeconomic modernization and economic freedom. I do not replicate Teorell’s 
measures of these variables, but use GDP per capita from the World Bank (supplemented 
by Gleditsch),248 a proxy for development that is associated with democracy.249 
I include a Cold War dummy to capture changes in the international system over 
time. The end of the Cold War marked a new normative commitment to democracy by 
the international community, resulting in increased pressures for the spread and 
institutionalization of democratic forms of government and against coups and other forms 
of military intervention.250 I also include a control for the country’s Polity IV score in the 
year prior to the campaign (Dem Level). 
I measure my dependent variable of democracy in two ways: the country’s Polity 
IV score in year five after the campaign (politypost5), and the change in its Polity IV 
score from the year prior to the campaign to year five after (politychange5). Polity scores 
range from -10 to 10. In the first measure, greater values indicate more democratic in 
absolute terms, while in the second, greater values indicate more democratic relative to 
pre-campaign levels. Together they provide a sense of the explanatory factors’ effects on 
                                                 
248 As in Chapter Three, I primarily use the World Bank’s data, but consult Gleditsch on cases where the 
World Bank is missing information. I detail the process by which I rescale the Gleditsch data in Chapter 
Three, footnote 29. The World Bank, World Development Indicators (Oxford: Oxford University Press); 
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Expanded Trade and GDP Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 
(2002): 712-24. 
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no. 1 (1996): 1-30. 
 
250 Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathan M. Powell, “Coup d’etat or Coup d’Autocracy? How Coups Impact 




overall democratization and ensure that the effects are not limited to one measure of 
democracy. As further robustness checks, I include tests using a binary measure of 
democracy (with democracy defined as Polity scores of six or higher) and continuous 
measures using V-Dem’s polyarchy measure in the Appendix.251 The results generally 
hold up, though as below, the effects of the shifts (in particular, Fragmented High Level) 
are much stronger in the absence of controls. 
Tables 3 and 4 contain summary statistics for the dependent and control variables. 
Table 3. Summary statistics: continuous dependent and control variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
politypost5 110 1.6455 6.2142 -9 10 
politychange5 110 5.9000 6.4764 -11 19 
V-Dem post 97 0.4466 0.2386 0.0722 0.9025 
V-Dem change 97 0.2014 0.2426 -0.3494 0.7731 
Dem Level (Polity) 112 -4.2321 4.0758 -10 5 
Dem Level (V-Dem) 111 0.2543 0.1304 0.0718 0.6949 
GDP per capita 108 7.6995 1.0900 5.2843 10.3414 
Trade 87 66.7387 43.1989 0.2177 280.3610 
Fuel Exports 70 15.7901 26.6837 0.0000 99.9134 
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Table 4. Summary statistics: binary dependent and control variables 
Variable 0 1 
dempost5 62 48 
Cold War 48 64 
Asia 82 30 
Americas 93 19 
Africa 89 23 
Europe 94 18 
FSU 107 5 
MENA 95 17 
 
Exogenous Methods and Results 
I start by running basic tests of the relationship between categories of type shift 
and democracy, with some models that include success and the other determinants of 
democracy as controls. Here, I am in effect assuming that military loyalty shifts are 
exogenous to democratization. I enter in type shift as a set of dummy variables, each 
representing a category or type of military loyalty shift. Loyal serves as the omitted 
baseline category. The resulting coefficients are then the effect of the other categories of 
type shift on democracy, relative to loyalty. I use OLS regression and calculate robust 
standard errors with cases clustered by country, to account for the fact that some 
countries experienced multiple campaigns over the period of analysis.  
In Table 5, Model 1 reports the results of a simple regression between categories 
of type shift and politypost5, controlling for Dem Level. Fragmented High Level has a 
positively, statistically significant effect on democracy, while the other military responses 
(including United Defections) do not. This supports Hypothesis 2 but not 1. In Model 2, 
which includes control variables, the effect of Fragmented High Level disappears. The 
number of observations also dramatically decreases. I drop Trade and Fuel Exports for 
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Model 3 because neither is associated with democracy at a statistically significant level 
and their data has many missing observations. Here, Fragmented High Level is again 
positive and statistically significant. None of the other categories are statistically 
significant, though United Defection’s (and Neutral’s) coefficient is positive. 
Table 5. type shift and democratization measured as politypost5 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
Neutral 1.7100 (1.4720) -0.8090 (1.7620) 0.2720 (1.3640) 
Low Level 0.4760 (2.1180) -0.3510 (2.5560) -0.5260 (1.8340) 
Fragmented  6.752*** (1.6580) 2.6190 (2.8080) 3.991* (1.9590) 
United  2.5510 (1.5530) -0.1030 (2.3060) 0.8760 (1.9120) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.528*** (0.1260) 0.3240 (0.2120) 0.462* (0.1850) 
Success 
  
3.807* (1.6970) 3.889** (1.3690) 
GDP per capita 
  




  Fuel Exports 
  
0.0180 (0.0320) 
  Area  
  
-0.7700 (0.5250) -0.5070 (0.4280) 
Cold War 
  
2.8260 (2.2690) 3.5820 (1.8100) 
Asia 
  
2.0640 (3.9500) 4.167* (2.0370) 
Americas 
  
4.7410 (4.0600) 5.434* (2.5230) 
Africa 
  




  MENA 
  
-3.4200 (4.8130) -1.9090 (2.3880) 
Europe 
    
3.0120 (3.1330) 
















 BIC 716.888   454.533   656.781   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
The results are similar in Table 6, when the dependent variable is politychange5. 
Fragmented High Level has a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy, 
relative to loyalty. Its effect is no longer statistically significant but still positive in the 
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presence of control variables in Model 2, and returns to significance in Model 3. In 
response to anti-regime protests, then, military loyalty shifts that are high level and 
fragmented positively impact democratization, while military neutrality, low level shifts, 
and united defections do not. These findings support Hypothesis 2 – high level military 
loyalty shifts differ in their impacts on democratization. A significant loyalty shift by a 
weaker military organization is more likely to bring about democracy because of the 

































Table 6. type shift and democratization measured as politychange5 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
Neutral 1.710 (1.472) -0.809 (1.762) 0.272 (1.364) 
Low Level 0.476 (2.118) -0.351 (2.556) -0.526 (1.834) 
Fragmented  6.752*** (1.658) 2.619 (2.808) 3.991* (1.959) 
United  2.551 (1.553) -0.103 (2.306) 0.876 (1.912) 
Dem Level -0.47*** (0.126) -0.676** (0.212) -0.538** (0.185) 
Success 
  
3.807* (1.697) 3.889** (1.369) 
GDP per capita 
  




  Fuel Exports 
  
0.018 (0.032) 
  Area  
  
-0.770 (0.525) -0.507 (0.428) 
Cold War 
  
2.826 (2.269) 3.582 (1.810) 
Asia 
  
2.064 (3.950) 4.167* (2.037) 
Americas 
  
4.741 (4.060) 5.434* (2.523) 
Africa 
  




  MENA 
  
-3.420 (4.813) -1.909 (2.388) 
Europe 
    
3.012 (3.133) 
















 BIC 716.888   454.533   656.781   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
To assist with interpretation of these results, I calculate the predicted values of 
politychange5 at each category of type shift (holding the other covariates at their mean 
values) and plot them in Figure 2. This graph more clearly demonstrates the substantive 
impacts of Fragmented High Level versus the other military responses on democracy. 
The predicted value of policychange5 is between 4.66 and 5.46 (the maximum possible 
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value being 20) for the categories of Loyal, Neutral, and Low Level, reflecting the 
positive impact overall of civil resistance on democracy. It increases to approximately 9 
when militaries shift loyalty through Fragmented High Level shifts, compared to 6 for 
United Defections. In substantive terms, both high level shifts positively impact 
democratization, but in line with Hypothesis 2 the effects of Fragmented High Level 
shifts are greater. 
Figure 2. Predicted values of politychange5 at different categories of type shift 
 
 
Endogenous Methods and Results 
Importantly, the above models do not account for the possibility of endogeneity 
between military loyalty shifts and democratization. Military loyalty shifts may emerge in 
contexts where democratization is already underway, meaning that military responses to 
anti-regime protests have no real effect on democratization beyond campaign outcome. I 
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want to be confident that shifts, and particularly fragmented high level shifts, do not only 
occur in conditions where democracy is already present or developing. 
To deal with potential endogeneity, I first set up a model that includes both 
determinants of democratization and determinants of military loyalty shifts, based on the 
findings of Chapter Three. To review, these latter factors include institutional coup-
proofing (ICP), personalist coup-proofing (PCP), and protest size or campaign per capita 
(Size). A coup in the last five years was also an important predictor of Fragmented High 
Level shifts (Coup).252 Testing the hypotheses with this model allows me to control for 
any effects they may have on democratization, not limited to their relationship with the 
types of loyalty shifts. Table 7 displays the results for politypost5 (Model 1) and 























                                                 
252 I include summary statistics of these variables for this analysis in the Appendix.  
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Table 7. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 1.1410 (1.3890) 1.4140 (1.3890) 
Low Level -1.2770 (2.1250) -1.2770 (2.1250) 
Fragmented 2.6690 (1.9280) 2.6690 (1.9280) 
United 0.5140 (2.1570) 0.5140 (2.1570) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.600*** (0.1340) -0.40*** (0.1340) 
ICP -0.9750 (3.1080) -0.9750 (3.1080) 
PCP 3.1330 (1.7070) 3.1330 (1.7070) 
Size 5.3200 (5.6530) 5.3200 (5.6530) 
Coup 0.4080 (1.1290) 0.4080 (1.1290) 
Success 3.800** (1.1370) 3.800** (1.1370) 
GDP per capita 0.7960 (0.6710) 0.7960 (0.6710) 
Area -0.1800 (0.6280) -0.1800 (0.6280) 
Cold War 2.0570 (1.7600) 2.0570 (1.7600) 
Asia 6.200* (2.6680) 6.200* (2.6680) 
Americas 7.526* (3.2230) 7.526* (3.2230) 
Africa 0.8720 (2.2180) 0.8720 (2.2180) 
Europe 7.692* (3.0010) 7.692* (3.0010) 
MENA -0.3710 (2.6350) -0.3710 (2.6350) 




 R2 0.526 
 
0.607 
 AIC 537.971 
 
537.971 
 BIC 585.255   585.255   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Unfortunately, none of the categories of type shift have a statistically significant 
relationship with democracy when accounting for factors related to the regime, protest 
movement, or structural determinants of democratization. Neutral, Fragmented High 
Level, and United Defections have positive coefficients. However, when I drop Success, 
the effect of Fragmented High Level shifts returns, as shown in Table 8. United 
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Defections also has a positive effect on democracy, but it is not statistically significant, 
and Fragmented High Level’s coefficient is larger. This supports Hypothesis 2. 
Table 8. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift and no 
success 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 1.6100 (1.4800) 1.6100 (1.4800) 
Low Level -1.6290 (2.1730) -1.6290 (2.1730) 
Fragmented 5.053** (1.8520) 5.053** (1.8520) 
United  2.8140 (1.8300) 2.8140 (1.8300) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.611*** (0.1450) -0.389** (0.1450) 
ICP -1.3120 (3.2730) -1.3120 (3.2730) 
PCP 2.8110 (1.7980) 2.8110 (1.7980) 
Size 7.6940 (5.8950) 7.6940 (5.8950) 
Coup 0.0900 (1.1680) 0.0900 (1.1680) 
GDP per capita 0.6490 (0.7690) 0.6490 (0.7690) 
Area -0.0620 (0.6540) -0.0620 (0.6540) 
Cold War 2.5800 (1.9260) 2.5800 (1.9260) 
Asia 5.0620 (3.1610) 5.0620 (3.1610) 
Americas 7.668* (3.5560) 7.668* (3.5560) 
Africa 0.1320 (2.7180) 0.1320 (2.7180) 
Europe 7.656* (3.3970) 7.656* (3.3970) 
MENA -2.0060 (3.0740) -2.0060 (3.0740) 




 R2 0.465 
 
0.556 
 AIC 546.713 
 
546.713 
 BIC 591.509   591.509   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Given these findings, I move on to a two-stage model in an attempt to more 
directly account for potential endogeneity in the relationship between Fragmented High 
Level and democracy. In the first stage, I set up an equation to determine Fragmented 
High Level shifts. Again, I draw on the results of Chapter Three. I use multinomial logit 
regression with type shift as the dependent variable, but limit my interest and the result to 
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the relationship between this type of loyalty shift and its determinants. The model is a 
good predictor of Fragmented High Level, as shown in Table 9.  
Table 9. First stage model, for Fragmented High Level instrument 
PCP 4.326*** (1.2720) 
ICP 6.250** (2.2710) 
Size 5.3660 (2.9570) 
Nonviolence -1.3270 (0.9260) 
Viol Conflict 1.952** (0.7030) 
Dem Level (VDem) -3.3910 (5.3100) 
Incumbent 2.317* (1.0890) 
GDP per capita 2.293* (0.9240) 
Soldier Quality -2.784* (1.1750) 
Coup 5.526** (1.8430) 
Constant -26.314** (9.7680) 
 
I save the predicted probability generated from this first equation and use it as an 
instrument for my second equation, an OLS regression with politychange5 as the 
dependent variable.253 I also include a range of covariates between the models.254 Table 
10, Model 1 includes Success, and Fragmented High Level is positively but not 
significantly associated with democratization (its p-value is .078). Model 2 does not 
include Success and here Fragmented High Level’s instrument has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the outcome. This supports Hypothesis 2 while partially 
                                                 
253 I attempt to use CDSIMEQ from Keshk 2003 (Maddala 1983), which tests a two-equation system with a 
dichotomous endogenous variable and a continuous dependent variable. However, because calculating the 
instrument for Fragmented High Level requires modeling it relative to the other categories of type shift, I 
must use a separate equation. Standard errors should be interpreted with caution. Omar M.G. Keshk, 
“CDSIMEQ: A Program to Implement Two-Stage Probit Least Squares,” The Stata Journal 3, no. 2 
(2003): 157-67; G.S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). The correlation between the predicted probability for Fragmented High 
Level and a dummy variable for Fragmented High Level is .5135. 
 
254 I do not include Dem Level and GDP per capita because I use these covariates to determine the 




allaying endogeneity concerns.255 This type of loyalty shift appears to have an 
independent impact on democracy.  
Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (politychange5) 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Pr(Fragmented) 3.2410 (1.8080) 5.365* (2.1500) 
Success 4.842*** (1.1130) 
  Area -0.0550 (0.5460) 0.1600 (0.6590) 
Cold War 0.8080 (1.8650) 0.8760 (1.8570) 
Asia -2.2070 (2.2810) -3.8850 (2.3180) 
Africa -6.127* (2.4070) -6.568* (2.5010) 
Europe 1.5350 (2.9390) 1.2460 (3.0690) 
FSU -7.745** (2.6970) -8.097* (3.1640) 
MENA -8.522*** (2.2890) -10.43*** (2.3020) 




 R2 0.515 
 
0.396 
 AIC 533.537 
 
550.735 
 BIC 558.31   573.031   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
In summary, this evidence generally supports my argument and hypotheses. High 
level military loyalty shifts can positively impact democratization, even when controlling 
for campaign outcome and other determinants of democracy. The type of loyalty shift 
matters, though: full defections by a united military organization have less of an impact 
than high level shifts by a fragmented military. This is because united defections allow 
the military leadership to influence the democratic transition and challenge the 
establishment of civilian control, compared to militaries that are disunited and weaker 
                                                 
255 However, this result does not hold in models with politypost5 as the dependent variable. Thus, this two-




and will likely have less influence. These findings challenge the civil-military relations 
literature’s claims that a politically active military is harmful for democratization, while 
supporting its overall intuition that civilian control is necessary for democratic 
consolidation. 
Conclusions 
This analysis confirms the importance of military loyalty shifts for both anti-
regime protest movement outcomes and post-protest democratization. Through it, I 
support the claim I have implicitly been making throughout the dissertation: that military 
support for anti-regime protests can support democratization. I add to the insights of the 
existing literatures on the military’s role in politics, as well as my earlier argument 
regarding the effects of strategies of regime control on the military’s authority and 
organization. The forms authoritarian regime control of the military takes impacts 
military responses to protests, which in turn impact democratization. I also further 
demonstrate the value of considering types of loyalty shifts, because differences in the 
extent and quality of military organizations’ loyalty shifts have varying impacts on 
democracy. 
 These findings speak to the literatures on civil-military relations and 
democratization. The military may play a positive role in democratization, especially 
when it partners with other elites or offers support to nonelites. During mass, nonviolent 
challenges to an authoritarian regime, the military’s role is often crucial – both in terms 
of campaign success and democratization. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom 
among civil-military scholars that a military acting outside of its authority delegated by 
civilians is problematic for democracy. There are ways a military may involve itself in 
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political transitions that challenge the establishment of civilian control and democracy, 
though. This analysis provides insights as to when this is more likely in the context of 
protest movements. Authoritarian regime control of the military impacts the nature of 
military support for protesters, and thus the likelihood of democratic civilian control and 
democratic consolidation. I examine these relationships in more detail and as causal 
processes through the case studies in the next chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX: MALI – AUTHORITY THREATS, UNITED DEFECTIONS, 
AND MILITARY-LED DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
In Mali, major protests against President Moussa Traore began in fall 1990. They 
ramped up in January 1991, shortly after a conflict between the national government and 
a Tuareg rebel movement ended in negotiations. The Malian military’s poor performance 
during this conflict owed to the effects of Traore’s coup-proofing strategies on military 
capabilities and put its functional authority in question. In the context of threats to the 
military’s functional authority, large, nonviolent protests challenged the regime as the 
source of the military’s delegated authority. My argument would expect high level 
military loyalty shifts in response. Given the Malian military’s united defection, my 
argument would also expect it to have influence over the post-Traore transition, 
challenging the establishment of democratic civilian control.  
This chapter uses the Malian case to demonstrate the logic of my argument for 
high level united defections and their impacts on democratization. In what follows, I 
show that the Traore regime exercised control over the military such that when faced with 
mass protests, the military shifted loyalty. In particular, Traore’s use of institutional and 
personalist coup-proofing and the effects his control had on military effectiveness during 
conflict led the military to fully defect in response to large anti-regime protests. The 
military’s disloyalty was responsible for the protest movement’s success but put military 
leaders in a position to control the initial post-campaign transition period. The Malian
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military acted outside regime control and in support of protesters and political change, yet 
created some challenges for post-protest democratization. 
Traore’s Regime and Control of the Military 
In 1991, the Malian military was under the control of a former military regime 
whose civilianized, one-party rule had little legitimacy. Moussa Traore came to power in 
a 1968 military coup against President Modibo Keita. Traore’s regime transitioned to 
military-backed civilian rule over the next decade. A new constitution was approved in 
1974, and Traore created the Democratic Union of the Malian People (UPDM) party in 
1979.256 He was elected president in June 1979, receiving 99 percent of the vote,257 and 
reelected in 1985.258 In spite of the UPDM, he exercised mostly personal authority, ruling 
largely through decree259 and “...control[ing] all aspects of Malian life.”260  
Traore controlled the military with the potential threat it posed against him in 
mind. It was President Keita’s poor management of this threat that had led to his 
downfall. Traore and other officers seized power partly in response to Keita using the 
military to serve his regime and ideology. For example, Keita set up Communist party 
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sections within military units and employed them for development projects.261 He also 
created a People’s Militia that acted as his personal guards. It numbered approximately 
9,000 by late 1968 and received paramilitary training.262  
The military resented its position in Keita’s regime. In particular, it resented the 
Militia and considered it a political move out of line with military interests.263 In the 
military’s view, the Militia was set up “...to neutralize the army’s technical monopoly of 
violence.”264 Prior to the coup, Traore and other junior officers expressed their 
displeasure regarding the Militia to Keita and requested he either disband it or put it 
under army control. They claimed it was “...creating mass insecurity and discontent 
through intimidation.”265 Keita did not heed their advice, and soon after seizing power, 
the military council headed by Traore liquidated the MP as well as the Comite National 
de Defense de la Revolution, Keita’s Communist party body.266  
Traore understood these sources of military discontent when he took power, yet 
structured the military primarily to secure his rule. Following early military unrest, 
Traore used his rising position in the anti-Keita coup coalition to purge those who 
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disagreed with him, replacing them with loyalists.267 According to later writings by 
retired officers, he regularly imprisoned members of the military suspected of 
disloyalty.268 He engaged in institutional coup-proofing, dividing the Republican Guard, 
or “Red Berets”, from the regular army “Green Berets”. The Red Berets were outside the 
army chain of command and answered directly to Traore.269  
These strategies protected Traore but did not provide for military interests. 
Despite high security expenditures (in part to fund the Red Berets), the living conditions 
of military personnel were poor.270 Rank and file soldiers frequently went unpaid. His 
weakening of the military and the military hierarchy through personalist coup-proofing 
created tensions between senior officers and the rank and file, and fears of mutiny.271 
Though the Traore regime remained in power, military discontent was evident, with 
multiple coup attempts reported during the 1980s.272  
The effects of Traore’s control on military capabilities and their implications for 
military functional authority became clear in its performance against Tuareg rebels. The 
northern conflict, though ongoing, flared up in June 1990. Poorly armed members of the 
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People’s Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) attacked a police station, 
seeking to free rebels that had been captured by Malian security forces earlier in the year. 
The attack was successful, and the rebels stole weapons and vehicles.273  
As the conflict continued, the military was forced to become more engaged, using 
arrests and violence.274 By the final months of 1990, though, the MPLA had won “...a 
number of resounding victories over the Malian army.”275 This was despite the rebels 
numbering only around 200, and the army deploying 4000 soldiers, or two-thirds of its 
total strength, to the region.276 The military did not have sufficient resources, equipment, 
or overall capacity to defeat the Tuaregs.277  
The military’s ineffectiveness was largely tied to its organizational weakness, 
which was a product of Traore’s personalist control and support of forces counter to the 
military. The military leadership had problems directing increasingly unreliable units 
stationed in the north.278 The rank and file were not certain to follow orders from the 
military hierarchy. Intra-military disagreements between soldiers and officers 
“...significantly weakened their loyalty and collective strength.”279 The military was not 
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powerful or cohesive, and so unable to carry out its functional role – providing for a 
secure society.  
Because of the link between military capabilities and regime control, the Tuareg 
conflict strained the regime-military relationship. “Continuous losses produced 
exhaustion and resentment on the part of the army, which...could not successfully 
continue the military struggle.”280 As a result, the military stopped supporting the 
government’s efforts in the area.281 The Tuaregs, while not an especially formidable 
threat to the state, had resisted military defeat. In the process, the military had suffered 
losses to military personnel and reputation. According to public opinion, the army had 
given up.282  
The Traore regime signed a ceasefire in January 1991 that gave northern Mali 
some autonomy.283 At that point, victory was unlikely because the regime “...had no 
control over the army.”284 Further, a matter of greater urgency was growing anti-Traore 
protests in the capital. Traore needed to move elite troops from the north to Bamako to 
defend his regime.285 The ceasefire was then part of a decision to “...focus on efforts to 
hold on to power.”286 It also became another source of discontent for the military: “It was 
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widely believed that [the signing of the peace agreement] was done so the military could 
be turned on the increasingly restless population... As well as resenting this role, the 
military felt slighted by the speedy settlement with the Tuaregs.”287 
Traore moved to negotiate in part to secure his rule, but the ceasefire had the 
effect of further undermining his popular legitimacy. The agreement was reached with 
little input from many northern communities, or the political opposition.288 It was far 
from an acceptable resolution to the conflict, for either the larger Malian population or 
the military. Both “...were enraged by the pledges of the agreements and perceived the 
concessions made to the Tuaregs as a threat to the integrity of the country.”289 Traore 
sought to keep the details of the agreement secret, knowing the “special status” for the 
Tuaregs would be controversial. As expected, protests broke out as details of the 
agreement were leaked.290  
In sum, the conflict served to make the regime’s threats to military functional 
authority especially clear, putting the military’s delegated and functional authority in 
tension. Traore’s coup-proofing had damaged military capabilities, decreasing military 
effectiveness in conflict and threatening military functional authority. Further, he ended 
the conflict partly to delegate some authority to the military to end the growing popular 
protests against it. The challenge to the regime’s legitimacy also challenged the 
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legitimacy of the military’s delegated authority, in the context of already diminished 
military functional authority.  
Anti-Traore Protests and the Military’s Response 
The failure of the Traore regime to support Mali’s territorial integrity only further 
challenged its claims to authority. The UPDM had been unable to solve many of the 
country’s problems over the previous decade, and “...very early on, Malians began to 
question its legitimacy.”291 Though initially Traore himself had been popular, corruption 
undermined his rule. It was well known that his family and those close to him were 
benefiting from power.292 Groups began to demand multi-partyism in 1990, but the 
regime refused to make reforms.293 Opposition took the form of demonstrations and 
strikes and escalated in 1991. On January 21, the extent of the opposition to Traore 
became clear; hundreds of students rioted in Bamako after authorities banned marches 
calling for multiparty democracy.294  
Traore took a hardline stance in response to the unrest, offering no concessions. 
He asserted control over the situation by reshuffling his cabinet and putting some of his 
military supporters in charge of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of the Interior.295 
The Interior Minister, General Sekou Ly, had previously served in the position but left 
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due to rumors of corruption. His first tenure was marked by the severe suppression of 
strikes by teachers and students in 1979 and 1980.296 This move thus signaled Traore 
would again use repression if needed.  
The regime’s reaction to the January demonstrations encouraged a renewed 
challenge to the regime in mid-March.297 The protests required security force 
involvement, and at this point, the military seemed loyal to Traore and willing to repress 
on his orders. On March 22, soldiers fired on protesters in Bamako, killing at least 22, 
wounding hundreds, and setting off widespread rioting. Following this violent episode, 
Traore indicated he was willing to discuss the protesters’ grievances, but declared alleged 
violence on the part of the protesters unjustified. He announced a state of emergency and 
imposed a curfew in an attempt to tamp down the situation.298  
The next day, March 23, saw more military repression and a new stage in the anti-
Traore movement. Large groups of women marched in the streets of Bamako to protest 
the previous day’s killings. Soldiers shot and killed five of them, then chased the rest and 
other demonstrators into a building and set it on fire, killing another 65.299 Such 
egregious and indiscriminate violence shocked Malians and observers around the world. 
It is unclear whether the regime or military leadership ordered the killings. In response, 
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though, the opposition demanded Traore resign, because he “...had no moral right to 
remain as president of the country”300 after such violence on his behalf.  
Traore agreed to talks with opposition leaders and lifted the state of emergency 
and curfew. He remained confident in his position, at least partly because he believed he 
had the support of the army. He told a radio station that he would not step down from 
power, instead urging calm from the protesters so that the security forces could stop using 
lethal force.301  
The military’s loyalty was not absolute, however. So far, military support of the 
regime through repression had not ended the popular challenge. The opposition, 
including the National Union of Malian Workers and students, called for more 
demonstrations on March 25. 45,000 people took to the streets, and for the first time in 
four days, troops did not fire on the protesters.302 The unrest challenged the military’s 
interest in order and functional authority, but was due to Traore’s refusal to resign. The 
leaders of seven civil society associations had the day before released a statement 
threatening an indefinite strike until Traore left power.303 More repression may have 
ended the protests, but would have further compromised military delegated authority – 
the ultimate source being the population.  
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Importantly, the protesters were committed to nonviolence, large in size, and 
diverse in support, indicating they might be an alternative source of military authority. In 
the later stages of the protest movement, the opposition set up an umbrella group labeled 
the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition (CCAOD). It brought together 
students, trade unionists, opposition politicians, and human rights activists. Earlier, the 
Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), a major opposition organization, had 
proclaimed itself a political party. It had strong, broad-based support in both urban and 
rural areas.304 At the protests’ height, tens of thousands of people were demonstrating 
against the regime.305 The regime was facing a major challenge, would likely need 
military support to withstand it. 
On March 26, military leaders opted to preserve the military’s functional authority 
by shifting loyalty to the protesters. A group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel 
Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) informed a human rights activist and representative of 
the opposition that they had arrested Traore.306 ATT was commander of a paratrooper 
battalion and former head of the Red Berets.307 Later that day, he explained the military’s 
loyalty shift to a press conference, saying, “We just did what the people wanted... We 
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completed what they started.”308 The arrest largely had the support of the rest of the 
military.309  
The operation to arrest Traore involved a small number of high ranking officers. 
However, no members or factions of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed 
disagreement with ATT’s decision. It does not seem that the rank and file or low ranking 
officers shifted loyalty prior to Traore’s arrest, but their resentments towards him were 
well known and mutiny rumors may have spurred ATT to act. As popular opposition to 
the regime increased, security forces tasked to respond “...had to be constantly monitored 
and frequently replaced.”310 Traore’s weakening of the military organization did not 
prevent it from defecting in full, given the great threats to its sources of authority. 
Rather, the Malian military responded to the anti-regime protests according to my 
argument’s expectations regarding threats to military authority and military loyalty shifts. 
In the military’s view, Traore was no longer able to keep the peace – either in the capital, 
or the north.311 According to media reports, the military was especially affected when 
Traore’s orders for tanks and soldiers on the streets of Bamako resulted in massive loss of 
life.312 Continued loyalty would have meant further threats to military functional 
authority from Traore’s control and the unrest for which his increasingly illegitimate rule 
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was to blame. Instead, the military supported the protest movement as an alternative. In 
the days following, military leaders committed to their new source of delegated by 
authority by issuing an apology to representatives of the opposition for the atrocities 
soldiers had committed against the protesters.313  
The impacts of Traore’s control on military functional capabilities were especially 
clear following the Tuareg conflict. Traore was unable to prevent the military from acting 
against him to preserve its functional authority, even with the use of institutional coup-
proofing. ATT, a former commander of the Red Berets – the force tasked with guarding 
the president – led the defections. In fact, ATT may have used his ties to the Red Berets 
and access to the regime they gave him to mount the arrest.314 Traore’s counterforces did 
not secure his regime, and generated further military discontent. And despite Traore’s 
weakening of the military, these control strategies combined with the Tuareg conflict and 
the large and nonviolent protests led to united defections.  
Additional implications of the military’s concern with restoring its functional 
authority were evident in its actions after Traore’s arrest, offering further support for my 
argument. It moved to return order to the country, by closing Mali’s borders and 
international airport. It also imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and with the civilian 
opposition appealed for calm in the streets. Violence in the aftermath claimed the lives of 
59 people – but most of the dead were alleged looters, killed by soldiers.315 ATT and the 
                                                 
313 Gerald Bourke, “Mali Army Deposes President,” The Independent, March 27, 1991. 
 
314 Andrew McGregor, “Red Berets, Green Berets,” Terrorism Monitor 11, no. 4 (2013). 
 





united military organization had supported the anti-Traore protesters by protecting its 
sources of authority. Its loyalty shift had a less clearly positive impact on democratization 
during the transition.  
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes 
The military remained united in the period following Traore’s arrest, allowing the 
leadership to take decisive control of the situation. The military quickly arrested all of 
Traore’s ministers. However, it did not arrest any army chiefs, even those involved in 
repression.316 It then took the lead of the transition by setting up a National 
Reconciliation Council (NRC) of 17 army officers, some of whom had been very close to 
Traore. These included an aid, Lieutenant Colonel Oumar Dialloa, and the director of the 
Defense Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Cheikh Oumar Diarra.317 This further signaled a 
united military leadership whose discontent was with the Traore regime and not along 
military divisions.  
The NRC’s plans for the transition were initially unclear. The officers stated they 
were going to replace Traore’s “bloodthirsty and corrupt regime” with a multiparty 
democracy.318 They also met with pro-democracy leaders, promising to cooperate with 
them. Yet a lack of details led to pressure from the CCAOD over military intentions and 
civilian involvement.319 As a result, 10 officers and 15 representatives of the political 
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organizations formed a new body, the Transition Committee for the Wellbeing of the 
People (CTSP). It held a national conference from July 29 to August 12, during which it 
developed a constitution and other governing documents.320 The new constitution was 
adopted by referendum in January 1992.321  
Throughout this period, there was concern about the military’s role in the 
democratization processes, and whether it would accept rule by a new civilian 
government. The CTSP included civilians, but ATT remained in control as president. In a 
late August 1991 interview with Soumana Sako, interim and civilian prime minister, 
Sako stated: 
...the military is coming out of a period of 23 years in which it exercised power, 
and we are now asking them, during this period of transition, to prepare to give up 
power to civilian, democratically-elected politicians. This situation obviously 
doesn’t please all the soldiers, officers, and junior officers.322  
 
For the time being, the transitional government had a military head of state, ATT, and 
civilian head of government, Sako. Problems had been avoided because, according to 
Sako, “...there [was] perfect harmony between the two.”323 The goal was that the army 
would respect the upcoming elections and then return to the barracks.324  
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The transition ended fairly successfully with parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 1992, and ATT’s relinquishing of power two months later.325 ADEMA won a 
majority of legislative seats and Alpha Omar Konare, leader of ADEMA, won the 
presidency.326 It did not take long for public dissatisfaction with the new government to 
develop, especially given continued economic problems. This new unrest led to worry 
about military intervention, with open fears of a possible coup in 1994.327 New 
challenges followed in 1997, when the opposition boycotted a second round of elections 
after the first had been canceled over poor organization.328 These tensions threatened the 
consolidation of the civilian, democratic regime. 
The military did not directly hurt consolidation nor formally return to politics 
during this period, even though its leadership had been united in disloyalty. This owed 
largely to continued civilian pressure against military intervention, as well as the military 
hierarchy’s ability to prevent coup attempts.329 Military leaders retained political 
influence, however, and ATT in particular re-entered politics when he ran for and won 
the 2002 presidential election.330 ATT promised throughout his campaign that if elected 
he would release Traore, who had been in prison since his arrest. Traore was released 
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days before ATT took office.331 Civilian-led democracy was further destabilized in 
March 2012 when ATT’s term was cut short by a coup, partly in response to his 
government’s failed efforts against a new Tuareg rebellion.332 As one analyst writes, 
“Ironically, for many Malians the only way to get democracy back on track was a coup 
d’etat...”333 The intervention established the continued role of the military in the 
country’s political trajectory and put the future of civilian control in question.  
Conclusions 
By 1991, the Malian military had a long history of involvement in politics, often 
taking the form of repression against unarmed civilians. In fact, it was known for its 
record of human rights abuse. It had used brutal force to repress student-led anti-
government demonstrations in 1980,334 and in July 1990, engaged in indiscriminate 
violence against Tuareg rebels as well as non-combatants.335 It also killed protesters 
during the 1991 uprising.  
In the end, however, the military in 1991 supported democratic change by shifting 
loyalty from the Traore regime to the protest movement. This response was not due to a 
change of heart or a new normative commitment to democracy by the military, but rather 
its concern with its sources of authority. Traore’s coup-proofing threatened military 
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functional authority by reducing its effectiveness, which was especially evident through 
conflict with the Tuareg rebels. The mass protests against Traore then challenged his 
legitimacy and reduced military delegated authority. In this context, the military played a 
supportive role in political change by preserving its functional authority and defecting to 
the protesters.  
This case study demonstrates that a politically active military can support pro-
democracy protesters and political change, yet challenge civilian-led democratization. 
Thus it both develops and confirms claims from the civil-military relations literature. The 
Malian military’s disloyalty to the Traore regime was crucial to the success of the protest 
movement. Further, it was Traore’s forms of control over the military that helped to 
produce this outcome. Because the military organization was united in its defection, 
however, the military leadership was able to involve itself in the transition process and 
democratic politics.  This was particularly notable in ATT’s 2002 election and 
subsequent pardoning of Traore, and culminated in the coup of 2012. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BANGLADESH – AUTHORITY THREATS, FRAGMENTED 
SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
In December 1990, President Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh faced 
mass protests that required he call on the military for support. While Ershad had exerted 
some control over the faction-ridden military during his time in power, he did so by 
establishing personal ties of loyalty based on cronyism. This control threatened military 
functional capabilities by weakening the military organization. The protests that first 
developed in October 1987 were large and nonviolent, but had difficulties uniting due to 
longstanding tensions between the main opposition parties. My argument would expect 
significant loyalty shifts to the protesters, but along military divisions or across a 
disorganized military. It would also expect limited military influence over the democratic 
transition.  
In this chapter, I use the case of Bangladesh to assess the relationship between 
medium levels of threat to military functional authority in the form of personalist coup-
proofing and high level, fragmented military loyalty shifts. I find that Ershad’s granting 
of political and economic benefits to loyal senior officers generated discontent among 
junior officers who worried that the military leadership was corrupt and ineffective. The 
junior officers pressured the chief of army staff to shift loyalty from Ershad, though some 
seniors were in favor of intervening on Ershad’s behalf. In the end, Ershad’s regime fell. 
The military loyalty shifts supported the protesters and the subsequent political change
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was democratizing, because democratically-elected civilians were able to establish 
civilian control over the fragmented military organization.  
Ershad’s Regime and Control of the Military 
Ershad was serving as army chief of staff when he seized power by coup in 1982. 
His coup continued a long tradition of military intervention in politics. Beginning with 
the Bangladesh military’s first post-independence coup in August 1975, it launched a 
series of 22 coups, countercoups, and mutinies.336 Most of the coups were a result of a 
sharp divide and competition for power between the “freedom fighters”, or irregular 
troops who had fought in East Pakistan, and the repatriated troops that had served in the 
Pakistani army prior to independence.337 The divide developed out of the war and 
worsened with Bangladesh’s victory and the fusion of the two forces as one national 
military in December 1971.  
The coups represented a struggle for supremacy between the military factions and 
furthered the military divide. They also challenged the military hierarchy because they 
were often carried out by junior officers. Intra-military discontent was otherwise evident 
in the large-scale mutinies and desertions that took place in 1975, 1976, and 1977.338 
Throughout this post-independence period, the Bangladesh military intervened in politics. 
The coups were however most associated with a fundamental weakness of the military 
organization.  
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Ershad was a repatriated officer, but his coup was not part of this factional 
conflict. His predecessor, Ziaur Rhaman (Zia), had favored the repatriated officers and 
put them in positions of authority.339 He eliminated many freedom fighters from the 
military altogether; his “great purge” from 1977 to 1981 involved executing more than 
1000 officers and other soldiers.340 Because of Zia’s heavy hand, the most intense 
struggles over this division had ended by the time Ershad took power.  
Still, Ershad sought to secure his regime by further stabilizing the military. He 
followed Zia in weeding out the freedom fighters. He placed repatriated and other 
favored military officers in positions of power, including political and administrative 
positions.341 This increased military and political authority and provided the officers 
positions to advance themselves. Under his control, officers were appointed to the federal 
government, police, foreign service, and public corporations.342 By 1985, all seven 
members of his cabinet and nearly 1500 other positions in the civilian administration 
were filled by members of the military. He also increased military funding – the defense 
budget as well as salaries and other benefits.343  
Ershad’s strategies were effective for reducing intra-military conflict and 
preventing military challenges to his rule. As Hakim writes,  
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With handsome salaries, lucrative fringe benefits, the prospect of rapid 
promotion, ever-increasing military budgets, and the opportunity of appointment 
to the government bureaucracy, the armed forces seemed to be reasonably 
satisfied. Ershad was considerably successful in maintaining control over a 
faction-ridden and undisciplined military...344  
 
Indeed, he faced no coup attempts or rebellions during his tenure.345 The military was 
well provided for, and society was increasingly militarized as a result.  
Ershad’s overall structuring of authority was fundamentally personalist, though. 
While his rule was not unlike that of previous Bangladeshi leaders, its personalist nature 
was deeper and more extensive. For example, Ershad’s political party, the Jatiya Party 
(JP), relied on him completely, for its direction and organization.346 More generally, 
Ershad did not rule through institutions but rather monopolized policy and personnel 
decisions. He used his personal control of state resources to distribute political patronage 
and create networks of loyal clients.347  
His control of the military was similarly based on loyalty ties rather than merit-
based standards. His personalist coup-proofing divided the repatriated military into 
favored and disfavored factions, weakening military autonomy and hierarchy. 
Specifically, he used divide and rule tactics to promote some officers and reward them 
financially, while sending others to undesirable postings with inadequate salaries.348 He 
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frequently reshuffled the military command to prevent a centralization of power and the 
emergence of threats.349 His appointment of officers to civilian posts was “mainly 
selective, discretionary, and limited to senior officers and Ershad loyalists.”350 The 
military leaders he favored were political powerful, and corrupt.351  
Ershad exercised control over the military. But the forms in which he delegated it 
authority had negative implications for the military organization’s interests in its 
functional capacity and authority. His personalist strategies created new divisions 
between the upper and lower ranks, politicized the military leadership, and damaged the 
military organization. The weak military institution with its lack of functional capacities 
lost credibility in the eyes of medium and lower ranking officers.352 The senior officers’ 
political appointments gave them a stake in the regime, but took away from the military’s 
focus on its ability to play a functional role in society. The military was not involved in 
conflict over this period, though, and so not directly confronted by the effects of Ershad’s 
policies. Growing protests against Ershad challenged his rule, and threatened the 
military’s reliance on authority delegated by legitimate civilians.  
Anti-Ershad Protests and the Military’s Response 
The anti-Ershad protests that developed in the late 1980s challenged a regime that 
had long struggled to legitimize its rule. Ershad took power just months after the election 
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of a new president. At the time, the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was 
having problems governing, and fighting within the party and between it and its main 
political opponent, the Awami League (AL), had produced clashes.353 Still, his coup was 
not the result of conflict between the government and military, or intra-military conflict. 
Rather, it “...ruptured the civil-military elite consensus that had been nurtured by Zia, and 
it also alienated the masses.”354  
After seizing power, Ershad suspended the constitution and banned all political 
parties. In 1983, he assumed the presidency. He civilianized the government by forming 
the JP later that year.355 These initial steps to solidify his rule were unsuccessful; the JP 
failed to generate support despite its participation in elections.356 Ershad’s close control 
of the JP also weakened the parliament’s functioning.357 Ershad then attempted to bolster 
his legitimacy by holding a referendum in March 1985, but the opposition responded by 
demanding the withdrawal of martial law. The military had to use shows of force to keep 
order during the vote.358 Ershad restored the constitution and full political activity in 
1986, but this lasted less than a year.359  
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Ershad was thus unable to legitimize himself through elections, most of which the 
opposition boycotted or refused to accept when he did not meet their demands. He was 
also unable to turn around the economic crisis and governance failures from which the 
country was suffering when he took power. He almost immediately began to implement 
structural adjustment measures, but these produced little economic stability or growth. 
Under his rule, Bangladesh became increasingly reliant on foreign aid, as well.360  
Though discontent was present from the start of Ershad’s regime, protests ramped 
up in October 1987. He responded by declaring a state of emergency in November and 
dissolving parliament in December. The regime regained some stability, and the BNP and 
AL let up on their demands. This was partly because the AL’s leadership was concerned 
that further instability would bring about a military coup, and that it could be sympathetic 
to the BNP.361 In general, the two parties’ longstanding divisions prevented them from 
putting substantial pressure on Ershad.362 Ershad withstood this particular challenge as a 
result.  
The opposition boycotted the 1988 elections but the anti-regime movement then 
stalled, largely because of devastating natural disasters over the fall and winter that 
displaced millions.363 Protests reorganized in spring 1990 though when Ershad 
announced new elections for early 1991. Increasingly, students participated alongside the 
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more established political organizations. A particularly violent confrontation between 
security forces and demonstrators in October impelled twenty-two existing student 
organizations to join to form the All-Party Students’ Unity group.364 Their determined 
involvement ushered in a new phase in the campaign. In this period, “...political alliances 
were under tremendous pressure from students and other sectors of civil society to be 
united and announce programs that would keep the movement going to oust the 
government.”365 Protests became more steady, and the BNP and AL’s division less 
central.  
As the protests’ momentum grew, the Ershad regime took aggressive measures to 
limit their impact. It had mostly relied on the police and paramilitary forces, including the 
Bangladesh Rifles, with little military involvement.366 At times, however, these forces 
resisted being used by Ershad against unarmed protesters. The police could be unreliable, 
and the Rifles were open about their discontent.367 Consequently, the regime began to 
look to the military for support. This resulted in particularly violent confrontations such 
as in October 1990 when soldiers killed five and injured several hundred 
demonstrators.368  
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Some of Ershad’s attempts to end the popular challenge only escalated the unrest. 
First, he armed parts of the JP, including their student branches. These armed groups 
came to be his main arm of repression – beyond the role of the military. They even 
engaged in violent battles on the Dhaka University campus.369 Second, in late November 
he released criminals who went armed to confront the students.370 This led to more 
violence and generated more protests. Such efforts thus failed to restore regime 
legitimacy (or military delegated authority), and further threatened military functional 
authority with disorder and instability. It was at this point that junior military officers’ 
complaints about Ershad became public.371  
Ershad had few options remaining. The opposition demanded that he transfer 
power to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who would then form an interim 
government and hold elections.372 After meeting with some senior military commanders, 
he declared a state of emergency on November 27 to “safeguard internal security.”373 The 
protests continued, and troops opened fire on demonstrators, killing up to 50.374 On 
December 3, Ershad proposed concessions, but the emboldened opposition rejected 
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them.375 Huq writes of this period: “...the movement for the removal of Ershad and 
restoration of democracy reached its climax when many professional groups such as 
university teachers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, engineers, artists, and others lent their 
unequivocal support to the movement.”376 Under these conditions, it was increasingly 
clear that Ershad needed the military to end the challenge.  
However, from the start of the protests there were “...growing doubts about 
[middle-ranking officers’] patience” with Ershad and his inability to restore his 
legitimacy and societal order.377 Many were critical of the state of emergency and at least 
two battalion commanders sent to reinforce the capital in late November refused to put 
their troops on the streets to kill students.378 When Ershad attempted to move 
reinforcement units to Dhaka, Chief of General Staff Major General Abdus Salam 
resisted, saying he needed additional orders from other military leaders.379 As of early 
December, the troops that had fired on demonstrations just a week previously now stood 
by.380 The military’s loyalty was not absolute, but any loyalty shifts were disorganized 
and temporary.  
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In these later stages of the anti-Ershad movement, the demonstrations were 
moderately large, numbering in the tens of thousands.381 They were also diverse, 
involving workers, doctors, and intellectuals, from across ethnic and kinship groups.382 
Notably absent, however, were organized laborers from the agricultural or industrial 
sectors. Students continued to play an outsized role, maintaining pressure on the BNP- 
and AL-led opposition groups to unite in their challenge to Ershad.383 Still, the leadership 
of the organized parties remained important. Their conflictual history and the fact that the 
AL was known to be anti-military likely affected the military’s view of them as 
alternatives to Ershad.384  
On December 6, Ershad called on the military to end the protests with force.  
Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin Khan refused, and Ershad resigned as a result.385 Reports 
emerged that Khan had acted largely as a middleman after junior officers advised him 
they would not support an increasingly illegitimate government.386 These officers could 
no longer rely on their delegated authority. They were also dissatisfied with Ershad’s 
control of the military institution. According to media coverage of the situation, they 
were specifically unhappy about Ershad’s patronage-based promotions and the constant 
                                                 
381 Earleen Fisher, “Alert for Military Threats, Ershad Underestimated the People,” The Associated Press, 
December 5, 1990. 
 
382 Wilkinson, “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan,” 205. 
 
383 Huq, “Civil Society and Democratization in Bangladesh,” 94-5. 
 
384 Uddin, “The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Bangladesh, 1982- 1990: A Study of 
Political Sociology,” 189. 
 
385 Kulkarni, “Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle,” 14. 
 




changes in command.387 Consequently, they had come to “...assert the apolitical nature of 
the military in its institutional interests.”388  
This response by the military was divided, as one faction of the military supported 
intervention on behalf of Ershad and pressured Khan to take power.389 “It was generally 
known that the top army brass had been divided between Ershad loyalists and neutralists, 
and that [Khan] had been performing a difficult balancing act in the early days of 
December.”390 Khan himself succeeded an Ershad loyalist, Lieutenant General Atiqur 
Rahman, and had only served as Chief since August 1990.391 In the aftermath of Ershad’s 
resignation, Khan took care to remove the interventionist generals, as well as intelligence 
chiefs who reported directly to the president, from positions of power. He also disbanded 
Ershad’s elite officer guard.392 The loyalty shift was also disorganized, with junior 
officers who had become increasingly unreliable pressuring Khan to refuse Ershad’s 
orders.  
In the end, Khan and a large section of the military refused to back Ershad, 
effectively shifting loyalty from his regime to the opposition. Ershad attempted to control 
the military and the threat it posed to his rule, but his strategies of coup-proofing based 
                                                 
387 Arthur Max, “Ershad Quit Following Revolt by Military,” The Associated Press, December 8, 1990. 
 





390 Kulkarni, “Cycle of the Repression Returns with Emergency Rule: Full Circle,” 14. 
 
391 Talukder Manizurraman, “The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the Prospect of Civilian 
Rule in Bangladesh,” Pacific Affairs 65, no. 2 (1992): 208. 
 




on ties of personal loyalty threatened military functional authority. For the lower and 
middle-ranking officers, “...corruption and incompetence of top military and government 
leaders, with whom the military as an institution came to be identified, cost dearly.”393  
Ershad rewarded officers’ loyalty with political and economic benefits that took 
from the military’s core competencies. Non-loyalist officers believed the military’s 
institutional interests – “…a sufficient defense budget, a respectable image for the 
soldiery, and lack of external interference in the army’s internal affairs”394 - were better 
served under a different form of regime control. After nearly three years of protests 
against his regime, the military’s delegated authority was also increasingly in question, 
even if the opposition was internally divided. Much of the military did not want to 
support a regime that had failed to legitimize itself – and that had threatened both sources 
of military authority in the process.  
As my argument expects, Ershad’s forms of control generated high level yet 
fragmented and disunited loyalty shifts. Those officers who expressed loyalty to Ershad 
and preferred intervention did not act in a way that prevented the fall of the regime, 
however. Consequently, the military response supported protesters and political change. 
As Khan and Husain write, “It remains a reasonable speculation that without this 
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response from the military, the bastion of power of Ershad, the fate of the uprising would 
have been different.”395 How then did the loyalty shifts affect democratization?  
Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes 
After Ershad resigned, a three-month transitional government was set up, headed 
by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Shahbuddin Ahmed. It declared a state of 
emergency, restored civil liberties, and organized elections for February 1991. They were 
considered free and fair by observers, and the BNP won the most seats and formed a new 
government.396 In some ways, Bangladesh’s democratic transition was against long odds. 
The country had a literacy rate of 35.52% and a low per capita GDP: “[a]s such, it 
seemed to lack several prerequisites to democracy.”397 Furthermore, the transition 
followed military rule.  
There were significant concerns that the military would play a major, and 
negative, role in the newly established democracy. Of its 24 years of independence, the 
country had been under military rule or significant military influence for 17.398 During 
the protests, some of the opposition worried that military support for Ershad’s ouster 
would result in the reimposition of military rule rather than democracy.399 In the run-up 
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to the elections, both the AL and BNP expressed support for a democratic government 
free of military interference.400 The AL threatened to reform the military if it were to take 
control of the government.401  
Yet the military did not involve itself in the new democracy, instead coming 
under partial civilian control. The BNP prime minister Khaleda Zia immediately retired 
or otherwise removed the senior officers closest to Ershad.402 A new parliamentary 
system was implemented that provided for a stronger legislature and a head of 
government with more power over the military; the presidential office traditionally 
responsible for the military’s political involvement was reduced to mostly ceremonial 
functions. In particular, the prime minister took over the Armed Forces Division, a body 
that coordinated the three service branches, allowing the government to oversee military 
affairs including personnel appointments and deployment decisions. It also subordinated 
the Ministry of Defense.403  
For its part, the military post-Ershad concentrated on “...restoring the military’s 
image as a moral and efficient organization.”404 The military had a long history of 
factionalism. In December 1990, some senior officers feared that supporting Ershad or 
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taking power would lead to a renewal of the conflict from the 1970s and early 1980s.405 
But factional divisions and rivalries owing to Ershad’s personal forms of control played 
an even bigger role in the military’s stance. In fact, “Had the military been fully 
professional and a tightly organized group...it would have managed to take control of the 
government.”406 The military factions did not come together to either remain loyal to 
Ershad or fully defect to the protesters, leaving divisions that reduced the military’s 
overall political influence.  
The military remained mostly out of politics and thus supportive of 
democratization in the days and years following. Khan assisted Prime Minister Zia in 
removing Ershad loyalists, in part to head off any attempts to seize power.407 A potential 
civil-military confrontation that did not end up challenging the democratic system 
occurred in May 1996. President Abdur Rahman Biswas sacked and interned Army Chief 
Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammed Nasim and some of his top military 
colleagues for allegedly conspiring to topple the government. There were suspicions as to 
Biswas’s motivations and the credibility of this claim, but Nasim and the rest of the army 
did not challenge the civilian government’s decision.408 The military at times struggled to 
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adjust to civilian control, but in the years following largely resisted a return to its former 
political role.409  
Conclusions 
By 1990, the Bangladesh military was accustomed to involvement in politics – 
whether through direct seizures of power over the first decades of independence or 
service in the government bureaucracy and all its benefits as rewards for loyalty under 
Ershad. Ershad seemed to have satisfied the military with this latter strategy and other 
forms of coup-proofing, as he did not face any coup attempts during his tenure. What he 
did face, though, was years of mass protest by a civilian opposition unhappy with his 
autocratic rule.  
The Bangladesh military supported democratization by supporting anti-Ershad 
protesters in December 1990. Its loyalty shift was fragmented, across a disunited 
organization. According to my argument, this is because Ershad controlled the military in 
ways that threatened its functional authority – reducing its autonomy and weakening its 
organizational integrity. Ershad’s policies prioritized loyalty over institutional quality. 
The protest movement was disruptive, and dominated by two antagonistic opposition 
parties. Even so, Ershad’s failure to restore his legitimacy threatened military delegated 
authority. The officers most concerned with these developments pressured Khan to shift 
loyalty, even without the support of some generals.  
Though Bangladesh’s democratization faced many challenges after Ershad’s fall, 
most of them resulted from ongoing tensions between the BNP and AL, rather than civil-
military relations. The military, despite its long history in politics, remained largely under 
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democratic and civilian control. My argument and findings suggest this is in part due to 
its divisions and relative weakness and its particular type of loyalty shift. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: PERU – FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITY, LOW LEVEL 
DISCONTENT AND SHIFTS, AND CIVILIAN-LED DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
In Peru, protests followed President Alberto Fujimori’s controversial 2000 
election to what was widely considered an unconstitutional third term. The demonstrators 
were not successful at preventing Fujimori’s inauguration, but continued as allegations 
emerged regarding Fujimori’s close advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos was 
head of the notorious national intelligence agency, and directly implicated in political 
violence and corruption. These revelations, even more than the protests, put the 
government’s legitimacy and the Peruvian military’s delegated authority at risk. 
However, the military’s functional authority was less in question following a brutal yet 
effective counterinsurgency against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Fujimori’s 
coup-proofing strategies, though personalist, ultimately did not threaten military 
functional authority. My argument would expect less extensive military loyalty shifts, 
with little role for the military in regime change or democratization.  
This chapter draws on the Peru case to trace my explanation for low level loyalty 
shifts, or shifts that involve limited numbers of the rank and file or low ranking officers. I 
show that while Fujimori controlled the upper levels of the military through forced 
retirements and non-meritocratic promotions, he rewarded its loyalty by increasing 
military autonomy in the fight against the rebels. Its effectiveness here bolstered the self-
conception it had had since ruling from 1968 to 1980: a professional military responsible 
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for national security and development. Additionally, the anti-Fujimori protesters did not 
represent an alternative source of military authority even as the regime’s legitimacy 
waned. In the end, while the movement put important pressure on Fujimori, and low level 
military loyalty shifts demonstrated discontent within the lower- and middle-ranks, 
Fujimori’s regime fell as a result of other forces. Following this, the country 
democratized, with little involvement by the largely discredited military.  
Fujimori’s Regime and Control of the Military 
Fujimori was unexpectedly elected to the presidency in 1990.410 Peru had 
democratized in 1980, following years of military dictatorship, but the first two civilian 
presidents presided over growing political and economic instability. Sendero Luminoso 
threatened both rural and urban areas, while the country’s GDP declined by 12 percent 
and inflation rose to 7,000 percent.411 This “disillusion with the political class, all major 
parties, and a failing system of government” provided Fujimori, a political outsider, the 
conditions for victory.412  
Fujimori’s status as a non-establishment candidate meant he had little support 
from political parties, civil society groups, or other elites. His lack of ties to traditional 
political institutions also made his rule largely personalist; according to Barr, Fujimori 
frequently used and abused executive decrees as a means to avoid dealing with Congress, 
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creating a system that scholars came to term “delegative democracy.”413 From 1990 to 
1992, for example, Fujimori issued an average of 29 constitutional decrees per month.414 
Given Peru’s past with military rule, Fujimori also feared the military, and sought to gain 
control over it with the help of Montesinos, a former army captain.415  
The military had seized power from President Fernando Belaunde Terry in 1968. 
It was motivated by a desire to advance the country and prevent another insurgency like 
the one it had eliminated over six months in 1965 and 1966.416 In Stepan’s extended 
analysis of the military over this period, he describes its “...new professionalism of 
internal security and national development.”417 The military believed itself capable of 
restructuring the state such to create stability. Despite the military regime’s efforts at 
agrarian reform and industrialization, though, economic recession hit Peru in the mid-
1970s. The military institution decided to return to the barracks before it was completely 
discredited. The military no longer ruled the country, but remained confident in itself as a 
respected, reformist organization.418  
Using Montesinos, Fujimori’s main strategy was to implement extensive military 
personnel changes based around loyalty to him. Beginning in November 1991, using 
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Legislative Decree 752, Fujimori assumed control over military promotions and 
retirements.419 Fujimori made these decisions mostly with regards to the military’s upper 
ranks. “By forcing out officers whose loyalty was suspect, and rewarding those whose 
support was unconditional, Montesinos helped Fujimori secure the backing of the 
military.”420 Most of these more “suspect” officers were from the institutionalist faction 
of the military, which disagreed with Fujimori’s use of the military for political 
purposes.421 The remaining loyalist officers formed a base of support for Fujimori’s 
regime.  
Much of the work of identifying the institutionalists was done by Montesinos and 
the National Intelligence Service, or SIN. The SIN had a reputation of being “...highly 
militarized, corrupt, conspiring, and free of judicial and legislative oversight.”422 Through 
it, Fujimori “...gain[ed] complete control of the [military].”423 Fujimori also used the SIN 
to monitor the political opposition and any threats it posed.424 He expanded the 
organization’s power in April 1995, following his reelection.425  
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Fujimori’s auto-golpe or self-coup in April 1992 strengthened the perception that 
he had a cooperative relationship with the military, despite his personalist control of it.  
With the help of armored tanks on Lima’s streets, he suspended Congress, the courts, and 
constitutional guarantees. He had been fairly popular leading up to this point, following 
progress on the economy and security, but this move cemented his power.426 He 
formalized his expanded executive authority with a new constitution that was approved 
by referendum in 1993.427  
In exchange for the military’s support in this instance and generally, Fujimori 
provided for some military interests. Specifically, Fujimori used a series of executive 
decrees to increase military power and autonomy in its fight against the Shining Path.428 
The military had been fighting the Shining Path and the smaller Moviemento 
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) since the 1980s, with little success.429 Under 
Belaunde and Garcia, the government had no clear strategy, and consequently, “...neither 
president gained control over guerrilla violence.”430 The military was frustrated by these 
failures and the ongoing insecurity.431  
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Under Fujimori, in contrast, the military got “carte blanche authority”432 to fight 
the rebels. Beginning in November 1991, Fujimori placed military commanders in charge 
of the conflict’s emergency zones.433 This allowed the military to take all steps necessary 
to secure the areas. Indeed, military officers allegedly involved in war crimes as part of 
their missions were pardoned by Fujimori.434 Later, in June 1995, Congress passed two 
amnesty laws that applied to all military operations in emergency zones since 1980.435 “In 
all, Fujimori dealt with Sendero forcefully and militarized the counterinsurgency to a far 
greater degree than previous administrations.”436  
It took awhile for these policy changes to generate military successes, though. The 
Shining Path launched a series of bombings in Lima during April and May 1992. The 
military split between the institutionalists and loyalists worsened amid fears the rebels 
were gaining strength, and the military was failing to create security. Soon after the 
bombings, the institutionalists reportedly made plans to seize power from Fujimori. 
“They believed a counter-coup would restore Peru to constitutional rule, rebuff the 
impending threat of a Shining Path triumph, and end the political manipulation of the 
armed forces that they perceived as a threat to the entire military institution.”437 These 
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officers looked for support from the institutionalist generals who had been forced out of 
the military in late 1991, as well as other frustrated lower and middle-ranking officers.438  
Military discontent at these lower ranks was well known during this period. The 
chief complaint among military institutionalists was Fujimori’s system of promotions and 
rotations based on loyalty rather than professional merit.439 In their view, the system 
“...endangered the autonomy and professionalism of the military.”440 They expressed 
their dissent in various ways besides the rumored coup attempts; in one instance by 
leaking information to the media that implicated Montesinos and high ranking officers in 
the abduction and murder of students and a professor.441 The case was brought to a 
military court, though, with no repercussions for the accused.442  
The fight against the Shining Path and the position of the institutionalists changed 
with the September 12, 1992 capture of the group’s leader, Abimael Guzman. This was a 
major victory for Fujimori and his military allies. The institutionalists never attempted 
their coup, but in November 1992 more than 40 of them were arrested.443 With these 
arrests, many of Fujimori’s opponents in the military were gone. His attention to military 
organizational interests further secured his position. According to Enrique Obando, “The 
quid pro quo in the military’s support for Fujimori was his promise to broadly expand 
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military power in the counterinsurgency effort.”444 Over time, the military was able to 
claim other successes in the fight against the rebels: violence associated with the 
insurgency declined greatly over the mid- to late-1990s.445 The rebels’ presence was 
reduced to just remote areas of the country. By 2000, the rebels posed little threat.446 The 
military was still unpopular, but no longer seen as ineffective.447 A brutal 
counterinsurgency had bolstered the military’s functional authority.  
In sum, Fujimori used Montesinos to co-opt the military into his increasingly 
authoritarian and personalist rule. Their personnel decisions generated military 
discontent, particularly among officers who had not yet been retired or at lower ranks 
concerned with the impact on military capabilities. Yet Fujimori also increased military 
power and autonomy as part of his counterinsurgency policies. “Although weakened and 
de-professionalized at the national level by Fujimori’s co-optative methods, at the 
regional one the Army became stronger.”448 This allowed the military leadership to 
reduce the threat of the Shining Path rebels. The military’s view of itself as an 
organization capable of protecting national development was not threatened by 
Fujimori’s control. By the late 1990s, then, the military had significant authority; at times 
exercising issuing its own political proclamations or using tanks in the streets to 
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“reinforce its positions.”449 Officers who disagreed with this approach had largely been 
retired and replaced with Fujimori loyalists.  
Anti-Fujimori Protests and the Military’s Response 
Fujimori was generally popular during the early and mid-1990s, especially as 
Peruvians began to attribute their country’s increased security and stability to him. After 
1992, protests occurred annually on the anniversary of his auto-golpe. Still, most of the 
population seemed to support his rationale for the power grab – that greater executive 
power was necessary to carry out economic reforms and defeat the Shining Path – and he 
was re-elected by a landslide in April 1995.450  
Fujimori capitalized on this support to pursue a third term. In August 1996, 
Congress passed a law allowing him to run again in 2000, reasoning he had only been 
elected once under the 1993 constitution.451 But not long after, reports emerged on 
growing opposition to Fujimori’s efforts: “...[Fujimori’s] economic policies have failed to 
provide jobs and the fading threat of leftist rebels has ceased to justify his blatant 
disregard for democratic checks and balance.”452 These criticisms were compounded by 
Fujimori’s personalist rule, which lacked the political institutions to build up his 
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legitimacy.453 He did not even use his governing party because Montesinos considered it 
a threat.454  
The 2000 election was held as scheduled, despite ongoing questions about its 
legality and an investigation into Montesinos’s involvement in drug trafficking.455 
Fujimori failed to secure 50 percent of the vote in the first round on April 9. When he 
attempted to claim victory anyway, he was met with protests, forcing him into a second 
round.456 Prior to the vote, the leading opposition candidate Toledo withdrew to protest 
what he claimed was the government’s manipulation of the electoral process.457 This 
opened the way for the military and police to declare Fujimori the winner on June 9. A 
few days later the Peruvian Electoral National Jury confirmed their declaration.458 
Fujimori was to be sworn into office on July 28.  
After protests failed to prevent Fujimori’s election, plans were made to disrupt his 
inauguration in late July. Protests had been ongoing in Lima since the elections, but on 
July 26, the first of three days of planned demonstrations, 10,000 people turned out.459 
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Concern over potential unrest led the government to set up barricades and bring in 
thousands of police troops to the capital. Army units were put on standby.460 On July 27, 
the police did not attempt to intervene.461 On July 28, though, at least 80 people, both 
police and demonstrators, were injured.462 Fujimori named an opposition politician as his 
prime minister, as some form of concession to demands.463 Otherwise, the protests had 
little impact, and the situation settled somewhat.  
In September, a series of events put Fujimori’s third term much more in question. 
First, a video was leaked to the press that showed Montesinos bribing a member of 
Congress. The congressman had been part of the opposition before switching parties to 
support Fujimori, and Montesinos was seen handing him thousands of dollars in cash.464 
This followed closely on reports that Montesinos had been involved in arms trafficking to 
the FARC rebel group in Colombia.465 Both the opposition and ruling parties demanded 
an investigation. Protests broke out to call for Montesino’s resignation.466 Fujimori 
attempted to get control of the situation, and it was reported on September 15 that he had 
fired Montesinos. The next day, however, Montesinos emerged and tried to arrest the 
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assistant to the head of the SIN because he suspected him of being involved in the video’s 
release. Perhaps seeking to distance themselves from Montesinos, the navy refused to 
follow his arrest orders.467  
The feelings of the rest of the military – and particularly the upper ranks loyal to 
Montesinos – were unclear. Fujimori met with his cabinet on September 17, amid 
continued protests, reportedly to make plans for leaving power. During this period, 
“Rumors spread through Lima...that Fujimori decided to call new elections because of 
resistance from high military officers when he tried to fire...Montesinos.”468 But in a 
televised address, Fujimori announced that in addition to holding new elections in which 
he would not be a candidate, he was deactivating the SIN.469  
Montesinos’s faction demonstrated no resistance to or dissent over the SIN’s 
deactivation. Experts weighed in that the military was unlikely to revolt over this 
decision,470 perhaps because they expected Montesinos’s position, and their benefits, to 
be unchanged. In fact, the loyalists in the upper ranks retained their positions, with the 
general next in line for the post of commander of the armed forces a loyalist too.471 
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Discontent middle-ranking officers were also likely supportive of Fujimori472 – for them, 
the SIN’s deactivation was a move in the right direction.  
Fujimori went a step further a few days later, when he fired Montesinos. This 
generated considerable uncertainty, and concerns over a possible military coup – by 
either officers seeking to remove both Fujimori and Montesinos or officers seeking to 
keep Montesinos in place.473 Montesinos was detained on September 18 by soldiers 
acting on the orders of the commander of the armed forces, General Jose Villaneuva 
Ruestra.474 Then, on September 20, Fujimori declared that he would reduce his third term 
to one year and hold elections ahead of schedule.475 There is no indication that the 
military played a role in Fujimori’s decision. Though close to Montesinos, the military 
leadership remained loyal to Fujimori over this period.  
With these concessions – Montesinos’s arrest and the new elections – Fujimori 
seemed to regain some stability for the rest of his term. According to analysts, he had 
strong support in the parliament, the judiciary, and most of the military, and was likely to 
remain in power.476 On September 21, the commanders of the army, air force, navy, and 
police confirmed this view by issuing a statement in support of Fujimori, while urging 
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calm from the population.477 Yet rumors of a coup led Montesinos to flee Peru on 
September 23.478 Fujimori followed this news by quickly scheduling a number of visits to 
military commands, to reassert his authority.479  
Fujimori’s legitimacy took another hit when it came out that Montesinos had gone 
to Panama and would not face corruption charges.480 This was the final straw for some of 
Fujimori’s supporters in Congress; on September 26, five members of the Fujimori’s 
Peru 2000 (P2000) party resigned, which cost him his majority.481 Soon after, lawmakers 
from the ruling and opposition parties voted to officially deactivate the SIN. Emboldened, 
protesters turned out to demand Fujimori’s immediate resignation and the extradition of 
Montesinos from Panama to be subject to legal consequences.482  
Montesinos returned to Peru in secret on October 22, after Panama refused to give 
him asylum.483 Fearing for his continued influence over the military, Fujimori retired a 
number of top officers in the days following.484 He then called an emergency cabinet 
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meeting that included the heads of the army, navy, and air force, to discuss the events.485 
He also visited a number of military installations, likely to suggest control of the 
situation.486  
Yet opposition to Fujimori was increasing because it had become obvious that he 
“...cannot control the military brass, nor Montesinos, who continues managing the 
generals that he himself placed in the highest points of command.”487 In the view of the 
protesters and others, Fujimori needed to remove the military leadership and replace them 
with generals who were free from association with Montesinos. His inability to do so 
weakened his position and led to calls for his resignation.488 In response, Fujimori 
embarked on a highly publicized and widely mocked “manhunt” for Montesinos, while 
insisting he was in charge of the military.489  
In this context of ongoing protests and Fujimori’s illegitimacy, the military’s 
delegated authority was compromised. The military’s functional authority was largely 
intact, however, and so the challenge to Fujimori’s regime did not put the military’s 
sources of authority in tension. The military’s effectiveness at providing order and 
stability, and its functional role in society, was not in question given the Shining Path’s 
defeat. The military was an organization capable of defending the national interest. 
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The protest movement also did not represent an alternative source of delegated 
authority for a military that could still rely on its functional authority. At the protests’ 
height, they numbered more than 100,000 and involved students, labor unions, peasant 
organizations, NGOs, women’s organizations, and political parties.490 They never became 
as large, or as sustained, as opposition leaders had hoped, though. Toledo vowed to put at 
least 200,000 people on the streets on July 27 but ended up with a respectable but not 
overwhelming 80,000, with a smaller crowd in the following days.491  
Overall, it was difficult for the movement’s leadership to build popular opposition 
in a country that was extremely de-politicized from the violence of a 20 year civil war 
and the fracturing of democratic institutions, including political parties. Over the conflict, 
68,000 people were victims of political violence by the state security forces or insurgent 
groups.492 Peruvians were dissatisfied with the democracy that had failed to provide 
solutions to societal problems.493 Their growing frustrations with Fujimori did not 
necessarily translate into support for the opposition. As reported during this period, 
“Many question whether Toledo’s star can continue to rise solely on cries of election 
fraud, saying an opposition leader has yet to emerge who can rally a poor country around 
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real demands for social and economic change.”494 The protest movement struggled to 
present a capable challenge to the regime’s authority.  
The only loyalty shifts that occurred in response to the anti-Fujimori protest 
movement were low level, by a small section of low-ranking officers. On October 29, a 
military garrison in the southern region of Peru rebelled against Fujimori and the military 
leadership. The rebellion involved around 100 soldiers and was led by Army Lieutenant 
Ollanta Humala Tasso, head of an anti-aircraft artillery unit. They took control of a 
copper mine and from there made a number of demands: that Fujimori be unseated, 
Montesinos jailed, and the armed forces general staff demoted.495 These demands 
reflected the main sources of discontent for low to middle ranking officers in the Fujimori 
military, and those of the protesters.  
Though the loyalty shift involved few soldiers, it was the clearest and most 
organized signal of anti-regime and pro-opposition sentiment from the military during the 
protests. It also received a significant amount of attention throughout Peru, and observers 
watched for indications that Humala’s broadcasted “Manifesto to the Peruvian People” 
would set off a larger armed forces rebellion.496 Some army reservists and veterans of the 
1995 conflict with Ecuador rallied and marched in support of the rebels, with plans to 
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join them.497 Beyond this, though, the loyalty shifts did not spread – to other geographic 
areas, or to other units or ranks of the military.498  
Neither did the shift of support by the military have much of an impact on the 
protest movement or its outcomes. The rebels and their demands had a receptive audience 
in the protesters, and two small demonstrations that included former members of the 
military were held in support of them. They were easily dispersed by police with tear 
gas,499 and the rest of the country remained calm. Further, Toledo and others in the 
opposition were hesitant to encourage rebellion, because doing so would have provided 
cause to the claim that the country was unstable – and thus open to a coup by the upper 
ranks.500 Along these lines, other politicians condemned the soldiers and called for the 
military to stay in the chain of command.501  
The Peruvian military responded to the anti-Fujimori protests according to my 
argument’s expectations. That is, while Fujimori’s coup-proofing strategies were based 
on personalist ties of loyalty, they did not clearly threaten military functional authority. 
His other forms of control – providing for military autonomy and power in exchange for 
its support – resulted in an effective (though brutal) counterinsurgency. This was 
particularly important given the military’s legacy as a professional organization 
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responsible for national security, an understanding of itself that survived Fujimori’s rule. 
During the protests, the high level officers remained loyal to Fujimori, and, despite well-
known discontent among the mid- and low-ranking officers, only a small group of 
soldiers far from Lima shifted loyalty from the regime. The military leadership issued an 
order for troops to search for and put down the rebellion.502 In the end, it fizzled out 
largely on its own.503  
Even without significant military loyalty shifts, though, Fujimori’s regime was 
near collapse. The release of a video showing Montesinos toasting military officers for 
their assistance in the elections was the final, fatal blow to Fujimori’s legitimacy as 
president.504 On November 19, Prime Minister Salas announced Fujimori would be 
resigning soon, in part because the opposition had taken control of Congress and was 
likely to remove Fujimori on grounds of ‘moral incapacity’. The Second Vice President, 
Marquez, reported that he had met with the military high command to discuss next 
steps.505 Fujimori stepped down and the military issued a statement saying it would 
continue to show “...absolute respect to the decisions taken by the legitimately constituted 
authorities.”506 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Military Authority and Democratization Outcomes 
After Fujimori resigned, Congress started work on a political transition by naming 
Valentin Paniagua interim president.507 The military’s role in democratization was an 
immediate concern, given its many links to the former regime. However, the suddenness 
of Fujimori’s fall prevented the military and other regime elites from reaching a formal 
agreement with the opposition to protect their positions. Panigua’s new government had 
more space to act as a result.508 Even more importantly, the military was discredited by 
its association with Montesinos and its support of a regime whose corruption and 
violence had now been exposed.  
Paniagua got to work immediately and fired the armed forces chief and other top 
military officers, as well as over a hundred other officers considered loyal to Montesinos. 
He named General Carlos Tafur, a critic of Montesinos who had been forced into 
retirement, head of the armed forces.509 Additionally, in the weeks following, 2000 
representatives of 14 political groups signed a National Accord committing to 
democratization. One point in the accord called for an official reorganization of the 
security services with limits on the political role of the military.510  
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The first post-Fujimori presidential election was held in spring 2001. Toledo was 
declared the winner and took office in July.511 He followed Paniagua’s lead in 
minimizing the former regime’s influence, most notably when his government convicted 
and imprisoned Montesinos, and charged other military and civilian officials for their 
involvement in corruption and human rights violations under Fujimori.512 Toledo’s 
government also passed legislation to create a new, reformed intelligence agency, and in 
December 2005 reduced the military’s involvement in intelligence.513 Under Toledo, a 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation began to uncover and report on the political 
violence of the counterinsurgency.514  
Toledo was quite unpopular, but this did not lead to major challenges from the 
military or elements of the former regime. By the end of his term in 2006 his approval 
ratings were in the single digits and overall support for democracy had declined.515 His 
government was forced to declare a 30 day state of emergency in May 2003 due to 
ongoing protests over economic issues. Yet the military remained uninvolved in politics. 
Observers considered a coup unlikely, because the military was still disgraced by 
Fujimori’s rule.516  
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Indeed, despite the military’s past in politics, and its lack of support for regime 
change, it did not inhibit the democratization process. As of 2005, “While remnants loyal 
to the previous regime remain in the army and secret service, civilian control over these 
organs is at its strongest since the 1920s.”517 This included even the role of the military in 
counterinsurgency policy, where it went from having nearly complete control over all 
aspects to just security in limited areas.518 The loyalty shift by the small section of low-
ranking officers had a minimal impact on Fujimori’s regime, but it fell anyway, with little 
role for the overall military in the transition to democracy. The military’s position at that 
stage of Peruvian history more than its response to the protests explained the successful 
democratization.  
Conclusions 
In the years following Fujimori’s fall, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and other investigations revealed the Peruvian military’s brutal violence during the 
counterinsurgency. Reports concluded that the military and other state security forces 
were responsible for 40 percent of the nearly 70,000 instances of political violence 
between 1980 and 2000, as well as many thousands of detainments and 
disappearances.519 The extent of the military’s corruption also became clear, particularly 
the wealth high-ranking officials had accumulated through their anti-narcotics work.520 
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However, all of this occurred in the context of military success in the campaign against 
the Shining Path. The military’s functional capacities were therefore not in question.  
Montesinos’s involvement in this violence and corruption and Fujimori’s close 
association with him were key to Fujimori’s rapid loss of power and consequent 
resignation. The protest movement put important pressure on Fujimori and his supporters 
despite its somewhat indirect link to the regime’s fall: “...the resurgence of civil society 
played a very dynamic role in denying the regime the legitimacy it sought to ensure 
through fraud and violence.”521 The military played a very limited role in the fall of 
Fujimori’s regime because only a small section of troops and low-ranking officers shifted 
loyalty.  
The Peruvian military’s response to the anti-Fujimori protest movement follows 
my explanation for low level loyalty shifts. The soldiers that rebelled and the wider group 
of officers that favored political change were frustrated by Fujimori’s strategies of 
military control, and Montesinos’s corrupting influence. But while Fujimori’s personnel 
decisions benefitted loyal officers at the expense of others, they did not weaken military 
functional capabilities in the context of the Shining Path insurgency. The protest 
movement also did not sustain momentum such that the military viewed it as an 
alternative source of authority, even as Fujimori’s legitimacy suffered. The military’s 
upper ranks were able to wage the Shining Path conflict with little political interference 
and remained loyal to Fujimori until the end, with long-term implications for the 
military’s reputation. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION  
 
“Just as the literature on the execution of coups stresses the role of ‘swingmen’ at crucial 
conjectures, so the (nonexistent) literature on noncoups should emphasize the strategic 
importance of ‘swingmen’ in making alternative outcomes possible. These officers may 
support the transition much more because of what they believe is good for the armed 
forces than because of any enthusiasm for democracy.”522 
 
In this dissertation, I have offered answers to two questions: Why do militaries 
shift their loyalty from non-democratic regimes in some instances of anti-regime protests 
and not others, and why do these shifts sometimes lead to democratic change? Existing 
research shows that military loyalty shifts are significant determinants of the success of 
civil resistance campaigns against authoritarian regimes. A body of work is developing to 
explain such military defections, but it provides competing arguments and is based 
largely on case studies of a few well-known instances of military responses to protests. 
The other literatures on the military’s role in political change disagree on whether and 
how the military can support democratization, and do not address the particular context of 
civil society-led transitions.  
I was motivated to explore these questions by the theoretical puzzle – that this 
topic is one the literatures on the military in politics cannot fully explain. Perhaps more 
important, though, is the topic’s major contemporary relevance. Civil resistance 
campaigns have increased in frequency to become the primary means of challenge to
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authoritarian regimes.523 They are an effective strategy of political contention, especially 
relative to violent campaigns.524 Thus, support for democratization today often takes the 
form of support of unarmed civilians seeking to overthrow illiberal, repressive, and 
autocratic regimes using tactics such as protests, strikes, and sit-ins. It requires paying 
close attention to the response of the military and other regime security forces. 
Understanding why militaries shift loyalty, and the impacts of shifts on democratization, 
is key to the continued success of nonviolence. It requires a reassessment of militaries 
and politics that takes the possibility of this particular military role seriously.  
I developed an argument that is based in the military’s sources of authority: the 
authority delegated them by leaders on behalf of the population, and the authority they 
gain by virtue of their functional role in society. In delegating the military authority, 
authoritarian regimes often structure it in ways that protect the regime by reducing 
military functional capabilities. The authoritarian regime thus threatens military 
functional authority. Popular challenges to the regime put the military’s delegated and 
functional authority in tension. If the military’s functional authority is already in 
question, supporting an illegitimate regime will not restore it or societal stability and 
security. A protest movement that is large and committed to nonviolence may be more 
supportive of military authority.  
In these contexts, militaries do not just remain loyal or defect; they respond to 
popular regime challenges with loyalty shifts that vary in terms of the extent and quality 
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of the military organization’s involvement. Specifically, loyalty shifts may involve the 
lower or higher ranks, and be fragmented or united. I also proposed an argument to 
explain these different shifts, drawing on my general argument but specifying its 
implications for the military organization. Some strategies of regime control, or forms of 
coup-proofing, will just generate military discontent. Others – personalist, specifically - 
will also compromise the military organization, making low level or fragmented loyalty 
shifts more likely than united defections. Large protest movements lead to disloyalty by 
the rank and file and together with coup-proofing produce high level shifts.  
I used the logic of my argument to generate expectations for the effects of military 
loyalty shifts on democracy. Military loyalty shifts during anti-regime protests are crucial 
to movements’ success. Successful movements (and civil resistance generally) are likely 
to positively impact democratization. I investigated whether military loyalty shifts also 
impact democratization. The civil-military relations literature expects that a politically 
active military will harm democratic consolidation. The scholarship on pacted transitions 
views the military as potentially supportive of democracy. Thus, I argued that high level 
shifts may positively impact democratization by supporting protest movement success. I 
also argued that high level shifts that are fragmented will have more of an impact than 
united defections because a civilian regime can more easily establish control over a weak 
military organization.  
I generated various forms of empirical support for these arguments and their 
expectations. First, I employed new data on military responses to all major anti-regime 
protests from 1946 to 2015 along with quantitative measures of coup-proofing and 
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protester characteristics to test my hypotheses for military defections and types of loyalty 
shifts. Based on regression analyses, threats to military functional authority have 
significant impacts on the likelihood of military disloyalty. The explanatory factors’ 
conditional effects confirm that they interact to either threaten or support military 
authority. Independently, they have the expected effects on types of military loyalty shifts 
via their impacts on the military organization. These results hold in the presence of 
various covariates, increasing my confidence in their explanatory power across space and 
time.  
I also used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a medium-N strategy that 
explicitly accounts for the complex causal relations between my argument’s conditions 
and outcomes. The results support those from the regression analyses, while providing 
new insights as to how coup-proofing and protest movement factors combine and 
substitute to produce threats to military functional authority and thus military loyalty 
shifts. Together, these analytical strategies provide a robust and meaningful assessment 
of the importance of the factors for explaining military disloyalty.  
Next, I tested the hypotheses related to the impact of military loyalty shifts on 
democratization. From the regression analyses, the shifts do not have major independent 
effects on democracy levels, when accounting for other determinants of democratization 
and addressing potential endogeneity issues. Still, fragmented high level shifts have a 
consistently positive and stronger impact on democratization than united defections (or 
other shifts). A military that shifts support to the protesters but is unable or unlikely to 
exercise significant influence over the new civilian-led political system is better for 
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democracy. The limitations of regression and more general quantitative analyses hold 
here, though: the challenges of dealing with possible omitted variable bias and 
simultaneity, and the inability to establish causation from correlations or descriptive 
inferences. Further, I propose a fairly long causal chain from regime control to military 
responses to democratization. I therefore finished with three case studies that demonstrate 
my argument’s processes in richer detail.  
In the case studies, I used evidence from three instances of major anti-regime 
protests and the military responses to them to show how authoritarian regime control of 
the military, in the context of a particular protest movement, affected military authority 
and led to military loyalty shifts. The cases – Mali 1990-1991, Bangladesh 1987-1990, 
and Peru 2000 - varied along their independent variables, or levels of threat to military 
functional authority, and as a result varied in terms of military loyalty shifts. The type of 
shift reflected in part the strength of the military organization, and this affected the 
military’s participation in post-protest politics.  
Altogether, these findings support my argument, and contribute to existing 
understandings of militaries’ roles in politics. Militaries can play positive roles by 
shifting loyalty to anti-authoritarian regime protest movements and supporting 
democratic change. They may be more likely to do so because of their particular 
institutional interests related to the provision of societal stability and security. It is 
through their performance of functional roles and creation of order that they gain 
authority. But this functional authority is sometimes threatened by the civilian authorities 
responsible for their delegated authority. When a regime faces a popular challenge to its 
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legitimacy and rule, the military may choose to act outside its delegated authority to 
preserve its functional authority by supporting the protesters. These conclusions suggest 
theoretical, methodological, and policy contributions.  
Theoretical Contributions  
My focus on military sources of authority draws on the foundational scholarship 
on militaries and military interests. The particular context of military responses to 
prodemocracy protests brings in the insights of the pact and civil resistance literatures. 
Militaries as organizations have particular institutional concerns, including the conditions 
that provide for their effectiveness in maintaining a stable and secure society. A 
longstanding claim across the work on militaries in politics is that militaries will act when 
these concerns are not met, sometimes by seizing power. For militaries, “The desire to 
maintain order can...prompt the removal of a regime and even the transformation of a 
status quo that seems to be productive of disorder.”525 Regime coup-proofing is aimed at 
reducing the threat of such military actions, in part by harming military functional 
capabilities. This in turn generates military discontent. Militaries may not stage coups, or 
successful ones, but they may respond to popular regime challenges with disloyalty. 
Military involvement in this form of political change can support both its institutional 
interests and civil society-led democratization.  
In making this argument, I challenge the civil-military relations literature’s central 
contention that a military acting against its delegated authority is problematic for 
democratization. I do not disagree that a military outside civilian control will challenge 
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democratic consolidation; in fact, I find support for this claim in Chapter Five. Rather, 
through this dissertation I demonstrate a different starting point for analyses of the 
military that has important implications for our understanding of the military and politics. 
The pact literature describes how militaries and civilians can cooperate for political 
change, while the civil resistance literature demonstrates the importance of military 
defections to campaign success. The civil-military relations literature has so far not taken 
these points seriously such that it recognizes the potentially positive role a politically 
active military can play in democratic transitions. A military may act outside the regime’s 
delegated authority - but in favor of its functional authority - to support democratization.  
I have used this insight to explore military responses to protests, but it allows a 
reconsideration of militaries and politics in general. Scholars should pursue more 
nuanced understandings of the causes and impacts of military political activity short of 
coups. There are many ways militaries can withdraw support from authoritarian regimes, 
for example – some that bolster civilian control, others that undermine it. It is possible 
that some can support democratic political outcomes, too. In the context of popular, 
prodemocracy protests, both military disloyalty and loyalty to the regime are political, but 
one may help to bring about democratic change.  
Methodological Contributions  
The most significant methodological contribution of this dissertation is my 
development of a large-N dataset on military responses to anti-regime protest 
movements. The minimal existing data on defections groups various types of loyalty 
shifts together and does not specify the rank and size of the military involved. Some 
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measure whether or not the military defects at all over the course of the campaign, while 
others analyze defections at each campaign-year and thus answer a different empirical 
question.  
My dataset advances the empirical record on military responses to protests 
significantly. My conceptualization of loyalty shifts as types provides new ways of 
thinking about these responses, and forms a foundation from which other questions 
related to the military organization can be asked and answered. In doing so, it follows 
similar developments in the study of coups, where scholars are increasingly 
differentiating them on the basis of which parts of the military hierarchy participate. They 
then make claims as to the coups’ likelihood of success526 and their threats to particular 
leaders versus overall regimes.527 I have organized military responses in one way, for 
theoretical and empirical reasons. Other conceptualizations will provide for new analyses 
of determinants and implications.  
Helpfully, the dataset narratives provide overviews of the main events of each 
protest movement and additional details on the military responses. Using this foundation, 
future scholars can collect and code new variables that further the research on military 
involvement in anti-regime protests. Examples of fruitful areas of inquiry include: 
specifics on the service and rank of the defectors; military involvement in particular 
instances of repression; the temporal development of the protests and the military 
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responses; the spread of disloyalty from individual soldiers to significant military 
segments; and the role of other security forces and their relations with the military.  
Importantly, I used the data to generate various forms of empirical support for my 
argument. Each of the methods confirmed my general expectations but revealed 
something new about the relationship between the explanatory factors and outcomes of 
interest. Together, they allowed me to estimate the relative importance of coup-proofing 
and protester characteristics, showed that they combine and condition each other, and 
illustrate the causal processes linking them to loyalty shifts and from loyalty shifts to 
democracy. The overall empirical strategy speaks to the value of using multiple 
techniques to assess a theory’s claims, especially given the complexity of the particular 
phenomena under study here. Despite the shortcomings of my evidence – the relatively 
small number of cases, the fairly broad and structural independent variables, the 
possibility of mismeasurement and the challenges of establishing causality – I am 
confident in my findings because I triangulated methodological approaches to reach 
them.  
Policy Implications  
Popular challenges to authoritarian regimes continue, from Venezuela to Iran to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Observers are closely watching their 
developments, including how each country’s military responds. For example, recent 
reporting on the protests has noted growing splits within the Venezuelan military,528 
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speculated whether the Iranian regime will deploy the army,529 and worried about more 
repression at the hands of security forces in the Congo.530 Movement participants and 
outside observers recognize that the military is key to whether the regime withstands the 
challenge or the protesters succeed in overthrowing it. This dissertation’s argument and 
findings will thus be of interest to policymakers who support civil-society led 
democratization and recognize the vital role of the military in protests’ outcomes – and 
who also have concerns about the military’s involvement in politics.  
Indeed, practitioners have sought answers to the dissertation’s questions and at the 
same time confirmed military defections’ importance. Sharp writes that protesters must 
remove the regime’s pillars of support, one being the military,531 while Ackerman and 
Merriman include military defections on a “to-do” list for successful movements.532 They 
and others do not have a clear understanding of how to achieve this goal, drawn from the 
experiences of many campaigns. According to this dissertation, whether loyalty shifts 
occur is partly out of protesters’ hands. Much depends on the regime’s structuring of its 
relations with the military – in particular, its use of strategies that protect itself at the 
expense of military functional capabilities. However, it follows from this framework of 
military interests and authority that the protest movement can present itself as more 
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supportive of both than the regime. It can do so by involving more people, from diverse 
yet organized groups, that are committed to nonviolence. Its leaders should highlight 
these qualities. Protesters may also want to leverage the post-military defeat period as one 
during which a military is especially concerned for its authority and perhaps more likely 
to shift loyalty.  
Protest movements and their supporters seek to generate military loyalty shifts 
because they leave “even the most tyrannical leaders...powerless and vulnerable.”533 But 
having achieved the overthrow of the dictator, some movements are disappointed in their 
attempts to establish democracy. There are many reasons a transition to democracy may 
fail. Military control over the transition processes is one possibility. This dissertation 
shows that types of military loyalty shifts vary in their impacts on post-movement 
political outcomes. Militaries are powerful organizations, and, for better or worse, their 
involvement in the protests will matter for their involvement in the new civilian 
governments.  
Protesters and their external supporters likely cannot influence whether the 
military shifts loyalty as a fragmented or united organization, or the strength of the 
military going into the transition. Once the shift occurs, however, they can and should 
seek to limit the military’s involvement. A united military organization is dangerous for 
democracy even if it was supportive of pro-democracy protesters. The Mali case is 
instructive here, for the Committee for the Coordination of Opposition pressured the 
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military leadership to include civilians in the interim government.534 This reduced the 
military’s influence and created space for the democratically-elected civilian government 
to establish some control over the military. Policymakers that recognize militaries can 
play positive roles during protests should remain circumspect about the military’s 
continued role in the democracy it helped to usher in.  
Future Research Program  
Studying the military as I have done here – its involvement in politics short of 
seizing power, the implications for democratization in civil society-led or other forms, 
and the effects of its relations with the authoritarian regime – offers a number of avenues 
for future research. Some of these build on the data I collected for the dissertation; others 
draw on the dissertation’s theoretical framework. First, the data and analysis are more 
disaggregated than existing quantitative work on defections, yet the relationships could 
be confirmed at other, some more micro, levels. As I noted in the conclusion of Chapter 
Three, a number of scholars are collecting new data that measures the specifics of regime 
control of the military. These efforts will prove useful to investigating more thoroughly 
the links between particular forms of control and military loyalty shifts or other 
behaviors, including during non-crisis periods.  
Second, the dissertation’s argument and findings might be enriched with 
fieldwork. Interviewing members of the military that did or did not shift loyalty could 
provide fascinating details as to the “why” behind their individual and organizational 
responses. The case studies provide some confirmation that militaries perceive coup-
proofing as threatening their functional capabilities and authority, but more evidence is 
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needed that they recognize a popular challenge to the regime as a challenge to their 
delegated authority. It would also be highly interesting to examine how views of the 
tension between military functional and delegated sources of authority, and the protest 
movement as an alternative, vary over the course of the protests and across military 
forces and ranks.  
In terms of other research questions, I noted in Chapter One that this study might 
be extended to violent campaigns. While I would expect military loyalty shifts to be less 
likely in response to violent anti-regime movements, it is possible that the military, or 
parts of it, shift loyalty under certain circumstances. Military loyalty shifts during 
nonviolent or violent campaigns might also have impacts on other post-protest outcomes, 
such as civil conflict. Fragmented high level shifts are better for democracy, relative to 
united defections, but a less cohesive military organization may make conflict more 
likely – by either military factions, or actors which the weak military is unable to counter. 
Finally, other security forces have different sources of authority, and likely shift loyalty 
for different reasons than the military. The military’s interests in its provision of societal 
order and stability means it might respond to security forces’ loyalty and disloyalty in 
ways worthy of investigation.  
Conclusion  
The military is one of the regime’s pillars of support, and also the regime’s 
biggest threat. The military can employ its capabilities for violence against elite and 
nonelite civilians, but also to guard the state and its population from harm. The military 
can remain loyal to the authoritarian regime in the face of a popular challenge, or remove 
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loyalty and support democratic change. During major anti-regime protests, military 
loyalty and disloyalty are both political actions, yet have very different implications for a 
country’s political future. For the opposition, military loyalty shifts are “...a material, 
psychological, and moral victory”535 that creates the opportunity for a new system of 
government. For the military, shifts are a way to ensure its role as guarantor of societal 
stability and security, and the authority it produces.  
Through this dissertation, I have offered an explanation for military loyalty shifts 
that draws on military interests and authority. I have sought to further our understanding 
of military roles in politics generally and in the important particular context of 
prodemocracy civil resistance campaigns. Unarmed civilians will continue to take to the 
streets in opposition to autocratic regimes, in hopes of a better future but at risk to their 
lives. Perhaps it is too much to ask for a military in such circumstances to support 
democratization – but a military that recognizes its authority is better served by regime 
change may side with the people and bring it about anyway.
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APPENDIX A: MILITARY RESPONSE NARRATIVES 
 
Albania 1/30/1990-3/31/1991 – loyal  
After months of popular regime opposition, on July 2, 1990, police fired on people trying 
to flee the country. The government declared a partial state of emergency. 
Demonstrations were small, but police deployed to guard public buildings at times 
clashed with protesters. President Ramiz Alia met with some students in the movement 
on December 10, and then convened the Central Committee so it could declare the 
introduction of political pluralism. Free elections were scheduled for February, but then 
postponed until March 31. Protests developed in response, and on February 20, became 
too large for the police and special troops to deal with. The police injured some 
demonstrators by firing warning shots, but some members of the security forces 
reportedly sympathized with them. Alia’s government resigned and a new Presidential 
Council formed to rule until the elections. The military remained loyal to the regime 
throughout, and was involved in repression, including during demonstrations on February 
22. The military was weak though and so most of the repression was the responsibility of 
internal security forces. The regime had reduced military funding because of economic 
crisis and used the secret political police and intelligence organizations to purge the 
military according to loyalty to the Communist party. Some accounts of these events 
report the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, refused Alia’s orders that the police 
and security forces end the February unrest. Others dispute this narrative and conclude 
Alia himself decided against using force. The communists won the mostly free and fair 
March 1991 elections but their government fell within six months, opening the way to a 
new, non-communist government.  
 
Sources: 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Tarifa, Taos. “Albania’s Road from Communism: Political and Social Change, 1990-
1993.” Development and Change (1995).  
 
Algeria 1/22/2011-5/2/2011 - loyal  
Riots by mostly young men began in early January. On January 20, some of the country’s 
political and social organizations started a new anti-regime campaign that held a march 
for democracy on January 22. This was quickly broken up by a large police force. The 
protest movement succeeded at getting the government to give some concessions, 
including lifting the state of emergency. But continued demonstrations in early February 
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were unsuccessful and outnumbered by the security forces, mostly riot police. The 
protesters were also highly internally divided at this point. The military remained loyal to 
the regime, and overall reacted with restraint, especially relative to earlier protest 
movements. At this stage the military had a large budget and was involved in economic 
activities in both the public and private sectors. President Bouteflika had brought the 
military under his control by forcing some high level resignations in the mid-2000s. At 
the same time, he promoted a new generation of officers. The military intelligence 
service (DRS) remained powerful, though, and there was some speculation that the head 
of the DRS, General Medience, was angered by the resignations.  
 
Sources:  
Entelis, John P. “Algeria: democracy denied, and revived?” The Journal of North African 
Studies 16.4 (2011): 653-678. 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meeting of the International Political Science Association World Congress, Madrid, 
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Volpi, Frederic. “Algeria versus the Arab Spring.” Journal of Democracy 24.3 (2013): 
104-115.  
Argentina 4/20/1977-12/10/1983 – fragmented high level  
Anti-regime protests began in 1977, but the military junta went through many changes 
between then and when it fell in 1983. General Roberto Eduardo Viola succeeded 
General Jorge Rafael Videla as president through regular processes on March 28, 1981. 
Viola’s tenure was cut short when he was ousted by a December 11 coup led by General 
Leopoldo Galtieria, the Army’s Commander in Chief. Viola had begun some political 
reforms, and Galtieri and other hardliners were opposed to them. The military’s divisions 
remained. Galtieri was a weak leader, but on April 2, 1982, invaded Malvinas, starting 
the Falklands War. Argentina lost two months later, and Galtieri (presently serving as 
president, junta member, and army commander) and three other service commanders 
were forced to resign. General Cristino Nicolaides replaced him as commander of the 
army, and a caretaker government led by retired General Reynaldo Bignone took power 
in June. Bignone scheduled elections in line with the recommendations of a multiparty 
coalition. Military conflicts rose to the surface again, though. Most of the army wanted a 
continuation of military rule, and Bignone as president meant the army controlled the 
transition. The air force and navy withdrew from the junta because they wanted a transfer 
of power. After negotiations, the junta was reestablished in early September, including 
new air force and navy high commands. It then began negotiations with the opposition. 
During this time pressure began to build in the lower ranks for an end to military rule. On 
December 4, 1983, for example, hundreds of conscripts protested against the junta during 
a military ceremony. This dissent, plus the high level divisions within the military 
institution, was a fragmented loyalty shifts from the military regime. It agreed to hold 
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Research 16, no. 3 (1997): 327-350.  
Goetz, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. “Argentina: A Country Study. US Army War 
College (1983). 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Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (1985): 55-76.  
Zagorski, Paul W. “Civil-Military Relations and Argentine Democracy.” Armed Forces 
and Society 14, no. 3 (1988): 407-432.  
Armenia 2/20/2007-3/1/2009 - loyal  
Protests ramped up in response to the February 2008 presidential election, which the 
ruling party candidate (Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan) won. During protests on March 1, 
2009, hundreds of security personnel moved into the city center to break up the crowd, 
setting off violent clashes. In response, the incumbent president declared a state of 
emergency. The protests effectively ended at that point. The overall security apparatus 
was known to be large and experienced, and was effective in ending the popular 
challenge to the government.  
 
Sources:  
Hess, Steve. “Protests, Parties, and Presidential Succession.” Problems of Post-
Communism 57.1 (2010): 28-39.  
 
Bahrain 2/15/2011-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal  
Calls for reform led to demonstrations starting on February 14, 2011. On February 17, the 
king ordered the police to attack the protesters. This set off an escalatory dynamic, where 
the regime increased repression, strengthening the demonstrations as well as the 
protesters’ demands. They came to call for an end to the monarchy. While the protests 
weren’t sectarian, they mostly involved Shiites, and one of their demands was for the 
regime to end its practice of recruiting Sunni foreigners to join the armed forces to 
increase the Sunni proportion. Sunnis dominated the highest political and military posts, 
as well as the officer and rank and file positions. The king’s concessions and the police’s 
efforts did not end the protests, so on March 15 the regime declared a state of emergency. 
The military and other security forces, along with troops from Saudi Arabia, UAE, and 
Qatar, forcefully cleared the main square of demonstrators. There were divisions within 
the regime over how to respond, but these did not seem to be reflected in the military. A 
report was commissioned in the months following in an attempt to bring about 
reconciliation. It criticized the government’s repression, but put most of the blame on 
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Bangladesh 6/23/1987-12/6/1990 – fragmented high level  
Protests against President Hussain Muhammed Ershad went on for more than three years 
before requiring that he call on the military for support in December 1990. Over that 
period, Ershad’s regime held a number of illegitimate elections. The opposition went 
from divided between the Bangladesh National Party and the Awami League to united 
with the participation of twenty two student organizations. Ershad deployed the police 
and paramilitary forces, and sent in other armed groups to university campuses as 
demonstrations gained momentum in November. The police could be unreliable and the 
paramilitary (the Bangladesh Rifles) were open about their discontent, though. Ershad 
declared a state of emergency on November 27, and troops opened fire on new 
demonstrations, killing up to 50. Discontent middle-ranking officers were critical of the 
state of emergency. Troops deployed to the protesters stood by. When Ershad called on 
the military to end the protests with force on December 6, Chief of Army Staff Nuruddin 
Khan refused. Ershad then resigned. Khan apparently acted as a middleman after the 
middle ranks told him they would no longer support Ershad. Some senior generals, 
however, remained loyal and were in favor of following Ershad’s orders. Ershad had 
provided political and economic benefits to the seniors, generating discontent for others 
in the military who felt the institution was becoming corrupt and ineffective.  
 
Sources:  
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2007).  
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(1991): 155- 160.  
Wilkinson, Steven I. “Democratic Consolidation and Failure: Lessons from Bangladesh 
and Pakistan.” Democratization 7, no. 3 (2000): 203-226.  
 
Bangladesh 2/12/2004-4/29/2004 – loyal 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The anti-Bangladesh National Party (BNP) government protests were led by the main 
opposition party, the Awami League (AL). The AL backed down from its demands at the 
end of April 2004. Though the military doesn’t seem to have responded to the protests 
directly, throughout 2004 parts of the army were deployed to maintain “law and order” as 
part of an anti-crime drive. Interestingly, in March 2004, the BNP-led government 
established a Rapid Action Battalion under the police but including military personnel. 
The Rapid Action Battalion was used to suppress the protests.  
 
Sources:  
Freedom House. “Bangladesh: Freedom in the World 2005.” 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/bangladesh. 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Rahman, Waliur. “Police Hold 5,000 in Bangladesh.” BBC News, April 23, 2004. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3654129.stm.  
 
Bangladesh 10/28/2006-1/11/2007 – united defections  
Prime Minister Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) ended his term in October 
2006. Power was transferred to a caretaker government in advance of the new elections. 
Unrest developed over the neutrality of the head of the caretaker government, K.M. 
Hasan; he was a former chief justice and thus head according to the constitution, but had 
been an active member of the BNP before joining the judiciary. He declined to accept the 
position. This did not resolve the issue, and there was widespread rioting and even 
violence during December. On January 3, 2007, the Awami League (AL) party 
announced it would boycott the elections scheduled for January 22. In addition, it 
planned strikes and blockades. On January 11, President Iajuddin Ahmed, on the orders 
of the military leadership, declared a state of emergency and cancelled the elections. 
Under the military’s guidance, a new caretaker government was put in place with Chief 
Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed and lasted until elections in December 2008. The protests 
were against the caretaker government of Hasan and the elections under Ahmed. The 
military leadership removed its support from the caretaker government, and transferred it 
to a new interim ruling body.  
 
Sources: 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Bangladesh.” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2010): 23-47. 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Vaugh, Bruce. “Bangladesh: Political and Strategic Developments and U.S. Interests.” 
Congressional Research Service, April 1, 2010, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520780.pdf.  
 
Belarus 10/30/1988-12/8/1991 - neutral  
Protests and overall popular mobilization against the Communist regime increased over 
this period, as the government opened space for political contention. The demonstrations 
were relatively peaceful, and the state was reluctant to repress them. During this period, 
the military in Belarus consisted of units of the Soviet Belorussian Military District; that 
is, the forces were under control of the Soviets. The most important event during the 
protest movement was the August 1991 failed coup attempt in Moscow, which provoked 
large demonstrations in Minsk. Still, in Belarus generally, there was no confrontation 
between the protesters and the military. There is also no evidence that any parts of the 
Belarus forces shifted support to the protest movement.  
 
Sources:  
Potocki, Rodger. “Dark Days in Belarus.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (2002): 142-
156. Sanford, George. “Nation, State, and Independence in Belarus.” Contemporary 
Politics 3, no. 3 (1997): 225-245.  
Titarenko, Larissa, John D. McCarthy, and Clark McPahil. “The Interaction of State 
Repression, Protest Form and Protest Sponsor Strength During the Transition from 
Communism in Minsk, Belarus, 1990-1995.” Mobilization: An International Journal 6, 
no. 2 (2001): 129-150.  
Belarus 3/19/2006-3/26/2006 – loyal  
Protests began in the lead-up to the 2006 presidential election. On election day March 19, 
over 100,000 paramilitary and other special forces were put on alert. None were actually 
deployed to the streets though, besides Colonel Dmitry Pavlinchenko’s special police 
force squad. This group was used to disband protests on March 25th, or Freedom Day. 
Overall, though, the regime used limited force in response to the unprecedented levels of 
public protest. Much of the army was ready to act and security forces were responsible 
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Benin 1/9/1989-4/20/1990 – fragmented high level 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Protests developed throughout 1989, but really presented a challenge to the regime in 
November and December. When five protesters were killed December 4, President 
Mathieu Kerekou and other key actors agreed to a national conference. The conference 
met in February and was intended to be advisory. But it almost immediately declared its 
right to take binding decisions, and, against opposition from a minority in the military, its 
right to dismiss the government. Kerekou threatened the conference with military action, 
but he probably could not rely on much of the military by that point. Kerekou had 
controlled the military through ethnic balancing, pay and promotions, manipulating 
postings, and the use of counterforces. Discontent had grown in recent years, evidenced 
by two coup attempts in 1988, involving military officers and personnel from the 
presidential guard. From then there was mounting criticism of the political system by 
officers. By the conference, then, much of the military had withdrawn its support, though 
not in a direct way. The president of the conference persuaded Kerekou to back down 
from his threats.  
 
Sources: 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Bolivia 12/28/1977-9/17/1982 – fragmented high level  
In late 1977, President and General Hugo Banzer announced elections for July 1978. The 
military’s candidate General Juan Pereda was supposed to win, and when he did not, he 
launched a coup instead. Anti-military protests escalated due to the apparent electoral 
fraud and then military coup. The situation further destabilized when General David 
Padilla Arancibia overthrew Pareda on November 24, with the goal of transitioning the 
country to democracy. Elections were held on July 1, 1979, but no candidate received an 
absolute majority. The newly- elected Congress named civilian Walter Guevara Arze 
interim president until June 1980. In November though Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch 
launched another coup. Guevara Arze refused to step down, though, and protesters took 
to the streets to support him. Busch conceded. The June 29 elections were won by 
civilian Siles Zuazo. A rightist faction of the military led by General Luis Meza Garcia 
Tejada seized power to prevent him from taking office, though. Garcia Meza ruled for a 
year and was replaced by a new, more reformist, military regime led by General Celso 
Torrielo in August 1981. The continual instability had created deep divisions within the 
military and the following July General Guido Vildoso Calderon took over with the 
mandate of transitioning the country to civilian-led democracy. Congress then put Siles in 
the presidency because of his 1980 electoral victory, and the military stepped aside. The 
military institution removed support from the military regime in response to popular 
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Bolivia 3/7/1985-3/23/85 - loyal  
Protests against President Hernan Siles Zuazo took place in the context of economic 
crisis, including hyperinflation. The military’s support of Zuazo had been less than 
absolute in recent years, with a failed military coup in June 1984 and rumors of other 
coup attempts. But the military was unhappy with the protesters’ violence. Zuazo called 
on the military to restore order, likely because of military pressure for an end to the 
violence. The continued demonstrations and strikes led Zuazo to agree to concessions 
including a special election in July 1985, which he lost. One source said the military was 
active in Zuazo’s resignation, but most others characterize the military as loyal to 
Zuazo’s orders and neutral to the unrest, with rumors of but no actual dissent.  
 
Sources: 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Bolivia 9/29/2003-10/18/2003 – low level  
These protests against President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada turned violent when the 
military and police followed the government’s orders to repress. According to some 
reports, 80 civilians were killed by the security forces. The protesters did not back down, 
though. And, as a result of the violence, military divisions came to the surface. Mid-level 
officers were upset with the senior command’s loyalty to the government, including over 
the repression orders. These disagreements didn’t translate into significant loyalty shifts, 
however. Though some sources state that the military denied Lozada their full support, 
there is no documentation of actual disloyalty. The most evidence comes from a single 
source that claims on October 17th (the day with the largest protests) some unit 
commanders voiced their disagreements. The known discontent and wavering in loyalty 
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at the lower ranks of the military produces the low level shift classification. Lozada was 
forced to resign, because of loss of support from his political allies, including the vice 
president. The military’s relations with the public suffered in the years following, because 
of its involvement in repression.  
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Bolivia 3/18/2004-7/18/2004 – neutral  
Opposition to President Carlos Mesa developed into anti-regime protests in March. They 
escalated in April, when he signed a natural gas export deal with Argentina without 
waiting for the results of a referendum on gas exports scheduled for July. The political 
left was hoping to approve greater state involvement in the industry. The referendum 
passed, and Mesa regained some popular support. The military was not involved in the 
protests, and Mesa decided against using police force too.  
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Bolivia 5/23/2005-6/6/2005 - neutral  
Protests developed over a new Hydrocarbons Law that, while rejected by the opposition, 
was implemented by President Carlos Mesa using his executive powers. Over the same 
period, the government wavered in holding elections for a new Constitutional Assembly, 
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despite its wide support, including from the military. After a delay, Mesa announced 
elections and other concessions, but demonstrations continued. He resigned rather than 
use violence. He did not order the security apparatus to intervene, and no parts of it 
supported the protest movement.  
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Bosnia 2/4/2014-10/12/2014 - neutral  
These anti-government protests were particularly large and disruptive in the beginning, 
especially February. During this stage, demonstrators set buildings on fire, and engaged 
in violent clashes, resulting in injuries to nearly 150 police officers. As they continued, 
the protests became smaller and more peaceful. But they did not have clear leadership or 
organization, and did not generate any concessions from the government. It remained in 
power. They also did not generate a response from the military.  
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Brazil 1/25/1984-1/15/1985 – fragmented high level  
This protest movement, directed against the military regime, demanded direct elections 
for the presidency. It failed to achieve this goal, but did force the military to agree to a 
transition. Part of the armed forces was significantly opposed to democratization, yet 
most of it recognized that the institutional costs of remaining in power were no longer 
acceptable. This division played out within the junta and the military institution. Because 
a major faction of the military institution supported democratization, the junta peacefully 
transitioned from power. In the elections of 1985, the protesters and overall opposition 
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Bulgaria 10/16/1989-1/15/1990 – neutral  
Pressure for democratization came from the protest movement and through more 
institutionalized channels. The Club for the Support of Glasnost and Reorganization in 
Bulgaria was established in late 1988 as a challenge to the regime. All of its founding 
members had also been members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). The desire 
for reform within the party was evident in other ways too; in October 1989, for example, 
minister of foreign affairs Peter Mladenov used an open letter to call for change. At a 
politburo session on November 9, 1989, a majority of the BCP forced General Secretary 
Todor Zhivkov to hand in his resignation. Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov said the army 
would not support Zhikov, but it remained loyal to the party. The army was under the 
control of the BCP, with the highest ranks members of the BCP. In early February 1990, 
a purely communist government was formed because no other parties wanted to 
collaborate with the BCP. The BCP was the most organized political group and thus 
highly involved in the transition.  
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Bulgaria 1/14/2009-1/21/2009 - neutral  
Protests against the Socialist-led government’s handling of the financial crisis (which 
included proposed austerity measures) lasted for a short period in January 2009. At times, 
demonstrators clashed with the police; in one instance on January 14, so-called extremists 
attacked police, and they responded with arrests and some violence. The protests 
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Bulgaria 6/14/2013-7/24/2014 – neutral  
The coalition government of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski faced protests for a 
number of reasons, one of them being its appointment of a media mogul to head the 
national security agency. The mogul resigned, but the protests continued and demanded 
the government’s resignation too. After 14 months, the government agreed to hold new 
elections. The security forces remained loyal throughout. Violence was fairly minimal, 
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Burkina Faso 10/21/2014-10/31/2014 – fragmented high level  
Protests began when President Blaise Compaore proposed an amendment to the 
constitution that would have allowed him to stand for re-election in 2015, for a fifth term 
of office. They continued for a year then escalated in late October 2014 when the 
proposed amendment was scheduled for a vote. The state security forces, including the 
most elite unit within the army, the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP), killed at least 
30 demonstrators. In response, the protesters burned down a parliamentary building. They 
were receiving signals that the military might not use force against them – dozens of 
soldiers had joined the protests. On October 30, Compaore agreed to withdraw the 
amendment and to dissolve the government, but not to resign. That same day Army Chief 
of Staff General Honore Traore issued a communique that he was in charge of the 
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country. It was unclear whether he was following Compaore’s orders, though, given 
Compaore was still president. The protests continued and on October 31 Compaore 
resigned after the RSP (led by vice commander Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida) 
informed him it wouldn’t use violence against the demonstrators. Zida, a largely 
unknown figure, declared himself head of state, largely because he was at the presidential 
palace with the main opposition leaders when Compaore resigned. This declaration 
obviously conflicted with Traore’s earlier, and the high level shift was marked by 
confusion and indecision. The security forces negotiated and on November 1 endorsed 
Zida. Traore had been close to Compaore, but the RSP was also a feared force in society. 
The armed forces had a history of infighting, particularly between March and May 2011, 
when various military units and the presidential guard staged mutinies. This infighting 
continued post-campaign.  
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Burma 3/1/1988-5/27/1990 – low level  
Anti-regime protests began in March 1988 and were broken up by a combination of riot 
police and army troops, with many resulting casualties. In July, Burma Socialist 
Programme Party Chairman (and regime leader) Ne Win stepped down because he was 
angry over the handling of the protests. He was replaced by Sein Lwin, who assumed the 
presidency at this time as well. Amid continued unrest, General Saw Maung (the Minister 
of Defense and Chief of Staff) and the intelligence chief Colonel Khin Nyunt went to Ne 
Win for advice. Ne Win ordered the senior officials of the party to hand power over to a 
military council. This preceded the massacre of August 8 (8/8/88), when the military 
opened fire on demonstrators with machine guns. On August 12, Sein Lwin resigned 
from his positions and Maung Maung was named the new party chairman, but protests 
continued. Finally, on September 18, a group of generals organized by Ne Win and led by 
General Maung Aye announced the formation of the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC). With its new authority, the military imposed martial law and used 
extreme brutality to end the ongoing protests. SLORC held elections on May 20, 1990, as 
promised, but when the opposition won, SLORC refused to honor the results and the 
military remained in power. At the start of the protests, Ne Win had been in power since 
1962, and was largely responsible for the senior military officers’ positions. The military 
command was united. However, there were reports of loyalty shifts from lower level 
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personnel; disloyalty within the air force and navy in early September 1988, and 
discussions among individual soldiers and their units and some movement leaders about 
joining the demonstrations on September 15.  
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Burundi 4/23/2015-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – fragmented high level  
On April 25, the ruling party (National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for 
the Defense of Democracy) named incumbent president Pierre Nkurunziza as its 
candidate in the presidential elections, meaning he would be running for a third term. 
Protests started soon after and lasted for several weeks, and were repressed by the police. 
His decision to do so had the support of the Supreme Court, though. On May 13, while 
Nkurunziza was out of the country, a faction of the military under the command of Major 
General Godefroid Niyombare attempted a coup. Niyombare had been an ally of 
Nkurunziza but was recently dismissed from his position as director of national 
intelligence after a document in which he called Nkurunziza’s third term unconstitutional 
went public. The protesters celebrated the regime’s overthrow, but soon troops loyal to 
Nkurunziza regained control and arrested some rebels but not Niyombare. (Niyombare 
became head of a new armed group, the Republican Forces of Burundi.) The failed coup 
put a damper on the protests, and gave the regime more reason to be repressive of them. 
The coup involved senior generals and was a high level loyalty shift.  
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Cambodia 7/26/1998-9/14/1998 – loyal  
The protests were in response to alleged irregularities in the 1998 elections, and pitted the 
opposition parties (SRP and FUNCINPEC) against the ruling party (CPP). After weeks  
of demonstrations, the protesters called for a sit-in. Following a grenade explosion near 
Prime Minister Hun Sen’s home, he dispatched riot police to clear the site, which resulted 
in violence. There were also confrontations between the police and protesters in other 
parts of the capital. Hun Sen then banned demonstrations. When the protesters put 8000 
people in the streets in defiance, the government crackdown continued, until the 
movement subsided. The movement was already struggling prior to this, because of 
growing opposition to Vietnamese influence within Cambodia, and violent attacks on 
ethnic Vietnamese. The core of the security forces was formed by CPP officers and 
soldiers, and the military in particular remained loyal.  
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Chile 7/21/1931-7/27/1931 - neutral  
Regime leader Colonel Carlos Ibanez del Campo came to power in a 1924 coup. In 
January 1931, he assumed the power to take control during economic crisis. This lost him 
the backing of his once-allies in the traditional political parties and strained his relations 
with the military institution. Massive demonstrations broke out in July, resulting in some 
violence between the protesters and police. Ibanez used the police because he didn’t want 
to send the army into the streets. But, his decision to involve the opposition in a new 
cabinet had opened the political system such that there was no turning back. Ibanez left 
power on July 26 to avoid more conflict with the opposition, and because he believed it 
best the military stay out of politics. The military did not act during the campaign. But, 
Ibanez’s resignation set off a period of instability, with nine different governments over 
the following 15 months.  
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Chile 5/11/1983-12/14/1989 – united defections  
May 11, 1983 was the official start of organized “days of protest” against President 
Augusto Pinochet. Such demonstrations occurred roughly once a month until September. 
Pinochet reacted with heavy repression, including arrests, and as the protests failed to 
achieve their goals in the initial years, they dwindled to involve mostly discontent lower 
classes. Anti-Pinochet mobilization re-developed from 1985 to 1987 but was divided 
between Marxists and non- Marxists. Though there were dissenters within the military 
during this period, they did not see the civilian opposition as an alternative. In accordance 
with the 1980 constitution, a plebiscite on Pinochet’s regime was held in 1988. The vote 
was an overwhelming no, and Pinochet was forced to step down when the military 
leadership refused to intervene to keep him in power. Pinochet could not impose martial 
law because the military institution had defected from him. However, he remained in 
control of the military until 1998, which complicated the democratic transition.  
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China 5/2/1956-7/31/1957 – loyal  
This campaign followed from Chairman Mao’s Hundred Flowers “experiment”, in which 
he allowed criticism of the Communist Party. For instance, in January 1957, factory 
workers in Chongqing demanded pay raises from party officials. Soldiers were called in 
to disperse them using force, but the workers took their calls directly to the municipal 
party committee headquarters. By May 1957, Mao realized the criticisms had developed 
too far, and come to challenge the Party’s rule. One notable demonstration on May 19 
involved Peking University students, which set off demonstrations in other cities. In early 
June, Mao and the party issued directives that turned the movement into an anti-Rightist 
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China 4/5/1976-12/31/1979 – neutral  
These protests against the Communist regime began when a large crowd gathered in 
Tiananmen Square on April 5. They gathered to pay homage to late premier Zhou Enlai, 
but developed into a demonstration against the regime and especially the Cultural 
Revolution. At this point the regime was dominated by an ultra-left faction of the 
Communist Party, and it employed state militias to brutally repress the gathering. The 
militias killed and injured many and arrested hundreds. Deng Xiaoping, a reformist 
within the Central Committee, was sidelined and forced to resign as a result of the 
protests. After Chairman Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, the Party was purged 
and Deng re-emerged. The protests had continued and starting in 1978 Deng re- 
interpreted them as revolutionary acts acceptable to the regime. This development led to 
more demonstrations in early 1979, which became known as the Democracy Wall 
Movement. However, as the protests and their aims became more radical, Deng and a 
united Party leadership cracked down. The military was mostly uninvolved in the 
campaign, with the militias carrying out the repression. In part this was because Deng 
supported the military and it was demoted with him in favor of the militias and their 
allies. When Deng regained power, he put the militias under the control of the military 
and the Party. One source mentioned that 11 military officers and soldiers “identified as 
activists” during the first demonstrations. It included few details, though, and the 
information was not corroborated by any other sources.  
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China 4/16/1989-6/4/1989 – low level  
Ongoing protests were met at various points with violence from the police and army. On 
May 20, the government declared martial law, ordering troops to occupy the main protest 
site, Tiananmen Square. The troops soon retreated, though, and two weeks went by. Over 
this period, the Communist Party was divided over how to respond. Its leaders were 
concerned about a coup. The military leadership was dissatisfied over the Party divisions 
and did not want to be used by one side over the other. Some members of the army had 
reportedly joined the demonstrations, and so the military was also concerned about force 
disintegration. On June 4, the army, including troops transferred in from other provinces, 
forced its way into Tiananmen Square, killing hundreds. This was probably at the orders 
of Deng Xiaoping and other Party leaders. Some within the Party, such as the General 
Secretary, did not want to use force, but they had been sidelined. By the crackdown, 
seniors within the Party and the army were in consensus. There were some reports of 
military disloyalty, though. Some soldiers went missing; it is likely many young, poorly 
trained troops deserted. Some individual officers and commanders resisted orders to 
deploy their troops, but details are difficult to confirm. Also, in late May, in response to 
the Party’s indecision, over a hundred military officers and several generals signed a 
petition calling on the Central Military Commission to not use troops against civilians. 
Once the Party united, the army leadership did too, and followed Deng’s orders.  
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China 9/22/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - neutral  
This anti-regime campaign was known as the Umbrella Movement and concentrated in 
Hong Kong. The protests were highly disruptive, and lost significant public support by 
the end of 2014. The police were active in repressing them, at times clashing with and 
injuring demonstrators. In early October, a violent mob attacked demonstrators and the 
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Croatia 5/25/1999-10/10/2000 - neutral  
This protest movement was successful at forcing the authoritarian regime of Franjo 
Tudman and his Croation Democratic Union party to hold free and fair elections, and 
thus to democratize. This process of political reform was helped along with Tudman’s 
death in December 1999, opening up divisions within the ruling party and space for the 
opposition. There was no major threat of suppression of the demonstrations by the 
military or other security forces, or other military response to the protest movement. The 
military had achieved victory in the war of independence of 1991-1995, though internal 
forces were rumored to have committed war crimes during it.  
 
Sources:  
Kuzio, Taras. “Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist 
Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave.” Demokratizatsiya 16, no. 1 
(2008).  
 
Czechoslovakia 11/16/1989-12/10/1989 – loyal  
On November 17, nearly 50,000 students rallied together against the Communist regime. 
In response, riot police used unprecedented violence, setting off new demonstrations. A 
general strike on November 27 involved millions of people. The regime was unable to 
end the challenge. It offered minor concessions, but they were seen as a sign of 
weakness; the party general secretary (also the Commander in Chief of the army) ordered 
the People’s Militia, or the party paramilitary units, to march on the capital, but it was 
reported the militia refused to use action. The military was not involved. While both 
civilian and military leaders considered using force, events changed quickly, and the 
Central Committee decided on a political solution. Support for the protest movement 
began to spread among the military in mid-November, and this threat to military 
discipline led the minister of defense (Milan Vaclavik) to threaten military force. He was 
also critical of the protesters. The regime never gave intervention orders to Vaclavik, and 
it never lost control of the security forces. The military was domestically-controlled at 
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this time though Soviet occupation forces were also present. In December, a reformist 
government took over the party leadership. Vaclavik was also replaced.  
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Djibouti 1/28/2011-3/4/2011 – neutral  
Protests against President Ismail Omar Guellah that began in late January became violent 
in mid-February. They involved only a couple of thousand people, mostly youths. 
Because of the clashes and rioting, the government deployed police, who arrested 
opposition figures and other activists. The government also banned demonstrations or 
other meetings of the opposition. Beyond the police, it doesn’t seem other security forces 
were involved.  
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East Germany 5/31/1953-6/17/1953 – loyal  
This protest movement against the Communist regime involved more than 500,000 
people, across 560 East German towns. By June 17, the East German police and security 
forces were no longer able to contain the uprising. In response, the regime declared 
martial law and the Soviet army (in particular, the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in 
Germany, or GSOVG) entered Berlin to put down the challenge. They mostly relied on 
intimidation but in a few instances fired on demonstrators directly. The Soviets were 
assisted by the military arm of the East German People’s police, and all reports point to 
subordinates following orders. It later emerged that some troops, junior officers, and even 
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senior officers of the GSOVG were unhappy with being used against civilians – but no 
loyalty shifts occurred during the campaign. Many within the military believed the Nazis 
and their Western patrons organized the riots, and supported ending them with force.  
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East Germany 12/15/1956-12/22/1956 – neutral  
The Second East Germany uprising against the Communist regime was part of the 
general crisis in Eastern Europe after Premier Nikita S. Khruschev’s February 1956 
“secret speech”. In the remarks to a closed session of the Soviet Union’s Communist 
Party Congress, he criticized deceased Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin. In East 
Germany, the shock and disillusionment these remarks set off and the resulting period of 
liberalization saw increased dissent and a wave of strikes. The regime offered minor 
concessions but was overall united and strong enough to withstand the challenge. The 
military was not involved.  
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East Germany 9/4/1989-11/7/1989 – low level  
The protest movement brought together members of the opposition and reformers within 
the Communist party. In late September through early October, demonstrations remained 
small, and the regime relied mostly on preemptive coercion. On October 4, though, there 
were reports of police repression, which brought out thousands of demonstrators in the 
following days. More repression as well as arrests followed. The October 9 protests in 
Leipzig were a turning point, as the regime chose not to use force against 70,000 
nonviolent demonstrators. There had been dialogue between the movement and lower 
party officials, and indecision in the politburo. In fact, Erich Honecker, the East German 
party boss, had signed an order to use force against the protests, but other officials were 
unwilling to issue the order. There were also reports that a security chief had told 
Honecker the police would not be able to beat up hundreds of thousands of people; in the 
end, the police and military did not act. By October 15, some security forces were siding 
with the protesters. Low level dissent had been evident since August, including dozens of 
desertions. In mid- to late-October, some soldiers refused or resisted their officers’ orders 
to deploy to demonstrations. The military leadership did not shift loyalty, but rather was 
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East Timor 6/6/2006-6/26/2006 – neutral  
Unrest in East Timor began in March 2006, when 600 of the army’s 1,400 troops striked 
and then abandoned their barracks, alleging discrimination because they were from the 
country’s west. Most promotions in the army did in fact go to easterners. The government 
dismissed the troops, with support from Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. President Xanana 
Gusmao, on the other hand, was believed sympathetic to the disaffected soldiers. Gusmao 
had left the ruling party in the 1980s. He was elected president in 2002, but unable to 
cultivate personal loyalty from the army whose leadership was loyal to the Fretilin party 
of Alkatiri. Protests developed during this period, too, and in April turned violent because 
of clashes between the dismissed soldiers and the increasingly splintered military and 
police forces that the government had deployed to restore order. Another group of 
soldiers as well as police (led by Major Alfredo Reinado) abandoned their posts in protest 
of such a deployment on April 28. They then ambushed loyal soldiers and police on May 
23, which generated more violence and riots. Also in May, international troops arrived to 
help calm the situation. On May 31, Gusmao declared a state of emergency and took 
control of the army and police forces. The situation was indeed at crisis levels by late 
June; more than 30 people had been killed, and people were fleeing their homes. Alkatiri 
stepped down on June 26, partly as a result of allegations that the Minister of Internal 
Administration had armed civilians for the conflict (he resigned June 1). He faced 
pressure from the political opposition that included Catholic Church figures, as well as 
Gusmao. The new prime minister, Jose Ramos- Horta, was sworn in July 10.  
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Ecuador 4/13/2005-4/20/2005 – united defections  
Lucio Gutierrez was elected president and took office in January 2003 but soon adopted 
conservative policies that gradually angered the indigenous movements that had formed 
the backbone of his campaign. Leftist groups took to the streets, first under the direction 
of political parties, then becoming more spontaneous. They faced repression by the police 
and newly-trained Special Forces. Gutierrez also mobilized his supporters. But, on April 
20, the Command of the Armed Forces publicly announced it could no longer support 
him. The opposition parties in Congress then met and declared that Gutierrez had 
abandoned his duties. Gutierrez resigned and Vice President Castillo assumed the 
presidential office.  
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Egypt 9/30/2000-12/7/2005 - neutral  
These anti-President Hosni Mubarak protests were long lasting. But, they never involved 
the institutionalized opposition parties, and often met with massive displays of force by 
the Egyptian security forces. One of the largest demonstrations took place February 21, 
2005. In response to this particular incident, Mubarak offered some concessions, but he 
also cracked down, in particular with arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. More 
demonstrations occurred on May 25, 2005, the day of a referendum on constitutional 
reform. Security forces engaged in brutal repression of the protesters. Mubarak then won 
a fifth term in September, and the opposition, and especially the protest movement, 
became less active. The opposition was diverse and had supported different presidential 
candidates rather than presenting a united challenge to Mubarak. Mubarak was fairly 
tolerant of later protests, but used the police against them on occasion.  
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Egypt 10/29/2007-2/11/2011 – united defections  
Ongoing protests against President Hosni Mubarak grew in momentum in the wake of 
other uprisings in the region. Throughout January 2011, Mubarak deployed his security 
forces to deal with them. While the police did most of the repressing, the military units 
did not stop them. The military leadership also issued a number of statements calling on 
the protesters to give up and go home. On February 2, armed pro-government groups 
unleashed violence on the demonstrators, and the military did not interfere. In the 
surrounding days, some soldiers in the streets joined the protests. There were also internal 
military reports around this time about a potential mutiny within the lower ranks. These 
low level shifts, combined with Mubarak’s failure to make sufficient concessions to end 
the protests, led the generals to shift the full military’s loyalty. On February 10, the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (a body that convenes in times of national 
emergencies) announced it was taking control of the situation, thus not cracking down on 
Mubarak’s behalf. Mubarak resigned and left the country the next day. The Council then 
declared it would temporarily lead the government.  
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Egypt 6/24/2013-7/3/2013 – united defections  
This period saw large protests against President Mohammed Morsi, but also large 
protests in support of him. On July 1, the military issued a two-day ultimatum to Morsi, 
demanding that he call early presidential elections to end the political crisis. The next 
day, Morsi gave some concessions, but refused to call early elections, or step down. He 
attempted to form a consensus government, except the opposition would not join. In fact, 
all of the non-Freedom and Justice Party ministers within the government had resigned 
after the military’s ultimatum. On July 3, Minister of Defense General Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi, on behalf of the military, overthrew Morsi, disbanded the legislature, and suspended 
the constitution. He then appointed a new interim president. Prior to the coup, Sisi had 
met with leaders from a number of organizations to get support, including the Coptic 
Christian Church, youth groups, and other political parties.  
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Egypt 7/4/2013-6/7/2014 - loyal  
Protests in support of President Mohammed Morsi continued after his overthrow by 
General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in July 2013. The crackdown under the interim government 
of Adly Mansour was brutal, employing violence and arrests. The most notable incidents 
were August 2013 massacres at the Rab’a and el Nahda Squares, but the Republican 
Guards killed over 70 in protests in late July, too. The demonstrators themselves were at 
times violent; they weren’t unarmed at Rab’a, and they used violence when provoked by 
others during marches. Most of the protests included the Muslim Brotherhood, but others, 
particularly in January 2014 in commemoration of the revolution, involved students. 
They were crushed by security forces, with police storming university campuses. 
Through this period, there were no signs of pro-democracy (or pro-protester) members of 
the military, or actions by them.  
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El Salvador 4/15/1944-5/7/1944 – low level  
On April 2, 1944, the air force and two army regiments launched a military revolt against 
the regime of General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez. President Hernandez Martinez 
was able to put it down with the help of loyal troops, consisting largely of the National 
Police and National Guard. These events set off a general strike, though. Demonstrations 
culminated on May 7 when a policeman killed a young boy. The military government did 
not take action to end the protest movement, in part because of divisions and discontent 
within the military institution. Junior military officers in particular were unhappy with 
Martinez’s dictatorial rule, though their discontent did not translate into widespread 
loyalty shifts. Hernandez Martinez resigned on May 9 and was replaced by interim 
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El Salvador 2/21/1977-11/27/1980 – low level  
Mobilization against the military regime developed following the 1977 presidential 
elections, becoming disruptive and at times violent. Some early demonstrations were met 
with repression, such as when 50 to 100 protesters were killed on February 28. A group 
of progressive military officers launched a coup on October 15, 1979, because of General 
Carlos Humberto Romero’s refusal to institute reforms. The resulting military-civilian 
junta incorporated some opposition leaders, but largely failed to institute reforms. 
Further, because it proposed reforms more radical than most of the military preferred, 
conservatives within the military blocked its efforts. A new junta formed in January 1980 
with the goal of defeating the leftist opposition with force. In order to accomplish this, 
the mostly rightist leadership purged progressive officers from the government and the 
military leadership. Those close to Colonel Adolfo Majano, a key participant in the 
October 1979 coup, fared especially badly. Yet most of these elements remained loyal to 
the military regime and institution. When Majano defected in early 1980, he led only a 
small group that included few officers. The disloyal forces also had few ties to the protest 
movement. The protest movement peaked in early 1980, in part because of unrelenting 
repression. Further, opposition in the form of the Farabundo Martin National Liberation 
Front (FMLN) rebel group had begun a violent campaign.  
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Estonia 8/24/1987-8/22/1991 – neutral 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The first stages of this anti-Communist regime campaign saw opposition in Estonia (as 
well as other Baltic nations) expanding their demands and ramping up their dissent. In 
January 1991, the USSR warned Baltic nations that they must comply with military draft 
laws. This was followed by an influx of USSR troops. The particularly violent events to 
come (pro-Soviet paramilitary attacks) were mostly concentrated in Lithuania, and 
Estonia remained largely calm. Estonia and Russia actually signed an agreement that 
recognized each other’s sovereignty. Protests continued in Estonia until the failed coup in 
Moscow on August 21. The day before, it was reported that the Soviet army was ready to 
move into Tallinn, which prompted the Supreme Council to declare independence. 
(Estonia had been in a transition to independence since March 30.) The coup attempt 
formalized this declaration. The Soviet military had little involvement in these events, 
and throughout, the fear of a massive military crackdown was relatively low given the so-
called Gorbachev doctrine. In October 1989, the Soviet Union had indicated it would not 
interfere in the internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies.  
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Fiji 5/16/1987-6/3/1987 – neutral  
On May 14, while the Commander of the Army and his second in command were away, 
third in command Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka led a coup against the newly 
elected National Federation Part-Labor Party Coalition government led by Timoci 
Bavadra. This coalition was multiracial and Indo-Fijan and threatened the hegemony of 
the Fijan-dominated Alliance Party. It was rumored that Bavadra would reform the 
military in ways unacceptable to most officers: reducing its role in internal security and 
admitting more Indians (the military was more than 90% Fijan at this time). Protests 
broke out against the coup, and quickly became violent. This led the rest of the military 
and the Great Council of Chiefs (Fiji’s constitutional assembly) to back Rabuka. The 
anti-coup movement was soon subdued and no part of the military shifted loyalty in 
response to the protests.  
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Fiji 4/24/2000-5/29/2000 – low level  
In April, indigenous Fijians began protests to call on President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
to dismiss Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry’s government. A civilian named George 
Speight led a coup against Chaudhry on May 19. Immediately, there were suspicions of 
military complicity, since it was slow to react, by securing parliament or securing the area 
from Speight’s accomplices. It emerged that the coup was in fact supported by members 
of the Army’s Counter Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) unit, a guard that former prime 
minister Sitiveni Rabuka had established in 1987 as a coup-proofing force. Its personnel 
were viewed as rogue elements of the military. There were rumors that the military coup 
leader, Colonel Ilisoni Ligairi, a retired armed officer, was a hired gun. Senior military 
officers did not support the coup, but also seemed unable to prevent the crisis, and the 
security situation quickly deteriorated. Prime Minister Chaudhry and his cabinet and 
colleagues were incarcerated by Speight’s forces for almost eight weeks. The commander 
of the military, Frank Bainimarama, told the president that the constitution did not offer a 
framework for resolving the crisis, and so he needed to step aside. The military leadership 
then declared martial law on May 29. Only one military unit – the CRW – shifted loyalty 
from the regime to the protest movement, by supporting Speight’s coup.  
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Georgia 11/4/2003-11/23/2003 – low level  
The protest movement against President Eduard Shevarnadze was short in duration but 
intense. Demonstrations started after parliamentary elections on November 2 that were 
considered unfair. On November 22, the day of the new parliament’s opening session, the 
protesters seized parliament. Shevardnadze had deployed hundreds of soldiers to the 
streets in advance. The protesters were confident some security forces wouldn’t intervene 
but didn’t know how the president’s special units would respond. When Shevarnadze 
declared a state of emergency, the elite military forces refused to comply. Further, many 
soldiers in the streets laid down their guns. Shevarnadze resigned on November 23, and 
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Ghana 11/13/2000-12/7/2000 - neutral  
The presidential election was held on December 7, 2000. It followed almost a month of 
protests, some of which the police dispersed violently. The candidate of the ruling party, 
the National Democratic Congress, did not win outright, and was forced into a run-off 
with that of the main opposition party, the New Patriotic Party. The opposition won. 
Neither round of the election was disputed and the contest ended peacefully. The military 
was not involved in the protests.  
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Greece 5/28/1963-6/16/1963 - neutral  
Protests started in part in response to the May 1963 assassination of leftist politician 
Gregores Lambrakes by right-wing extremists. Most involved students under the banner 
of the Democratic Youth Movement. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis’s rightist 
government repressed them, at times brutally. Meanwhile, Karamanlis had been pushing 
constitutional changes that would increase his position’s power. The monarchy disagreed. 
The military worried that the split between the government and the monarchy would give 
political space to the leftists. According to some reports, Greek officers actually asked the 
US Embassy for American support for a (possible) coup – they did not receive it, 
though. The monarchy forced Karamanlis to resign on June 11. While it indicated it 
might look to the military for support, such was not needed. A caretaker government took 
power, led by Panagiotis Pipinelis, until elections in November.  
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Greece 2/1/1973-11/17/1974 – fragmented high level  
Dictator Georgios Papadopoulos had seized power through military coup in April 1967. 
Growing opposition to the military regime and intra-regime conflicts led him to begin 
transferring power to a civilian government in early 1973. The opposition developed into 
popular protests involving students during February and March 1973. On May 23, a 
group of naval officers supported by some politicians and the king (who was at this time 
in exile) attempted a coup to hasten the junta’s end. The coup was frustrated by other 
security forces, and colonels purged about 400 officers for their involvement or disloyalty 
to the junta. Papadopoulos officially launched the transition on June 1 by negotiating with 
Spyros Markezinis of the Progressive Party on the formation of the civilian government. 
Reform was very limited though, as Papadopoulos soon introduced constitutional 
amendments which would give him more power, especially over foreign policy. This 
created tensions between him and Markezinis. After more negotiations, Papadopoulos 
agreed to hold elections in September. This liberalization increased popular mobilization 
over the summer. The military became involved after the police failed to control the 
growing protests. While lower and middle ranking officers were frustrated with the 
military junta, they also worried about leftists taking power. High ranking officers were 
also discontent yet resistant to civilian government. Markezinis did not have a good 
relationship with the military and exercised little control over it at this point. On 
November 25, Dimitrios Ioannides, a hardliner and head of the military police, led a coup 
that ousted Papadopoulous. He was unopposed by the rest of the military and re-
established full military rule. Ioannides’s regime was soon enveloped in crisis, though; he 
decided to interfere in Cyprus, which threatened war with Turkey in late July. Large 
sections of the navy and air force disagreed with Ioanniades’s strategy. This strengthened 
softliners within the weak military institution. Further, popular opposition to the regime 
was still high. Later that month, 250 or more officers from the Third Army Corps signed 
a declaration demanding the regime create a transitional government. The regime and the 
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Guatemala 5/1/1944-7/1/1944 – fragmented high level  
Demonstrations against the dictatorship of Jorge Ubico grew throughout May and June. 
The situation got interesting in late June; first, in response to protests on June 24, the 
security forces did not intervene. When they got even bigger the next day, the police and 
army did act, and killed some women. In spite of this event, the military overall began to 
disobey Ubico’s orders. Junior army officers played an especially key role in forcing 
Ubico to resign on July 1. Senior officers were not yet ready to give up power to 
civilians. Before leaving office, Ubico chose an ally General Frederico Ponce Vaides to 
take power with two other generals. Vaides stepped up repression against the opposition.  
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Guinea 1/10/2007-11/17/2010 – united defections  
Mobilization against the regime of former military leader Lansana Conte took the form of 
strikes in 2006 and 2007, often with violent responses from the security forces, resulting 
in many casualties. In 2008 the situation became tense because of unrest within the 
security forces. In May, junior army officers led an uprising at a military base that 
headquartered the army’s elite commando parachutist unit. They were angry over pay and 
promotions. After a few weeks, Conte met with the leader of the mutiny and reached an 
agreement on concessions. In June, police officers mutinied, but were crushed by army 
troops. In December, Conte died, and hours after it was announced, the army (in 
particular, junior officers) took over, putting Captain Moussa Dadis Camara in power. 
They faced little resistance from more senior officers, and the population generally was 
supportive after years of Conte’s unpopular rule. The junta was supposed to oversee a 
transition ending in January 2010, but in April 2009, Camara announced he would run for 
president. This set off demonstrations that were brutally repressed by the security forces. 
The most notable instance of repression took place on September 28, 2009, and involved 
Camara’s forces as well as some rogue sections within the military. The commander of 
the Presidential Guards, Lieutenant Aboubacar Diakite, feared he would be blamed for 
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the violence so he made an assassination attempt on Camara in December. Camara left 
the country for medical treatment, and the military considered its options. In the end, led 
by vice president and Minister of Defense General Sekouba Konate, it decided to support 
civilian rule. This united decision to shift loyalty from the regime was preceded by 
military factionalism including tensions between Camara’s junta and the armed forces 
over reports that the government had recruited irregular fighters to form a militia. A 
semi-military transitional government was put in place, and opposition leader Alpha 
Conde was elected president in November 2010.  
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Guyana 9/16/1990-10/7/1992 - neutral  
Following years of anti-regime protests, the October 1992 presidential elections put 
Cheddi Jagan of the opposition People’s Progress Party (PPP) in power. This followed an 
election period that saw fears the military would declare martial law to guarantee a ruling 
party (People’s National Congress, or PNC) victory. It didn’t, and after, the PNC made 
no attempt to get military support. The military command at one point indicated it did not 
want to be involved in politics. Because it is not clear whether the regime planned or 
wanted to use the military, the military’s noninvolvement is best considered neutrality.  
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Haiti 11/27/1985-2/17/1986 – united defections  
Regime opposition first took the form of food riots in fall 1985. In November, students 
joined in the streets. Troops sent in to guard the demonstrators did not know how to 
respond and ended up killing a number of them. This ignited other protests, and calls for 
President Jean-Claude Duvalier (“Baby Doc”) to step down and the army to take over – it 
was likely the only institution able to run the state in Duvalier’s absence. While the army 
did not explicitly support the movement, officers began to distance themselves from 
Duvalier, concluding he was on his way out, and by January 1986 were not acting against 
the demonstrations. Yet neither did the army want to take power. According to some 
reports, it was only following pressure from the US and other Haitian politicians that 
General Henri Namphy first removed support from Duvalier and then took power in a 
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new military government. Duvalier fled in February. His father and predecessor, 
Franqois, had controlled the military by promoting loyalists and removing potential 
threats, as well as through counterforces (including a paramilitary force, the National 
Security Volunteers or VSN). Some in the VSN supported Baby Doc to the end, but the 
military organization was disillusioned with his rule.  
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Haiti 6/29/1987-7/31/1987 – loyal  
Following the overthrow of Baby Doc, General Namphy remained in charge of the 
transitional government (the National Governing Council, or NGC) and moved only 
slowly from military rule to democracy. In June 1987, he and others in the NGC tried to 
take control of the November elections from an independent electoral council. This 
prompted major protests, which the military repressed throughout June and July. It killed 
many demonstrators. At no point did any of the military support the protest movement. 
The NGC eventually backed down from the decrees related to the council, but it also 
cancelled the upcoming elections. These months of unrest were followed by a series of 
coups, one of which overthrew the NGC and another that attempted to oust the new 
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Haiti 12/10/2003-2/9/2004  
Haiti had no military during this period; it was disbanded in 1995 by President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide.  
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Haiti 2/28/2005-5/17/2010  
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Haiti had no domestic military during this period. The country was militarily occupied by 
a US- French-Canadian force, then a UN pacification force.  
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Honduras 6/29/2009-9/28/2009 – loyal  
On June 28, President Manuel Zelaya was arrested by the military, in response to tensions 
over whether to hold a referendum about adding a question on convening a constituent 
assembly to the November ballot. Critics viewed the referendum and the question as an 
attempt by Zelaya to expand executive power, and the judicial branch declared it illegal. 
Zelaya continued with his referendum plans and ordered the military to help him carry it 
out. When head of the military General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez refused, Zelaya fired 
him. The army, navy, and air force commanders resigned in solidarity with Vasquez, and 
the Supreme Court reinstated him. Then, the Supreme Court issued the warrant for 
Zelaya’s arrest, following a request from the Chief Prosecutor. Instead of turning Zelaya 
over for trial, though, the military took him to Costa Rica. It then turned power over to a 
civilian interim government, in line with the constitution. Protests organized by Zelaya’s 
National Resistance Front Against the Coup (FNR) soon began, and brought together 
trade unions, peasant groups, and leftist popular organizations. They failed to remove the 
interim government and its president, Roberto Micheletti, however. An anti-Zelaya 
coalition of traditional political parties, the business sector, and the armed forces held 
strong. While Zelaya claimed to have support in the lower and middle levels of officers, 
no divisions emerged. The army, along with the police, also put down the FNR’s protests, 
and were accused of using excessive force in doing so.  
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Hungary 8/19/1989-9/11/1989 – neutral  
Though the start of the protest movement was August 1989, processes of political 
liberalization had begun long before. This is one reason the military was mostly 
uninvolved in the challenge to the regime. The military leadership was less than 
supportive of democratization, but did not want to be involved in politics, either. Also 
important were indications from Soviet leaders that it preferred peaceful negotiations. As 
a result, the transition was peaceful, with little violence. Soviet forces were stationed in 
Hungary during this time, but did not act. The Hungarian security forces were largely 
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Iceland 10/10/2008-1/26/2009  
Iceland did not have a military during this time. Anti-regime protests there were mostly 
peaceful but at times involved riot police.  
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India 6/14/1975-6/26/1975 – neutral  
Popular opposition to Indira Ghandhi’s government grew in the lead-up to elections on 
June 11. When the votes were counted on June 12, her party lost, and the same day a high 
court ruled that she had engaged in corrupt electoral practices in 1971. Instead of 
appealing the court’s decision, Indira informed President Fakhruddin Ali that she was 
going to declare a state of emergency. The president signed it into law on June 25. This 
marked the end of the protest movement, but throughout, the military was uninvolved in 
repression. Most was carried out by the police and internal paramilitary forces such as the 
Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police (both headed by senior police 
forces). The military also refused to act on behalf of the people by opposing the 
government. The state of emergency gave Indira the constitutional authority to use the 
army to enforce it. The army had a reputation as professional and competent, especially 
after its December 1971 victory over Pakistan. One contentious military issue that didn’t 
come to cause problems for Indira was the appointment of General Tapeshwar Nath 
Raina as Army Chief of Staff over other generals in line for the position. Some younger 
officers likely opposed Indira, but they didn’t shift loyalty, either.  
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India 1/20/1977-3/21/1977 – neutral  
Elections were held in the midst of the state of emergency, on March 16. Indira 
Ghandhi’s party, the Indian National Congress, lost. After the results were announced, 
Indira instructed the president to end the state of emergency and then resigned. According 
to one report, she was ready to suspend the constitution, cancel the elections, and declare 
martial law, but some officers refused. However, this was not corroborated by other 
sources. Thus, the military did not act to support the regime or the protest movement.  
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Indonesia 10/28/1997-5/21/1998 – fragmented high level  
Protests against President Suharto developed as the financial crisis worsened. Student-led 
protests grew throughout February and March 1998. Suharto’s party, Golkar, had won the 
1997 People’s Consultative Assembly elections, and in March 1998 Suharto was elected 
for a seventh term by the legislature. Suharto was a former army general, and the military 
formed a key base of support for him. However, a rivalry had developed between two 
generals (both Suharto loyalists) over control of the military: Wiranto and Probowo 
Subianto, who was also Suharto’s son in law. On May 12, Indonesia’s elite combat units, 
the Kopassus, killed four demonstrating students in Jakarta. This was likely at the order 
of Prabowo and set off mob violence. In the aftermath, he advocated for more repression 
of the protests, while Wiranto disagreed. Under Wiranto, the military facilitated a transfer 
of power from Suharto to his vice president, B.J. Habibie on May 21. Wiranto still 
supported Suharto and wanted him to leave peacefully, but Suharto had factionalized the 
military as a way to balance it. In the process, Suharto had increased the standing of 
Subianto, a relatively junior general. While Wiranto offered Suharto a plan forward, 
Suharto considered a new military command – until the army chief of staff General 
Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo refused to lead it. Subagyo accompanied Wiranto when he met 
with Suharto over stepping down.  
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Indonesia 5/21/1999-10/19/1999 – neutral  
Before stepping down, Suharto transferred power to his vice president B. J. Habibie. 
Habibie came to rely heavily on the military over his term because of his lack of popular 
support. His government undertook a number of military reforms, to reduce its political 
participation, but also made concessions to Minister of Defense and Commander of the 
Armed Forces Wiranto and the leadership, allowing it continued influence. Politics 
overall were contentious and Habibie as well as other parties looked to the military for 
support. But the political competition combined with divides in the military made 
Wiranto and others unwilling to intervene, on the side of Habibie or the opposition. 
Habibie held parliamentary elections in June 1999. His Golkar party came in second. 
Then in September, after demonstrations, he was forced to drop a new bill that would 
have provided the president and military greater latitude for handling unrest. Security 
forces killed several protesters during these events. Habibie ended up losing backing 
from Golkar and as a result did not attempt re-election.  
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Iran 11/16/1977-2/11/1979 – fragmented high level  
This anti-Shah Reza Pahlavi protest movement was massive, consisting of students, the 
intelligentsia, merchants, clergy, laborers, and professionals. The first major involvement 
of the military was in February 1978, when the regime ordered it to take over Tabriz to 
restore order. In August and September, the military became further involved when the 
regime declared martial law in Esfahan and then Tehran, as well as other major cities. 
Demonstrations continued despite the orders. Earlier, the Shah had appointed General 
Gholam Ali Oveissi as Tehran’s military governor, and now Oveissi ordered tanks 
downtown and troops to fire. This culminated on September 8, or Black Friday, when 
troops killed 400 to 500 people. Protests continued, and a small faction of the movement 
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started using violence. The first sign of disloyalty among the military was November 4, 
when an army conscript tried to join the demonstrators and was killed by officers. This 
set off rioting. The Shah responded with some concessions and by dismissing Oveissi. 
However, the military and especially the rank and file were becoming less and less 
reliable, and desertion rates were increasing. During rallies on December 10 and 11, the 
protesters reached out to the military for support. December 11 also saw a dozen upper-
ranking officers shot by their own troops as rival military factions faced off. The situation 
was extremely confused when the Shah left the country on January. Some senior officers 
remained loyal to him, and even followed him; other officers remained but stopped 
following the orders of their superiors of other civilians. Religious and opposition leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came back to Iran from exile on February 1, 1979 and 
declared a provisional government under Mehdi Bazargan. Then, he called on the 
protesters to go into the streets and prevent any security forces still loyal to the Shah 
(especially the Imperial Guards) from staging a coup. More intra-security forces conflict 
occurred on February 9, inside an air force base. The fighting came to involve other 
armed groups. Soon after, the Army’s Supreme Council recognized the Bazargan 
government. Finally, on February 11, chief of staff of the armed forces Abbas 
Gharabaghi announced that the military would remain neutral as the new regime 
struggled to take control. The military was not cohesive by this point. While in power, the 
Shah had employed various coup-proofing strategies, including personally controlling 
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Iran 7/9/1999-7/31/1999 - neutral  
Student protests against President Mohammad Khatami took place in July, leading to a 
July 9th attack by security forces on a dormitory at Tehran University. Hundreds of 
students were arrested, and at least one was killed. The attack, however, was against the 
orders of the interior minister. It also prompted more protests that set off violence 
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between the protesters, police, and other armed groups. The Basij volunteer paramilitary 
played a major role and was able to end the unrest, without need to call on the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or the army. The IRGC did threaten to intervene if 
necessary, and 24 of its commanding officers wrote to Khatami to criticize his failure to 
recognize the demonstrations as a threat to national security. Khatami then called on the 
protesters to cooperate with the government and backed a counter rally in support of the 
regime. At this point, the Iranian military was poor, weak, and disorganized following the 
war with Iraq. The armed forces overall were divided between the regular military and 
the IRGC.  
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Iran 6/12/2009-6/14/2013 – neutral  
Over this period, the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) gained power, and the regime 
became increasingly reliant on it for its security. The IRGC had been set up as a parallel 
force to the military for coup-proofing purposes, but the regime continued to invest in it 
to prevent popular opposition. This was evident in the IRGC’s repression of these 
demonstrations against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Basij, a network of social, 
professional, and militia groups used to mobilize support for the regime, was also 
involved in repression. Both forces were brutal and fully committed to regime orders. 
The IRGC (as well as the military) relied on conscripts, so there were some concerns over 
the rank and file’s loyalty. But, no loyalty shifts occurred. Most officers had been 
promoted on the basis of their loyalty to the regime.  
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Iraq 3/3/1991-3/28/1991 – low level  
Anti-Saddam Hussein protests by Sunni Arabs occurred in the midst of an uprising by 
Shiite Arabs and Kurds. For two weeks, both of them seemed on the verge of success; 
they overthrew various local governments, and put local army garrisons in disarray. At 
the same time, many in the army were exhausted from war and angry with Saddam over 
Iraq’s very recent defeat. Further, when Saddam announced his withdrawal from the war, 
he made no agreement on the safety of his retreating forces. His Republican Guard had 
already safely withdrawn, leading to suspicions that he wanted the enemy forces to wipe 
out those he suspected of disloyalty. Many soldiers, both Sunni and Shiite, deserted and 
joined the protesters in the streets. There was also a large anti-Saddam section in the 
higher levels of the military, in part because of the conflict. These officers were more 
cautious in their criticism, though, given that in late 1990 Saddam had executed disloyal 
officers. The deserting soldiers took up arms in revolt against the government, but overall 
their efforts were spontaneous, with little leadership or organization, and did not spread 
to Baghdad. The opposition never fully won over the military, either; the limited loyalty 
shifts were more in the form of disintegration than defection. In the end, the remainder of 
the army saved Saddam’s regime.  
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Iraq 2/12/2011-12/2/2011 - loyal  
The climax of this protest movement against the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-
Malaki seems to have been February 26, when tens of thousands participated in 
nationwide demonstrations. In response, soldiers shot into the crowds, and the security 
forces arrested hundreds. Army intelligence units were the main force involved in 
repressing the protests. After this incident, the protests became more aggressive, though 
most of the violence was on the part of the security forces.  
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Iraq 12/28/2012-9/8/2014 – low level  
These anti-Maliki protests mostly involved Sunnis. The Iraq Security Forces (ISF) first 
fired on the demonstrators in late January 2013. They continued, including as part of a 
protest camp at al-Hawijah. The security forces raided this camp in April 2013, which 
provoked some Sunnis to become more militant. In May 2013, Maliki reshuffled the top 
command of the security forces, likely to remove from view the individuals that Sunnis 
blamed for the violence. After months of continued protests, though, Maliki sent in the 
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army to shut down protest camps in Anbar, and also to secure the area from al Qaeda, 
which was encroaching. Sunni tribal forces repelled the troops and forced Maliki to 
withdraw. Many Sunnis did not feel safe under Malaki’s security forces, and formed their 
own instead. Starting in 2006, Maliki had steadily gained power as minister of defense, or 
the interior, of the state for national security, and the commander in chief of the armed 
forces. He replaced high ranking military officials with his allies, and created provincial 
command centers headed by loyal generals. He also integrated Shiite militias into the 
ISF. There were some instances of military disloyalty. A local army unit helped civilians 
flee the camp raid in April, and the mostly Kurdish 16th brigade of the army refused 
Maliki’s orders to fire on protesters. Maliki dismissed the brigade’s commander, which 
led it to defect to the Kurdistan Regional Government’s forces.  
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Japan 5/21/1960-7/15/1960 – united defections  
Protests started when the Nobusuke Kishi government attempted to revise the country’s 
Mutual Security Treaty. They grew over how Kishi handled the situation, including 
police violence against mostly students who were part of the demonstrations. During one 
protest on June 15, rightist “hoodlums” attacked the protesters. President Dwight 
Eisenhower of the United States was scheduled to visit Japan on June 19, so Kishi asked 
the defense agency chief to deploy the Self Defense Force Troops (the Japanese military) 
against the movement in advance. The chief refused the request and later said his 
decision had the support of the rest of the military. Kishi had lost significant support from 
his party, the Liberal Democratic Party, in the lead-up. The Treaty ended up being 





Berger, Thomas U. “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-
Militarism.” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 119-150.  
Fakuda, Kanichi. “The May-June Incident.” Far Eastern Survey 29, no. 10 (1960): 146-
151.  
Saruya, Hiroe. “Protests and Democracy in Japan: The Development of Movement Fields 
and the 1960 Anpo Protests.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2012.  
 
Jordan 1/14/2011-1/23/2013 – neutral  
These Arab Spring protests followed on others in the region, but here, the armed forces 
remained loyal. The regime mostly allowed the demonstrations under heavy police 
presence, and used the security forces (mainly the paramilitary) to clamp down when 
necessary. It also responded with minor concessions. The regime consisted mostly of East 
Bank Jordanians, and the same went for the armed forces. There were rumors of 
discontent among military veterans that disapproved of the regime, and the protests at one 
point involved loyalty tribes affiliated with the military. Still, no part of the military ever 
shifted loyalty, or acted in the protests on regime orders.  
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Kenya 2/18/1990-12/31/1991 – neutral  
Pro-democracy protests began in February 1990, and the crackdown against them began 
in June. The regime used violent repression in July. The demonstrations continued for 
more than a year, though, and on December 2, 1991, the government announced a change 
to the constitution that would allow competitive multiparty politics. This occurred in the 
absence of any military loyalty shifts.  
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Kyrgyzstan 5/1/1990-4/19/1991 – neutral  
Ongoing inter-ethnic violence (including a June 5, 1990 incident where more than 500 
were killed) increased the opposition to the Communist regime. In May, the opposition 
formed the Kygyzstan Democratic Movement as an anti-Communist bloc. The protest 
movement forced parliament to hold new presidential elections in October. The 
Communist Party’s candidate, Absamat Masaliyev lost in an upset to Askar Akayev. He 
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Kyrgyzstan 2/27/2005-3/24/2005 – low level  
Demonstrations began in February but escalated in March. On March 20, President Askar 
Akayev ordered soldiers to clear protesters from an administrative building in Jalalabad. 
This resulted in some injuries, with rumors of many more, and the protesters devolved 
into a violent mob. Some police were sympathetic to the protesters, and when ten 
thousand of them gathered in the capital on March 21, they were able to break through 
security force lines to flood the main government offices. Akaev decided against 
declaring a state of emergency, likely because he couldn’t rely on the security apparatus. 
He then fled the country. Violence was limited because the military and police dissolved 
rather than use force. These deployed soldiers resisted acting against the protesters and 
thus shifted loyalty from the regime in this limited instance.  
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Kyrgyzstan 4/6/2010-4/20/2010 – united defections  
After two days of major demonstrations, on April 7, Prime Minister Daniar Usenov 
declared a nationwide state of emergency. Thousands of protesters gathered anyway, 
overwhelming the police. They surrounded the presidential offices and demanded Usenov 
and President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to come out. When the officials refused, the protesters 
stormed the building. The police opened live fire, but the protesters continued, and 
occupied other buildings. The police ended up killing 85 and then abandoned their 
positions. The military defected from Bakiyev to the opposition on April 8, after the 
release of former Defense Minister Ismail Isakov from prison. Bakiyev left the country in 
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the days following. Bakiyev was already out of the country at this point, but this sealed 
his fate. His other security services also gave him little support. An interim government 
was declared after Bakiyev was overthrown.  
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Latvia 8/23/1989-8/31/1991 – loyal  
Anti-regime opposition in Latvia developed in late 1989, but in January 1991, the 
situation became more dramatic. First, on January 14, the plenum of the Latvian 
Communist Party Central Committee issued an ultimatum: it would call on the pro-Soviet 
Latvian National Salvation Committee (NSC) to take over unless the government 
resigned and the legislature disbanded. The headquarters of the Baltic Military District 
supported the NSC takeover, and its Commander in Chief Fyodor Kuzmin called on the 
government to comply with the Soviet Constitution. Then, Moscow, using Soviet security 
forces and specifically Black Berets, stepped up its attacks on the Latvian independence 
movement. On January 20, for example, the Black Berets attacked the Latvian Ministry 
of the Interior building. The struggle continued, though, only ending with the failed 
August coup in Moscow. Then Latvia declared its transitional period over and became an 
independent, non-Communist state.  
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Lebanon 11/23/2006-5/21/2008 – united defections  
Tensions emerged within Lebanon’s coalition government in November 2006. Hizbollah 
and its allies, which held 6 out of the 24 cabinet seats, resigned over issues related to the 
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investigation of former prime minister Rafic Hariri’s 2005 assassination. The resignations 
set off a larger political crisis, including the start of anti-government demonstrations by 
Hizbollah and its supporters. President Emile Lahhoud sided with the opposition, saying 
that the government had no legitimacy without Shiite representatives. But, Lahhoud’s 
term was ending in November 2007, and the government could not decide on his 
successor. Meanwhile, two of the largest demonstrations occurred on December 1 and 
December 10, and a sit-in continued over the next two years. Though there was the 
potential for communal violence between the Shiites and Sunnis, the protest movement 
itself remained peaceful. For its part, the army killed a few protesters from Hizbollah in 
January 2008. Tensions grew in early May 2008, when the government decided to 
investigate and take control of a wireless communications network operated by 
Hizbollah. The army remained neutral to avoid supporting the government, and partly 
because of rumors that a number of Sunni officers were considering resigning in 
opposition to it. Violence became more likely at this stage as Hizbollah mobilized its 
supporters and went on an offensive against its opponents. Hizbollah and the army 
largely stayed separate, though; Hizbollah avoided clashing with it, and the army didn’t 
intervene to end Hizbollah’s operations. The army was tired and disorganized after its 
conflict in Nahr al Bared (although it had won). The political deadlock ended with an 
agreement on May 5, 2008, that named Lieutenant General Michel Sleiman president. He 
was a consensus pick because of his perceived neutrality.  
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Lithuania 12/24/1988-9/1/1991 – neutral  
The protests were aimed at the Communist government, but the Lithuanian state was also 
seeking independence from the Soviet Union. In December 1990, the Soviet Union 
ordered troops into Lithuania to enforce conscription, following growing resistance to the 
draft. Protests had been ongoing since late 1988, but escalated in January 1991 when 
Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene raised the prices of food staples. A rally on January 
8 forced Prunskiene and her cabinet to resign. The same day, Soviet Defense Minister 
Dmitry Yazov ordered a special paratroop division to enter Lithuania. On January 10, 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev threatened to introduce direct presidential rule in 
Lithuania. Events developed rapidly. On January 11, the National Salvation Committee 
(NSC) announced its existence and Soviet troops and KGB units arrived in Lithuania. On 
January 12-13, the NSC demanded the Lithuanian Supreme Council’s resignation and 
announced direct Soviet presidential rule, with the chief of the Vilnius military garrison 
as Vilnius’s military commander. Soon after, military, interior, and KGB units were 
deployed to occupy the city’s television and radio buildings (Gorbachev’s role in this 
decision is disputed). Soviet soldiers killed 14 and injured 200 protesters who were 
attempting to defend the buildings. Soviet tanks also moved towards the parliament, but 
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thousands of protesters blocked them and then erected barricades. The situation then 
stabilized for a few months. The crucial event was the failed August 18, 1991 coup in 
Moscow. In Lithuania, putschist military forces also seized communication centers. 
Tensions rose when Soviet tanks and troops moved towards the Supreme Council 
buildings. More violence occurred on August 19 when protesters and Soviet soldiers 
clashed outside the KGB headquarters. The Soviets departed soon, though, and the 
Supreme Council remained in session.  
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Madagascar 5/13/1972-5/19/1972 – united defections  
The anti-President Philibert Tsiranana protests were largely student-led but expanded into 
a general strike in early 1972. The situation escalated on May 13, when security forces 
opened fire on demonstrators, leading Tsiranana to declare a state of emergency. This did 
not end the crisis; on May 18, Tsiranana dissolved the government and handed power to 
Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Ramanantsoa was a leader in the military, separate 
from the gendarmerie under Tsiranana’s authority and commanded by Colonel Jean 
Bocchino. The Les Forces Republicaines de Securite (FRS) was an additional security 
force under the control of the Interior Ministry and designed to protect Tsiranana. During 
the protests, the army committed against being involved, while the gendarmerie deployed 
into the streets refused to use violence. The military hierarchy was important here, though 
lower ranking officers put pressure on them. The FRS remained loyal to Tsiranana and 
shot into the crowds.  
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Madagascar 6/10/1991-2/10/1993 – united defections  
An opposition group, Forces Vives, began in 1991 to organize strikes and demonstrations 
across the country. On August 10, a massive group of protesters (between 100,000 and 
400,000) marched to the presidential palace of Didier Ratsiraka. The Presidential Guard 
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(RSEP) sought to disperse them and ended up opening fire on the crowd, killing 10 to 20 
people. The RSEP was known to be loyal to the president, and as a result, was resented 
by the regular army and its officer corps. In response to the violence, the Forces Vives 
stepped up its opposition and was joined by the National Council of Christian Churches. 
The military’s support of the president also began to wane, according to reports. On 
October 30, 1991, General Desire Philippe Ramakavelo made a statement on behalf of 
senior officers, asking that the politicians solve the crisis through dialogue. The next day, 
Ratsiraka made some concessions, including a new constitution and multiparty elections. 
He did not resign, instead inviting the opposition to a convention, which resulted in a 
coalition government and transition process. A new constitution was approved in August 
1992, with first round elections in November, and a run-off in February 1993. Albert 
Zafy was elected. Overall, the military, and particularly the senior leadership, was 
important in the transfer of the power. Ratsiraka had completely restructured the army 
after coming to power, to protect himself from it. He promoted loyalist generals and 
generated divisions and competition within the military.  
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Madagascar 1/28/2002-7/5/2002 – fragmented high level  
The protests against President Didier Ratsiraka developed in January after a disputed 
presidential election in December, where opposition candidate and mayor of 
Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana declared himself winner. By February, the protests 
had led to the resignations of the country’s prime minister and some of Ratsiraka’s 
cabinet. However, Ratsiraka also had supporters willing to take to the streets, which 
generated some clashes with those demonstrating against him. On March 1, Ratsiraka 
declared martial law and appointed General Raveloarison as governor of Antananarivo. 
But, Raveloarison did not follow Ratsiraka’s orders there. Ravolomanana took this as a 
sign of Ratsiraka’s weakness and named his cabinet. More demonstrations occurred in 
support of Ravolomanana and the military did not attempt to end them. On March 7, 
Ravalomanana’s allies (namely General Jules Mamizara) took over the ministry of 
defense. Ratsiraka’s defense minister General Marcel Ranjeva recognized 
Ravalomanana’s authority and resigned. Yet as of March 15 the army chief of staff 
General Ismael Mounibou was still loyal to Ratsiraka. It took a few more months for the 
rest of the military to move to support Ravalomanana. On June 8, under the leadership of 
 
 296 
pro-Ravalomanana officers, the army (as well as the gendarmerie) pledged loyalty to the 
new government. Ratsiraka finally gave up and left the country in early July.  
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Madagascar 1/24/2009-3/18/2009 – fragmented high level  
This protest movement was aimed at ousting President Marc Ravalomanana. Andry 
Rajoelina, Ravalomanana’s main rival, was mayor of the capital Antananarivo and 
backed by a group of opposition parties. The protests were violent almost from the 
beginning, with rioting and looting in late January. On February 3, Ravalomanana 
removed Rajoelina from his position. On February 7, the presidential guard killed around 
30 protesters who were marching near the presidential palace. The defense minister 
resigned in protest. While some talks took place in mid-February, so did more protests, 
some of which were suppressed by the security forces. As the military became more 
involved in violence, divisions developed. On March 8, a unit of paratroopers announced 
it would no longer take orders from the government, and on March 10, a group of officers 
forced the resignation of the defense minister over his involvement in repression. The 
army chief of staff warned the military might take power if the situation did not calm 
down, and was promptly replaced. But then a pro-Rajoelina officer claimed to assume the 
post, while a pro-Rajoelina unit deployed tanks to the capital city. They denied they were 
seeking to oust Ravalomanana by force, but then seized the presidential palace, with no 
interference from the rest of the military. Other key military leaders had shifted towards 
Rajoelina over this period, and on March 14, he announced the military was obeying his 
orders. On March 16, it was reported elements of the presidential guard had defected 
from the president. These events led Ravolomanana to announce his resignation on 
March 17. He tried to transfer authority to a navy admiral, though, but he refused to take 
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Madagascar 3/23/2009-1/17/2014 – neutral  
These protests were against the High Transitional Authority government, which 
repeatedly called and then cancelled elections during this time. Presidential elections 
were finally held on October 25, with a runoff on December 20. The results were 
confirmed by an electoral court on January 17, 2014, ending the anti-regime movement. 
The military did not act and there are no signs the transitional regime asked it to.  
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Malawi 3/15/1992-5/17/1994 – fragmented high level  
Anti-President Hastings Banda protests began in March 1992. At this point, there were 
reports of junior army officers stationed near the demonstrators (mostly students) offering 
them encouragement and protecting them from the police. In April, middle- and senior-
ranking officers met with Banda to tell him they were neutral and wouldn’t be used to 
repress civilians calling for democracy. Banda announced a referendum on the one-party 
rule of his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in October, and the next June it passed. This 
set the country up for elections in May 1994. In December 1993, though, with protests 
ongoing, junior military officers forcefully disarmed the paramilitary wing of the ruling 
party. This was the culmination of long- standing tensions between the military and the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and followed an attack of the MYP on demonstrators. As 
part of the mutiny, the junior officers also demanded the removal of senior commanders, 
who were linked to Banda’s regime, the MCP, and the MYP. They returned to the 
barracks to support the transition. In response, Banda retired a top army general. He and 
the MCP then lost the elections, and the military did not defend the regime. Sources point 
to the December 1993 conflict as being the key event in the military’s response to the 
anti-regime movement; because it involved junior officers, the shift is best classified as 
fragmented. Further, it is unclear whether the April 1992 meeting between army and 
Banda meant senior officers would’ve refused to support him had junior officers not 
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Malawi 7/20/2011-4/6/2012 – united defections  
On July 20, 2011, some anti-President Bingu wa Mutharika demonstrators were killed by 
the police. This set off a nearly year-long protest movement. In a surprising turn of 
events, Mutharika suffered a heart attack on April 5, 2012. Joyce Banda was sworn in as 
his successor, in line with the constitution. Mutharika’s son tried to take power but was 
opposed by cabinet members and other officials and Army Commander General Henry 
Odillo. Both Banda and Mutharika reached out to Odillo, seeking his support, with 
Mutharika urging Odillo and the rest of the military to seize power. Odillo pledged the 
army’s support to Banda in the end.  
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Malaysia 9/5/1998-9/20/1999 – neutral  
These short-lived protests sought to oust Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamed and his 
government. The police were deployed to repress them, while the military was not 
involved. Mahathir’s power was never really threatened by the popular opposition.  
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Maldives 9/20/2003-10/29/2008 – fragmented high level  
Protests against the government of President Maoumoon Abdul Gayoom developed 
following a September 2003 prison riot, when guards (also members of the military) 
opened fire and killed three and injured 17. A state of emergency was declared in 
response to the resulting unrest, and the military repressed the movement. The protests 
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continued, though, and included a mass rally that became violent in August 2004. A 
member of the crowd stabbed a police officer, and other participants set a government 
building on fire. The security forces forcibly dispersed the protesters. The military and its 
leadership was divided between support of Maumoon and of the opposition or in 
particular Mohamed Nasheed, a founder of the Maldivian Democratic Party. Both sides 
supported democratic government, though. The new constitution of early 2008 confirmed 
that the military would stay out of domestic politics. Nasheed unseated Gayoom in the 
second round of the October 2008 presidential election.  
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Maldives 1/17/2012-2/7/2012 – united defections  
On January 16, President Mohamed Nasheed sent soldiers to arrest the chief judge of the 
Criminal Court. The judge, and other members of the judiciary, were corrupt and had ties 
to the former regime. Still, this bold move was opposed internationally and domestically, 
and protests developed soon after. The Supreme Court declared the military did not have 
the authority to arrest and detain civilians and ordered it to release the judge, but it 
refused. On February 6, demonstrations turned into riots between pro- and anti-
government groups. Some police mutinied, and when the military was assigned crowd 
control, some soldiers defected. The defectors numbered less than a hundred, and none 
were commissioned officers, but the military leadership seemed to have lost some 
control. On February 7, the military said Nasheed had to go. Nasheed claimed this was at 
gunpoint, but a commission investigated and decided it was not a coup. Rather, Nasheed 
resigned after using the security forces for illegal purposes. In another, earlier, instance, 
Nasheed had ordered the military to detain two parliament members on bribing 
allegations. This was far outside its mandate. The security forces also violated the rule of 
law and human rights during the protest movement.  
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Maldives 2/8/2012-11/16/2013 - loyal  
Demonstrations began after President Mohamed Nasheed’s February 2012 resignation, 
demanding the reinstatement of his government. The new president, Mohammed Waheed 
Hassan, used repression in response; including police violence on February 8. The police 
remained the key repressive force but at times requested assistance from the military, 
such as for the demonstrations following the annulled September 2013 elections. Former 
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president Nasheed won the first round, and Supreme Court annulled it after allegations of 
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Mali 10/25/1990-3/26/1991 – united defections  
Opposition to President Moussa Traore’s regime began in fall 1990 and ramped up in 
January 1991, following Traore’s unpopular decision to sign a ceasefire with Tuareg 
rebels in the north of the country. Protesters demanded Traore’s resignation as well as 
multiparty politics. From the beginning, Traore responded with repression. As 
demonstrations continued into March, Traore deployed the military, and soldiers killed 
hundreds. In a particularly egregious episode, on March 23 soldiers killed five women 
who had been mourning the victims. The soldiers then chased other protesters into a 
building and set it on fire, killing 65. Traore still refused to resign. When the opposition 
launched a new strike on March 25, troops did not use violence. Then, on March 26, it 
was reported that a group of officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure 
had arrested Traore. No part of the military remained loyal to Traore or expressed 
disagreement with Toure’s decision. The military leadership issued an apology to the 
opposition for the violence and then formed a government of civilian and military 
reformers. Traore had divided the military and put the Republican Guard directly under 
his rule. There were tensions between the senior officers and rank and file over pay, and 
these worsened when the rank and file was deployed as part of the unsuccessful operation 
against the Tuaregs.  
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Mauritania 1/17/2011-6/20/2014 – loyal 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These protests were against the military regime of General Mohamed Ouid Abdel Aziz 
and mostly involved youths. In one notable event on October 13, 2011, Aziz was shot and 
wounded. Rumors spread that it was an assassination attempt by a group of soldiers, but 
details are difficult to confirm. Aziz agreed to some limited constitutional reforms in 
March 2012, but otherwise held on to power. He was believed to have the respect of the 
overall army and used it to repress the protesters.  
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Mexico 10/14/1987-7/2/2000 – neutral 
Protests against the domination of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexican 
politics achieved a number of electoral reforms beginning in 1987. Opposition parties and 
in particular the National Action Party (PAN) gained political strength through elections, 
which forced additional concessions by the PRI. In the July 2000 presidential elections, 
the PRI was defeated by Vicente Fox of the PAN.  
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Mexico 7/8/2006-9/1/2006 - neutral  
In Mexico’s July 2006 presidential elections, Felipe Calderon was declared the winner 
over Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador by a very slim margin. Obrador’s supporters took to 
the streets of Mexico City to protest the result. After months of demonstrations, the 
electoral courts noted some irregularities in the vote, but ruled that Calderon was 
officially the president. Calderon took office in December. At times the protesters clashed 
with the federal police, but the military was seemingly not involved.  
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Mexico 10/2/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal  
As these protests against governmental corruption continued, President Enrique Pena 
Nieto mobilized the army to take full control of public security in 32 municipalities. The 
military and other security forces was involved in repression of protests and more general 
human rights abuses, including the disappearance and likely massacre of 43 student 
teachers in September 2014.  
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Moldova 4/7/2009-4/15/2009 – neutral  
Parliamentary elections took place on April 5. The opposition declared them fraudulent, 
and it along with young demonstrators took to the streets to protest the Communist 
Party’s eight-year rule. The protest movement was disorganized, though, and made no 
declarations or written demands. Consequently, the government did not respond. On 
April 7, the demonstrators stormed past police troops to the parliament building. The 
police then engaged in some violence and detained hundreds. The president ordered a 
recount of the vote, but in the end, it didn’t change the election results. The military does 
not seem to have been involved.  
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Mongolia 12/10/1989-5/10/1990 - neutral  
As one of the first groups organized in opposition to Communist rule in Mongolia, the 
Mongolian Democratic Union launched protests in early 1990. The ruling Mongolian 
People’s Revolutionary Party was unsure how to respond, but decided against clamping 
down, especially since the Soviet Union had signaled it wouldn’t support it. The 
hardliners pushed for the use of force, even though they knew the police and internal 
security troops likely wouldn’t be sufficient. The Mongolian armed forces didn’t act, and 
Soviet troops had been removed from Mongolia over 1986 to 1989 as it lessened in geo-
strategic importance. The protests strengthened the reformers in the party; General 
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Secretary Jambyn Batmonkh resigned, and a new general secretary and Central 
Committee were put in place.  
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Myanmar 8/19/2007-9/29/2007 - loyal  
Early protests against the military regime were met with mass arrests. The regime mostly 
used the Swan Arr Shin, a civilians’ militia controlled by the Union Solidarity and 
Development Association (the junta’s political party). The militia and other security 
forces beat a small number of Buddhist monks during a demonstration on September 5. 
As a result, an All Burma Monks Alliance formed and held demonstrations across the 
country. The growing protests led the regime to announce a night-time curfew on 
September 25. When protests continued the next day, soldiers and police opened fire on a 
large demonstration in Rangoon. Later, they raided a number of monasteries and forcibly 
detained hundreds of monks. The crackdown ended the protests, which had been in 
response to the initial repression and spontaneous. There were some reports of tensions 
within the military, including unconfirmed instances of soldiers who refused shooting 
orders. Within the upper command, General Shwe Mann (Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force) began chairing the National Security Council meetings over Maung 
Aye, and there was speculation that this was because Maung Aye didn’t approve of using 
the militia. These rumors are not sufficient for loyalty shifts.  
 
Sources:  
Croissant, Aurel. “Why Do Military Regimes Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and 
Elections as Political Survival Strategy in Myanmar.” Asian Journal of Political Science 
21, no. 2 (2013): 105-125.  
Selth, Andrew. “Burma’s Saffron Revolution and the Limits of International Influence.” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 3 (2008): 281-297.  
Skidmore, Monique and Trevor Wilson, eds. Dictatorship, Disorder, and Decline in 
Myanmar. ANU Press, 2008.  
 
Nepal 2/18/1990-4/8/1990 – neutral  
In January 1990, the Nepali Congress political party issued a call for the peaceful 
restoration of democracy. It formed the Movement for Restoration of Democracy by 
allying with leftist parties and began demonstrating. Some of the subsequent protests 
included violence by young communists, including on March 30 when a group damaged 
 
 304 
property. The police response was brutal, which generated more resistance to the 
government. At least 50 people were killed by the police, such as on April 6, when 
thousands of demonstrators broke through barricades to the palace and the security forces 
opened fire. The government then imposed strict curfews. King Birenda decided to lift 
the ban on political parties following negotiations with opposition leaders. Throughout, 
the army remained supportive of the regime but uninvolved.  
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Nepal 11/26/2002-4/24/2006 – united defections  
In 2001, King Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and assumed all power in an 
effort to defeat the Maoist rebels. In late 2002, he dismissed the prime minister, assumed 
temporary executive authority, and chose a new prime minister. Though there was 
opposition to these moves throughout, demonstrations really ramped up in April 2006. 
The police responded with violence. The army, though providing backup, remained 
uninvolved. The middle-ranking officers sided with the pro-democratic forces. The senior 
command was less supportive of them. The army overall helped to persuade the king to 
restore Parliament and to allow the political parties to choose the prime minister. Its 
leadership had indicated it probably could not continue to protect the palace.  
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Nepal 5/1/2010-6/30/2010 - neutral  
 
 305 
These two months of protests against Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal were met 
with counterprotests. Nepal had become Prime Minister in June 2009 after a Maoist, 
Pushpa Kamal Dahl Prachanda, resigned because of his sacking of an army chief. Nepal 
refused to resign and deployed the riot police, though they did not use violence. Overall, 
the security forces did not interfere with the protests, and allowed the opposition to 
peaceably assemble. The violence was limited to clashes between the Maoist 
demonstrators and youths from the Communist parties that supported Nepal.  
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Nepal 5/30/2012-12/31/2012 - neutral  
Nepal’s Constituent Assembly was tasked with drafting a new constitution, but 
repeatedly missed its deadline to do so and dissolved on May 27, 2012. This was in part 
because of growing demonstrations by supporters of the NEFIN and JSC-NIEG. A 
caretaker government led by the Maoist prime minister Baburam Bhattarai was put in 
place. Protests continued, with reports of security force use of rubber bullets, but no signs 
of involvement by the military.  
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Nicaragua 1/23/1978-2/7/1978 – neutral  
This stage of the anti-President Anastosia Somoza Debayle campaign was nonviolent. It 
was also separate from, and much less organized than, the Marxist rebellion of the Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacion. The protest movement ended on February 7. On February 10, 
those participating in the continuing demonstrations started to fight back, especially after 
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Nicaragua 8/25/1978-9/24/1978 - loyal  
This anti-regime movement was closely related to the one earlier in the year, and by this 
point had come to involve the Sandanistas. In August 1978, the violent rebels of the 
Sandanistas staged a palace raid and took over 1000 hostages. Some in the National 
Guard (Nicaragua’s military) felt President Somaza had caved in to the Sandinistas, and 
dozens of the disgruntled troops attempted a coup soon after. The Guard became 
increasingly violent over this period, killing thousands of civilians as it sought to stem the 
Sandinistas’ gains.  
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Niger 2/8/1990-11/27/1992 – loyal  
Protests against the military regime of President and Chief of Staff Colonel Ali Saibou 
led him to announce a national conference that would transition the country to civilian 
rule. In November 1990, the government approved a multi-party system and other 
reforms. It repeatedly postponed the conference, though, leading to protests. The 
conference eventually took place between July and November 1991 and involved about 
1200 delegates. The military refused to attend. In August, Colonel Toumba Boubacar, the 
Army Chief of Staff, threatened a coup against it because it had agreed to debate crimes 
committed by the government with the help of the army. Boubacar called this a 
humiliation. The conference took other major steps: it suspended the constitution, 
cancelled Saibou’s executive powers, and voted to dissolve the government. Meanwhile, 
the regime stopped paying its soldiers, and in February 1992 a group of them mutinied. 
This followed other mutinies over the government and military leadership’s handling of 
the Tuareg rebellion. However, none were supportive of the protesters or regime change. 
A transitional government came into power in July 1991, and a new constitution that 
provided for multiparty elections was approved by 90 percent of voters in December 
1992. The military cooperated with these developments, though it used force against 
demonstrators on July 17, 1992.  
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Nigeria 7/5/1993-5/29/1999 – fragmented high level  
Protests began when the military regime voided the June 1993 elections. In the ensuing 
rioting, security forces killed more than 100 demonstrators. The increased pressure from 
the opposition, as well as parts of the military, led General Ibrahim Babangida to resign 
from the presidency and the military in August. He transferred power to a civilian-led 
interim national government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, in line with a timeline of 
political transition. The interim government made little progress, though, which 
generated more protests. Sani Abacha, the government’s Defense Minister, forced 
Shonekan to resign in November 1993. Abacha had already started to use his position to 
consolidate power within the military. His strategies followed Babangida’s, which 
politicized and factionalized the military, and personalized politics overall. Abacha 
shifted top personnel and arrested his opponents, including in March 1995, after his 
government announced it had foiled a coup attempt. Presidential elections were 
scheduled for August 1998, with Abacha as the sole candidate. In June 1998, though, 
Abacha died of a heart attack. This brought about renewed questions of whether the 
military government should give up power. The ruling military council followed the 
chain of command and named General Abdulsalami Abubaker rather than an Abacha 
loyalist as successor. Abubaker announced a democratic transition. Abubaker had once 
been close to Abacha and his supporters, but distanced himself after Abacha’s 
crackdowns, and from a realization that the military needed change. He faced pressure 
from the pro-democracy forces as well as retired military elites (led by General Olusegun 
Abasanjo) who supported a return to civilian rule. Under Abacha generally there was a 
widening of divisions within the military, between the hardliners and softliners, though 
the softliners were increasingly marginalized. Abubaker’s decision was crucial, but also 
allowed the military heavy control over the transition.  
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Pakistan 10/1/1968-3/26/1969 – united defections  
Protests against Ayub Khan led to negotiations and concessions from his regime to the 
mostly student-led movement. The anti-regime campaign further developed in January 
1969, when nearly all the opposition groups joined to call for direct elections. The regime 
employed some repression in response, which led to the death of a Dacca student. The 
military started patrolling town curfews. On February 21, Ayub announced he would not 
run in the next election. From the beginning, Ayub’s willingness to engage with the 
protesters rather than declare martial law led to questions over whether the military 
supported him. In November 1968 the protesters had been joined by Air Marshal Asghar 
Khan, former Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and General Azam Khan, a former 
member of Khan’s cabinet. On March 25, Khan handed control of the country over to 
Commander in Chief of the Army General Agha Humahhad Yahya Khan. Though Yahya 
was a Khan loyalist, he did not want to impose martial law to keep Khan in power, 
especially because Khan no longer had the support of other army leaders.  
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Pakistan 3/12/1977-7/5/1977 – united defections  
In the March 1977 parliamentary elections, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party 
won a majority of the seats. The opposition immediately claimed fraud, and anti-Bhutto 
protests began. They soon devolved into armed clashes between the demonstrators 
(supported by the Pakistan National Alliance party) and PPP-aligned gangs. The police 
did not interfere. As the unrest continued, Bhutto imposed martial law in three major 
cities on April 21 and suspended civil liberties nationwide. The military supported him in 
these efforts. Bhuto and the opposition engaged in some negotiations in late June and 
early July but failed to reach an agreement. The military, led by General Zia al-Haq, 
launched a coup against Bhutto on July 5. Then Zia became caretaker ruler and imposed 
martial law. Though Zia and Bhutto were close (Bhutto had promoted Zia), Zia seized 
power after other senior military officials said they would do so with or without him. The 
coup was a collective decision among the Army commanders. Recently, the military had 
been defeated by India and lost Pakistan. Bhutto had also responded to the opposition by 
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Pakistan 1/5/1983-8/28/1983 – loyal  
Though protests against Zia al-Huq began in January they escalated – and became more 
militant – in August. The army was deployed to take control of some areas. This reduced 
the protests’ momentum, and they ended and Zia’s regime survived. The military did not 
shift loyalty, but there was some discontent in the ranks. Some officers were unhappy 
with Zia’s use of religion to gain support, and the army’s loss of prestige. There was a 
coup attempt against him in early 1983, but it does not seem linked to the protests.  
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Pakistan 1/5/1986-8/28/86 – loyal  
The regime of Zia al-Huq lifted martial law in January 1986, allowing space for political 
opposition. By summer, the opposition parties and other pro-democracy forces were 
engaging in mass protests. The regime re-imposed political limits and the police 
responded to the demonstrations with repression. The movement became violent as a 
result; in mid-August, for example, police killed at least four and injured hundreds when 
they defied the regime’s orders. Protests had failed to gain in size or strength, though, and 
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Pakistan 3/12/2007-8/18/2008 – united defections  
This protest movement began when President Pervez Musharraf sacked Chief Justice 
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on March 9, 2007. He claimed Chaudhry was guilty of 
corruption, but Chaudhry had challenged Musharraf’s ability to be both president and 
army chief. Protests largely involved members of the legal community and resulted in the 
Supreme Court’s reinstatement of Chaudhry on July 20. Musharraf was reelected by the 
Electoral College in early October and promised then to give up his military position. He 
expected the Supreme Court to find him ineligible given that he hadn’t yet resigned from 
the military, so on November 3 he suspended the constitution. He used the ongoing 
instability between the army and Islamists as pretext. Under emergency rule, he purged 
the courts and packed them with his loyalists. This increased the opposition and united 
the two main opposition parties (the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Muslim 
League). On December 15, Musharraf lifted the state of emergency in advance of 
legislative elections in January 2008. Protests continued over spring and summer 2008, 
and in early August the PPP and PML-N in parliament moved to start impeachment 
proceedings against Musharraf. Given the events of the past year, including the 
December 27 assassination of PPP candidate Benazir Bhutto, the military high command 
withdrew its support from Musharraf. The new army chief, General Afshaq Kayani, 
ordered the force to stand aside from politics, in response to pressure from middle-
ranking and junior officers. Musharraf resigned August 18. The military also was not 
involved in repressing the protests.  
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Pakistan 2/25/2009-3/15/2009 - neutral  
These protests followed the developments of 2008, when Pervez Musharraf resigned in 
August and Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party was elected in September. In 
February 2009, the interim Supreme Court reinstated corruption charges against Nawaz 
Shari, who had been locked in a dispute with Zardari over Chief Justice Iftikhar 
Muhammad Chaudhry’s status. Zaradari then dismissed the government of Sharif’s 
brother. This, along with Zardari’s failure to increase the freedom of the judiciary, led to 
new protests by the lawyers’ movement. Zardari put the military on standby for a mass 
demonstration planned for March 15. But, Zardari was forced to reinstate the chief justice 
on March 16. This was largely as a result of pressure from army chief General Afshaq 
Kayani. He urged Zardari to fix the mess because of growing unrest on the streets and 
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discontent within the military. At this time, he was working to address the military’s 
demoralization stemming from its unpopular military operations in FATA. Zardari didn’t 
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Pakistan 6/23/2014-12/17/2014 - neutral  
These protests demanded that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign. At their height (on for 
example August 15), they numbered 30,000, and brought together the main opposition 
parties. Throughout, it was suspected that they had the tacit support of the military. The 
army and Sharif had a long history; it seized power from Sharif in 1999, and in recent 
years Sharif had allowed legal efforts against Musharraf on charges of treason. Sharif 
also pursued control over national security policies, a traditional domain of the military. 
Some violence occurred in late August, when the paramilitary Frontier Corps and police 
killed at least three demonstrators. Soon after, on August 29, the army announced it 
would facilitate a resolution to the crisis. It said it was taking this role at the request of 
the government, but Sharif denied being involved. An army spokesman also issued a 
social media message in early September that called for patience from all actors. The 
army did not shift loyalty, though. The protests lost some support as they continued 
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Panama 6/9/1987-12/20/1989 – low level  
The anti-Norieja movement began in June 1987, when the Panamanian Defense Force’s 
(PDF) former second in command (Diaz Herrera) accused him of corruption, electoral 
fraud, and murder. Herrera was likely partly motivated by the fact that Noriega had not 
promoted him according to standard personnel practices. The PDF killed and injured 
protesters on July 10, 1987. But, reports of dissent within the officer ranks emerged 
throughout 1988 and 1989. This set off more opposition to Noriega, culminating in a 
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failed coup attempt against him on October 3, 1989. It was led by Major Moises Giroldi 
(chief of security at the PDF headquarters in Panama City) and seriously undermined the 
military’s integrity and commitment to Noriega. Noriega was rapidly losing power, and 
had to annul September elections when it was clear the government’s candidate was 
going to lose. The United States had increased economic sanctions against the country 
during this period, and Noriega decided to declare war in response and on December 15, 
1989. The George Bush administration ordered troops to Panama; Noriega hid but 
eventually surrendered in January.  
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Peru 7/26/2000-11/17/2000 – low level  
Alberto Fujimori was a political outsider when he was elected president in 1990. He 
gained a lot of popular support by getting a grip on the country’s economic and security 
crises, and was reelected in 1995. His pursuit of a third term generated opposition, 
though, and this increased with allegations of fraud in the spring 2000 elections. Protests 
developed in late July to disrupt his inauguration. The police and army troops were put on 
standby, but did not have to act. The situation settled until information came out about 
the corruption of Fujimori and his government. Then, demonstrators began to call on 
Fujimori to resign. Fujimori relied on the military for his power and used the national 
intelligence agency to control the military’s senior ranks. The only loyalty shifts were 
low level; on October 29, a military garrison in the southern region of Peru staged a 
rebellion against Fujimori and the military leadership. This was led by Army Lieutenant 
Ollanta Humala and involved around 100 soldiers. There were concerns the shift would 
set off a broader rebellion, especially when Humala broadcast a “Manifesto to the 
Peruvian People.” But the rest of the military remained loyal, and two small 
demonstrations held in support of the rebellion were dispersed by police with tear gas. 
The rebellion itself fizzled. In mid-November, though, a video was released that showed 
an advisor of Fujimori, Vladimiro Montesinos, toasting military officers for their 
assistance in the election. Opposition parties in Congress were ready to remove Fujimori 
when he resigned.  
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Philippines 6/28/1983-2/25/1986 – fragmented high level  
Protests against President Ferdinand Marcos had been ongoing for a month or two when 
Benigno Aquino Jr., a longtime political opponent of Marcos, returned to the Philippines 
and was killed almost immediately. The resulting protests in support of Aquino were 
massive. They were also violent; on September 21, marines deployed against the 
demonstrators fired on them, killing 11. Protests continued throughout 1984, in part in 
response to May parliamentary elections. Over this period, Marcos began to lose military 
support, especially from his Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. There was a growing 
rivalry between Enrile (and vice chief of staff of the armed forces Lieutenant General 
Fidel Ramos) and Ver, who had risen in the ranks only because of his personal loyalty to 
Marcos. Ramos had the support of junior officers, and over 1984 Enrile joined the 
Reform the Armed Forces (RAM) movement with the goal of organizing low level and 
middle ranking officers against Marcos’s regime. In 1985, some within RAM talked 
about but did not follow through with assassinating Marcos, while the opposition parties 
unsuccessfully attempted to impeach him. Marcos announced that November that 
presidential elections would be held early, in 1986. This set off campaigning by Corazon 
Aquino that included large rallies. When Parliament declared Marcos the winner on 
February 15, Corazon’s supporters staged another the next day. On February 22, Enrile 
and Ramos with hundreds of soldiers barricaded themselves in the Ministry of Defense. 
RAM had been planning a coup but was thwarted. They asked Ramos for his help, and 
together staged the mutiny. Marcos sent loyal troops to attack the rebels, but thousands of 
civilians from the protest movement responded to a Catholic Cardinal’s call to protect 
them. Enrile and Ramos then gave a press conference where they resigned and declared 
their support for Corazon. Marcos announced a state of emergency on February 24, but 
by this point most of the military had joined the mutiny and civilian politicians were 
siding with Corazon. Marcos had the support of some troops, but he left the country.  
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Philippines 1/16/2001-1/20/2001 – united defections  
This crisis began when House minority members brought impeachment proceedings 
against President Joseph Estrada. The Senate heard the case, and given Estrada’s 
supporters there, was likely to acquit him. But, his supporters went further by attempting 
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to keep evidence sealed. This set off massive demonstrations. Within days, Chief of Staff 
General Angelo Reyes visited Estrada to inform him that the military no longer supported 
him. Reyes declared Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the rightful president. According to 
reports, Reyes did this knowing members of the rank and file and low level officers were 
planning to desert and join the demonstrators. Retired generals also urged Reyes to shift 
loyalty. While some feared Reyes would launch a coup or install a military government, 
the military’s divisions into pro- and anti-Estrada groups would have made such 
intervention difficult. However, there appears to be no instances of conflict between these 
groups over Reyes’s decision.  
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Philippines 4/16/2001-5/1/2001 - loyal  
This protest movement was termed EDSA III, following the Philippines’ two previous 
People Power Revolutions. It sought to reinstate Joseph Estrada, after Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was declared president as a result of the January 2001 demonstrations. The 
military came together with the police to crush the protests. Intra-military dissent existed, 
and emerged in later mutinies, but did not affect the military’s response to this 
movement. For the upper ranks, Arroyo rewarded those generals who had named her 
president by giving them senior civilian positions post-retirement.  
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Poland 6/25/1956-8/1/1956 – low level  
The anti-Communist regime protests occurred largely in Poznan and were especially 
violent in late June, when fighting between the demonstrators and security forces left at 
least 73 dead and hundreds seriously wounded. The politburo approved Marshal of 
Poland and Defense Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky’s recommendation to use force. 
While a few Polish officers tried to refuse using force, Soviet commanders dominated the 
Polish military and remained loyal. The other security forces also followed orders. There 
were no Soviet troops in Poland during this period, and First Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev decided not to send Soviet troops to address 
the crisis. A reformist in the Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was elected First 
Secretary of the Communist Party in Poland in October.  
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Poland 1/31/1968-3/25/1968 – loyal  
The main event in these anti-Communist regime protests was a student rebellion in 
March. The regime declared it was led by Zionists, and used the ZOMO (Zmotoryzowane 
Odwody Miliciji Obywatelskeij) militia units as well as police to repress the 
demonstrations. In early March First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka, Chief of Staff 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, and others were out of the country, and rumors spread about coup 
attempts and troop defections. None of them were substantiated, however. The mostly 
student protesters also failed to gain much outside support. While the military did not 
directly respond to the movement, the leadership gave statements of loyalty to Gomulka.  
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Poland 12/13/1970-12/20/1970 – low level  
This short period of anti-regime activity saw violent clashes between the protesters and 
the police and military. 44 people were killed, and hundreds injured. December 17, or 
“Bloody Thursday” was especially violent. Internal security troops had been deployed on 
December 14, and were joined by military units on December 15. First Secretary 
Wladyslaw Gomulka authorized military force when Deputy Defense Minister General 
Grzcgorz Korcynski and Deputy Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic reported the 
situation hadn’t stabilized. There were concerns with the troops’ reliability and 
effectiveness, though. The first troops used against the demonstrations, the marines or 
Blue Berets, were withdrawn when the division commander Edward Weiner refused to 
order them to use force. Gomulka had a heart attack on December 18 and was replaced 
by Edward Gierek on December 20. Gierek took a less hardline approach to the 
opposition and tensions eased. There is some debate about the Soviets’ role in the 
protests; they might not have been willing to send Gomulka military support.  
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Poland 6/24/1976-6/30/1976 – neutral  
The Polish army did not respond to these protests against the Communist regime. Police 
forces were deployed, but the army was not involved, and the crisis resolved. Polish 
United Workers’ Party leader Edward Gierek agreed to dismiss Prime Minister Piotr 
Jaroszewicz and did not go forward with a plan to increase prices. The regime remained 
in power, though, and did not need to call on the military to act against the demonstrators.  
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Poland 7/1/1980-6/18/1989 – neutral  
The military was largely involved in this protest movement and its overthrow of the 
Communist regime. This is partly because the regime voluntarily surrendered its power in 
a gradual process, and never asked the military to support it against the protesters. It 
considered doing so but for one thing the Soviet Union was unlikely to support a 
crackdown. The armed forces themselves underwent reform towards the end of the 
campaign and as part of the transition.  
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Portugal 4/9/1973-4/25/1974– fragmented high level  
The ruling party, the National Union, swept the legislative elections of October 1973. 
This result, alongside anti-Estada Novo regime protests that had been going on since 
April, convinced moderate General Antonio de Spinola to join a group of left-wing 
military officers in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). They believed a coup was the 
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only way to end the decades-long colonial war in Africa. The MFA and Spinola 
connected with the civilian opposition, including Ala Liberal, an organization of regime 
politicians who wanted democratization. It had become steadily more pro-democracy and 
anti-regime when it became clear President of the Council of Ministers Marcello Cateano 
would not allow reform. This put Ala Liberal on the side of the protest movement. In 
response to military discontent, Caetono resigned a number of military officers in March 
1974, including Spinola. On April 25, the MFA, a group of young, low- to middle-
ranking officers led by Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho overthrew the regime. People 
went out into the streets to celebrate, leading to the surrender of the secret police on April 
26. The National Salvation Junta under Spinola took power. The junior officers defected 
and were responsible for the regime’s fall, but most of the senior officers such as Kaulza 
de Arriaga remained loyal. The MFA may have been planning for the coup prior to the 
protests, but the protests ensured its pro-democratic end. The regime had been civilian-
led but heavily military- involved. Caetono, who replaced Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 
1968 after Salazar’s almost 50 years in power, was unable to secure full military support. 
In July 1973, for example, he implemented a law that provided privileges to conscript 
officers. This generated criticism from academy officers, and it was eventually revoked.  
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Romania 11/15/1987-12/25/1989 – fragmented high level  
The protests against Nicolae Ceausescu started around the time of his reelection as leader 
of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1987. He thought he could survive 
them, and did for the next two years as they spread across the country. The security 
forces (especially the Securitate) were brutal in their suppression of them, resulting in 
hundreds of deaths. The military first became involved in December 1989, when on 
 
 318 
December 17 it joined the other forces and opened fire on demonstrators. In the days 
following, though (particularly December 19), army units resisted direct intervention. 
The movement staged a general strike on December 20 and the army did not intervene at 
all. Importantly, the rank and file had started to refuse their superiors’ orders and join 
demonstrations. Soon after, the army began to withdraw to its barracks. Army Major 
Viorel Oancea claimed he was removing soldiers from the streets to maintain the army’s 
integrity, but by this point mid-level officers were mostly acting independently. On 
December 22, Oancea became the first officer in Timisoara to publicly support the 
protesters. The army with other forces repressed demonstrators in Bucharest through 
December 22, but soon also fragmented. Military officers withdrew their units from 
guarding the Central Command building, which allowed protesters to occupy it. The 
military’s highest command was unable to launch a retake of the building. The Securitate 
attempted a counter-revolution, but gave up when the newly installed National Salvation 
Front decided to execute Ceausescu. Over this period, the Soviet Union did not have 
troops in Romania, and the Romanian military did not depend on Soviet support. 
Ceausescu was known to be distrustful of the military, and used the Securitate in place of 
it and as a counterforce. He also froze all military promotions in 1989.  
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Russia 3/3/2007-12/14/2008 – neutral  
Protesters sought to oust Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and staged some of the largest 
demonstrations ever against Putin despite such gatherings being illegal. The regime used 
riot police and OMON (special police) forces to repress the anti-Putin movement, and 
they ended with no military loyalty shifts.  
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Russia 1/19/2010-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral  
Anti-Vladimir Putin protests re-developed and continued over this period, which included 
allegedly fraudulent legislative elections in December 2011 and Putin’s presidential 
inauguration in May 2012. They were characterized by large-scale arrests, and some 
violence, such as early May 2012, when clashes between the police and protesters 
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resulted in injuries for 80. The regime also made use of the Interior Ministry’s elite 
Dzerzhinsky division, but not the military.  
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Senegal 3/16/2000-4/1/2000 – united defections  
This protest movement was against President Abdou Diouf and his attempt to secure the 
presidency for another term. He ended up conceding defeat to opposition leader 
Abdoulaye Wade after the second round of elections. It is likely the military played a role 
in this decision; reportedly, senior officers told Diouf they would not back his attempts to 
stay in power, and when interviewed later mid-level officers said the military would not 
have supported him. 
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Serbia 11/17/1996-10/5/2000 – united defections  
There was evidence of the potential for military disloyalty already in 1996, at the start of 
anti-President Slobodan Milosevic protests. The Army Chief of Staff Pavkovic sided with 
Milosevic at this point but after the disputed 2000 elections declared the military would 
respect the electorate’s decision. The movement had attempted to reach out to the 
military, but never clearly communicated. The special paramilitary units also cooperated 
with the opposition. In a well- known event on October 4, the police responded to strikers 
at the Kolubara coal mine but ignored orders to use force against them. Milosevic then 
gave up power. Milosevic had reorganized the military’s top ranks in ways favorable to 
him, but it maintained some autonomy. The growing power of the police and paramilitary 
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Slovakia 11/16/1989-6/6/1992 - neutral  
The police and military police repressed protests throughout 1989, and in particular on 
November 17. On November 21, the prime minister announced the regime wouldn’t use 
force to disperse the demonstrations, but would protect the socialist system. Over this 
period, though the army was mostly uninvolved, the People’s Militia reportedly refused 
to take action. Further, in December, the new Defense Minister Vacek announced the 
army supported democratization and wouldn’t repress demonstrators or stage a coup. 
Later that month, the party disbanded the militia. While some within the party supported 
more repression, the regime rejected it, and opted for a political rather than military 
solution. It was clear the Soviet Union would not intervene, but the Czechoslovak state 
had its own military. The military remained passive, as the regime realized the rapidly 
shifting events meant it probably couldn’t make a difference. Protests continued to 
achieve the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
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Slovenia 5/8/1989-4/8/1990 – neutral  
These anti-communist government protests were accompanied by a broader effort at 
Slovenian independence. In September 1989, the Slovenian parliament passed various 
amendments that asserted its sovereignty. For example, only it could declare a state of 
emergency, and it had authority over the presence of Yugoslav military forces and 
command over the Slovenian military forces, or the Territorial Defense (TD). The 
Yugoslav military leadership wanted to disband the TD, and tensions over the TD’s 
future became particularly serious in April 1990 during the transition to the first freely-
elected, non-Communist government. These processes followed the parliament’s 
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December 1989 adoption of laws that legalize political pluralism. The TD was not 
involved in the protests or the decision to move closer to democracy.  
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South Korea 3/16/1960-4/28/1960 – united defections  
Protests followed President Syngman Rhee’s re-election on March 15, 1960. They 
became incredibly violent in mid-April, and on April 19, 186 people were killed, and 
hundreds injured. The regime declared martial law and the 15th Division of the South 
Korean Army took control of Seoul, with other units in other cities. Military commanders 
believed putting an end to the protests would require a massive use of force, but it never 
happened. Instead, the military refused to carry out shoot to kill orders. On April 26, 
despite the ban on demonstrations, a small group of protesters came out. By later that 
day, hundreds of thousands of people were in the streets demanding Rhee’s resignation 
and also engaging in the destruction of property. Rhee worried the protests would 
continue the next day and so resigned on April 27. The US government was involved 
because at this time General Carter B. Magruder and the American Army Command in 
Korea had operational control of the South Korean forces. It urged an end to the unrest, 
and allowed army tanks but not live ammunition in the enforcement of martial law.  
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South Korea 10/17/1979-5/27/1980 - loyal  
The government of President Park Chung Hee offered some reforms as political 
opposition grew throughout 1979. However, regime hardliners prevented meaningful 
change, and were increasingly harsh towards popular shows of discontent. On October 
17, 1979, five students were killed as they demonstrated in Pusan. The government 
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declared martial law for the region in response. On October 26, the director of the Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chae Kyu, assassinated Park. Kim had disagreed with 
the regime’s use of force on October 17 and feared he and other regime softliners were 
losing influence. Kim also believed he had the support of the military, but the Army 
Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander General Chung Song- Hwa refused to seize 
power on his behalf. The emboldened regime hardliners implemented martial law for the 
country. In December, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, the commander of the Defense 
Security Command who had been close to Park, initiated a purge of military reformists. 
This included Chung, who had refused Kim but wanted to remain neutral. There were 
reports that Chung had also prevented the promotions of Chun’s faction to the upper 
ranks. Some within the factions actually fought in Seoul on December 12. Meanwhile, 
Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah was named interim president, and began a process of 
liberalization. In April 1980, the protest movement staged massive demonstrations, 
leading to clashes between them and military troops in early May. This only strengthened 
the opposition, and at the urging of the military Choi extended martial law, giving the 
military direct control of the country. The protests ended on May 27, when the military 
entered Kwangju, a key site of the demonstrations, and killed at least 200. Chun ruled for 
the next six years. No parts of the military shifted loyalty to the protesters, though it was 
divided prior to Chun’s purge.  
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South Korea 2/4/1986-6/29/1987 – fragmented high level  
The protest movement first demanded a constitution with direct elections. The regime 
started dialogue, but the demonstrations continued, and their demands became more 
radical. Reformers within the military hoped to reach a compromise before the radicals 
within the opposition overthrew the regime. The reformists persuaded the hardliners that 
repression wouldn’t succeed; this made the difference when President Chun Doo-hwan, a 
hardliner former army general, mobilized the military to crack down on June 19, 1987. 
On June 26, General Roh Tae-woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling party, broke 
with Chun to announce direct presidential elections. Chun likely expected Roh to win and 
went along with Roh’s announcement because it kept the military intact. However, the 
army had also become less reliable during this period, because younger generals and 
colonels were concerned about being ordered to repress the demonstrators. The US also 
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pressured the military against using force and into talks with the opposition. Roh won the 
free and fair elections on December 16, 1987.  
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South Korea 2/25/1988-12/1/1992 - neutral  
President Roh Tae-woo made gradual reforms while in power. These included 
restructuring the military leadership by replacing the soldiers who had been close to 
former president and general Chun Doo-hwan. He also reduced the power of the National 
Intelligence Service. In the 1992 presidential elections, all the candidates were civilians, 
for the first time in almost 30 years. The military was not involved in the election or 
surrounding protests, and the ruling party candidate, Kim Young-sam, won.  
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South Vietnam 11/22/1964-1/27/1965 – fragmented high level  
These anti-regime and Prime Minister Tran Van Huong protests were largely comprised 
of students and Buddhists, while other Buddhists were using more militant means. Huong 
deployed troops against the demonstrations, and on November 27 declared a state of 
emergency. This brought some order to the situation, but Huong was also losing support 
in his cabinet and in the military. Those against him were cooperating with Tri Quang. 
On December 19, Khanh and a group of young generals known as the Young Turks asked 
the High National Council to retire military officers that had been in the service more 
than 25 years, believing them sympathetic to the militant Buddhists. When the Council 
refused, the Young Turks dissolved it. Although unclear at first, Huong supported the 
Young Turks’s move as a way to get more power himself, and this was their intent. On 
January 6, the military turned power over to a new civilian government led by Huong. 
This prompted new demonstrations led by Khanh and Tri Quang. By mid-January they 
had escalated to demand Huong’s removal. Huong used troops against the protesters, but 
troops in the areas controlled by Khanh and (his principal co-conspirator) General 
Nguyen Chanh Thi refused to act. Khanh and the Buddhists had agreed at this time that 
the Buddhists would support Khanh if he and the military took control of the government 
from Huong. Khanh ousted Huong on January 27, with support from General Thi and Air 
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South Vietnam 3/12/1966-6/23/1966 – low level  
This movement followed from the earlier one and pitted the Buddhists (as well as other 
opposition, including students) led by Tri Quang against the South Vietnamese 
government of General Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van Theiu. The situation 
reached crisis levels when the movement claimed it controlled the military in Quang Nam 
Province. This followed Ky’s March 1966 dismissal of Lieutenant General Nguyen 
Chanh Thi, a Buddhist commander of the I Corps (the most northern region of South 
Vietnam), for supposed Buddhist support. The opposition formed the Military-Civilian 
Struggle Committee to support Thi and spread demonstrations against the government. 
Beginning in April, some soldiers and even senior officers joined the demonstrations, and 
eventually most of I Corps was out of the government’s control. As the country’s 
Premier, Ky launched operations throughout April and May to retake the region. The 
movement collapsed after this use of force by the rest of the South Vietnamese military, 
at times assisted by American troops.  
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Sri Lanka 7/15/2001-9/2/2001 – loyal  
This protest movement was aimed at President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s suspension of 
parliament and proposed referendum on constitutional reforms. The police and 
Presidential Security Division cracked down on the demonstrators, particularly on July 
19, killing two and wounding about a hundred. In response, Kumaratunga banned 
processions until the referendum results were released. Military troops deployed to 
Colombo to assist the police and remained loyal. During this time, Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam suicide bombers attacked the country’s airport. Kumaratunga postponed the 
referendum because of the instability, but remained in power.  
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Sudan 3/26/1985-4/7/1985 – united defections  
Protests developed while President Gaafar Nimeiri was out of the country. In the 
beginning, the police arrested many demonstrators, and killed a few. As they continued 
into early April, there were signs the police had begun to support them. For example, an 
outlawed police officers’ association distributed leaflets that indicated they were prepared 
to help bring down the regime. Soon senior military officers met with Vice President 
Omar Mohammed El Tayeb to insist the troops shouldn’t be used as back ups to the 
police unless the protests became violent. The rank and file’s loyalty couldn’t be 
guaranteed. On April 6, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, General Abdel 
Rahman Swar al Dahab, took control of the country as head of the Transitional Military 
Council. The army leadership had planned to support the regime and police, but the field 
commanders refused. It was they and junior and non-commissioned officers that pressed 
the leadership to withdraw troops from demonstrations, takeover the government, and 
announce a return to democracy. There were concerns about clashes between the military 
and the General Security Organization, which had favored a crackdown on protesters, but 
these didn’t occur.  
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Sudan 1/30/2011-10/6/2013 - neutral  
Over the course of these anti-Omar al-Bashar protests, the police and ruling-party linked 
security forces often responded with violence. The latter units were responsible for 200 
demonstrators’ deaths in September 2013, for example. The military itself was not 
involved, and there were no loyalty shifts, despite known military discontent with the 
regime. The military was concurrently engaged in conflict with the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army, part of the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. The protest movement did not 
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coordinate with the rebels. Yet, the protesters were at times overshadowed by their 
violence. Eventually, the movement fizzled out.  
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Suriname 12/19/1983-1/18/1984 - neutral  
Thousands of striking workers demanded an end to the regime of President Desi 
Bouterse, who had come to power in early 1980 through a military coup. Bouterse 
dismissed his prime minister, Errol Alibux, but did not hand power over to civilian 
democrats. There is very little information on the military’s involvement, but no signs of 
loyalty shifts.  
 
Sources:  
Blum, William. “Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II.” 
Zed Books, 2003.  
Singh, Chaitram. “Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname: Critical Comparisons.” 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 84 (2008): 71-85.  
 
Syria 3/15/2011-10/31/2011 – low level  
When anti-regime protests started in March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad immediately 
responded with violence, deploying the army and its tanks. On June 4, some security 
forces fired at a funeral demonstration. The mourners set fire to the building on which the 
forces were posted, killing eight personnel. They also seized weapons from a police 
station. This event saw the first notable loyalty shifts, when some soldiers posted with 
their army units refused to fire on civilians. More followed after the secret police and 
intelligence officers accompanying the army executed the soldiers for their disobedience. 
Overall, most loyalty shifts took the form of desertions by low-ranking Sunni conscripts. 
They were disorganized and had problems coordinating with a disorganized opposition. 
Generally when soldiers left they did not join the unarmed protesters but either sought 
asylum abroad or joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which officially formed July 29 
under the leadership of Colonel Riyad al-Assad. The FSA began fighting government 
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forces in late September. Loyalty shifts never extended beyond the non- Alawites, and 
were very limited in the upper ranks. Most of the army was composed of conscripts that 
served 18 months, leaving career military officers appointed according to their regime 
loyalty with most of the power. The regime rotated senior officers often, and used the 
most loyal divisions and forces (including the Republican Guard) for repression. This 
prevented regular conscripts from sympathizing with the protesters.  
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Taiwan 12/10/1979-11/16/1985 – neutral  
The Kuomintang (KMT) government of Chiang Ching-Kuo was intolerant of basically 
any political opposition, and reacted to the initial anti-regime demonstrations in 1979 
with repression. On December 10, for example, the police cracked down and injured 
more than 40 and arrested others. This led the protest movement to engage more 
forcefully in electoral politics, alongside demonstrations. In late 1985, Chiang (who had 
inherited the presidency from his father) announced a political transition and stated that 
neither his family nor the military should take over. He recognized that the KMT’s 
continued rule required reforms. As part of the transition, Chiang transferred power to his 
vice president, Lee Teng Hui. The military did not play any role in the protest movement 
or transition.  
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Tanzania 5/1/1992-11/23/1995 - neutral  
These protests pressed for democratic reforms and followed a December 1991 
commission report that recommended President Ali Hassan Mwinyi adopt a multiparty 
system. The following years were to be a transition period, with the country’s first freely 
democratic presidential elections scheduled for 1995. The ruling party (Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi) tightly controlled the process, but Mwinyi chose to stand down before the 
elections. The military was uninvolved.  
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Thailand 10/6/1973-11/13/1973 – fragmented high level  
Thailand had been under martial law since a November 1971 coup. The military rulers 
and high command were disunited, however; Prime Minister General Thanom 
Kittikachorn and Deputy Prime Minister Praphas Charusathien were grooming Colonel 
Narong Kittikachorn (son of Thanom and son in law of Praphas) for the office of prime 
minister after their retirements. Other officers were upset by this, and especially younger 
generations. When anti-regime protests broke out on October 6, the military responded 
with many arrests. The protests continued, and in early October the king met with the 
movement’s leaders and announced a new constitution would be in place by October 
1974. The opposition was skeptical and staged new demonstrations. On October 14, 66 
students demonstrating outside the palace were killed by army troops. The government 
gave up power that night, though Thanom remained Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces. A caretaker government appointed civilian Sanya Thammasakdi as prime 
minister, but the protest movement was not satisfied. The embattled military leadership 
tried to discredit it by connecting it to the communists who were concurrently launching a 
rebellion. The movement’s leaders consequently asked the rebels to end their challenge, 
but at the same time were dividing over whether or not to use violence. Thanom, Prapat, 
Narong met with General Kris Sivara (who on October 1 had been appointed the Army 
Commander in Chief to replace the retiring Prapat) and ordered him to deploy more army 
units to Bangkok to use against the ongoing protests. Kris refused, and other army 
commanders as well as the leaders of the Air Force, Navy, and Border Patrol Police 
expressed they would not use force and supported the new government. Prapass and 
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Thailand 4/16/1992-6/30/1992 – loyal  
The military regime of General Suchinda Kraprayoon held elections in March 1992. 
Afterwards, Suchinda took the position of prime minister, even though he had said he 
wouldn’t. Protests followed, including demonstrations on May 17 that involved rioting. 
The military acted with force against them. Over this period, rumors swirled that the 
ongoing conflict would prompt Suchinda’s rivals to act against him. The king intervened 
on May 20 and forced Suchinda to resign, hoping to end the violence. The military, its 
reputation tarnished because of the violence, backed down as well. An interim civilian 
prime minister was installed.  
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Thailand 2/9/2005-9/19/2006 – fragmented high level  
This protest movement was aimed at Thaksin Shinawatra’s government. There had been 
tensions between the military and his government from its start. First, the military 
disagreed with the government’s strategy for the insurgency in the South. Second, 
Thaksin’s promotion policies tended to favor his classmates and allies over other 
candidates. They also challenged the influence of General Prem Tinsulanonda. Prem had 
been prime minister until 1988, and then became president of the King’s Privy Council 
(advisory body). Consequently, the military was divided into pro- and anti-Thaksin 
factions. During the demonstrations, Thaksin sought to declare a state of emergency, but 
Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin (an ally of Prem) responded there was 
no need because they were peaceful and lawful. Meanwhile, Sonthi made moves to 
transfer pro-Thaksin middle-ranking officers away from the demonstrations, to prevent 
them from intervening in support. In the end, the army seized power from Thaksin on 
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September 19, 2006. As justification, it said the government had planned to crack down 
on the protesters the following day.  
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Thailand 6/9/2007-8/15/2007 - neutral  
Following the 2006 coup, protesters called for Prem Tinsulononda’s resignation as 
President of the Privy Council (believing him responsible for the coup), and an end to the 
military-backed Council for Democratic Reform government. They also responded to the 
May 2007 ban on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party. The 
government and its security forces arrested many protesters. At the same time, the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy, an anti-Thaksin movement, called on the government 
to take a harder stance on the protesters. The government organized a national 
referendum on a draft of a new constitution (the 1997 one had been abrogated after the 
2006 coup). The referendum was held on August 19, 2007, and the constitution was 
approved. The king signed it into law on August 24. The protests ended around this 
period, not having achieved their overall goals.  
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Thailand 5/25/2008-12/3/2008 – fragmented high level  
The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) began daily protests calling for the Samak 
Sundaravej (of the People Power Party, or PPP) government to step down in late May 
2008. They became more disruptive as time went on, with PAD demonstrators, some 
armed, attacking a government television broadcasting station in Bangkok in August. 
Leading up to this, PAD had been training its own security guards, and Thaksin 
supporters formed the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship of Thailand with 
armed units. Violence broke out. In response, the government declared a state of 
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emergency. The military mostly refused to act to restore order. This strengthened 
perceptions that PAD was backed by elites including General Prem Tinsulonanda, Privy 
Council president. Prem’s faction did support the protesters, but others in the military, 
such as Major-General Kattiya Sawadiphol, supported Thaksin. These divisions meant 
the military was reluctant to become involved in the crisis, especially following the 2006 
coup. On September 9, the Constitutional Court disqualified Samak as prime minister 
because of conflicts of interest. Parliament moved to inaugurate a new PPP-government, 
led by Somchai Wongsawat, spouse of Thaksin’s younger sister. This change did not 
satisfy PAD, which wanted all Thaksin influence gone from government. It continued 
protests through October. At this stage, the government deployed the police, resulting in 
the deaths of two and injuries to over 400. Army Commander Anupong Paochinda was 
publicly critical of Somchai over the violence. On November 23, PAD attempted to seize 
parliament, the Finance Ministry, and an airport, and neither the police nor military acted. 
In early December, the courts found PPP guilty of buying votes in the 2007 election and 
disbanded it, leading Somchai to resign and ending the protests. Throughout this case, the 
military and particularly the army dominated by Anupong and Prem resisted supporting 
the government, refusing to intervene to end the unrest.  
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Thailand 12/28/2008-5/19/2010 – low level  
Opposition soon developed to the government of Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat Party 
put in place on December 17, 2008. It organized into a protest movement called the 
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirts. 
The security forces responded to the demonstrations with force, but they continued and 
intensified in April 2010. Discontent within the lower ranks of the military had also 
developed, though, as the anti-Thaksin faction had become dominant in the upper ranks. 
In a 2009 reshuffle, for example, officers close to the Queen’s Guard faction led by 
General Anupong Paochinda and his heir General Prayuth Chanocha took leadership 
positions. Some lower ranks became unwilling to act against the protesters. On April 10, 
a demonstration resulted in hundreds of casualties, including some soldiers who were 
believed attacked by soldiers aligned with pro-Thaksin junior officers. As the protests 
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continued over the next month, however, the military leadership was able to unite the 
institution for an operation to end the movement. This occurred as the UDD was splitting 
on whether to negotiate and compromise with Abhisit. On May 19, troops killed 91. The 
Democrat Party was anti-Thaksin and its position in the coalition government came about 
in part through the help of senior army officers.  
 
Sources:  
Chambers, Paul. “Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent Military, Eroded Democracy.” Asian 
Survey 50, no. 5 (2010): 835-858.  
Chambers, Paul. “Where Agency Meets Structure: Understanding Civil-Military 
Relations in Contemporary Thailand.” Asian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 
(2011): 290-304.  
Forsyth, Tim. “Thailand’s Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street 
Theatre?” Social Movement Studies 9, no. 4 (2010): 461-467.  
 
Thailand 10/31/2013-5/7/2014 – united defections  
These protests organized by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), 
against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, were motivated in part by a proposed 
amnesty bill that would have absolved corruption charges against Yingluck’s brother, 
Thaksin. On December 7, 2013, after pressure from military leaders, including Prem 
Tinsulanonda, Yingluck dissolved Congress and called for new elections. Protests 
continued, though, and the military was unwilling to actively support Yingluck. On 
December 22, for example, General Prayut Chanocha refused to order troops against the 
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the streets, and announced the military was 
neutral. The demonstrations became more violent in January 2014, when the PDRC 
launched an effort to shutdown Bangkok. The government declared a 60-day state of 
emergency soon after. Elections were held in February but declared invalid by the 
Constitutional Court. The Court then ousted Yingluck on May 7. Protests went on for two 
weeks until the army, led by Prayut, launched a coup. At first he declared martial law, but 
when the politicians and protest leaders failed to come to an agreement, he announced the 
coup, and became prime minister. The coup was endorsed by King Bhumibol. There was 
likely collaboration among the PDRC, the military, and the Privy Council. At lower 
levels, there were reports of armed soldiers providing protection to some of the protests.  
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Thailand 5/23/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – loyal  
The country remained under martial law after General Prayut Chanocha’s coup, but 
protests developed against him and the new military regime. In response, the military 
cracked down brutally, arresting and prosecuting hundreds. It maintained a massive 
presence at any show of regime opposition. Reports detailed ongoing military 
factionalism, but no part of the military shifted loyalty from the regime to the protesters.  
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Togo 6/6/1991-6/12/1991 – low level  
These anti-President Gnassingbe Eyadema protests were short-lasting and gained limited 
support from the military. Eyadama had used the military to secure his regime, and in 
particular elite units within the army headed by his close associates. Further, most of the 
army was composed of Eyadema’a Kabye ethnic group – while the protests were largely 
divided along ethnic lines, or the Kabyes of the north against the Ewes of the south. The 
marine commandos were the only section of the military under the command of 
southerners, and they refused to repress the demonstrators. Otherwise, the officers who 
had expressed support for democracy had already been expelled from the army. Eyadema 
agreed to a national conference but held on to power.  
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General Conference, Montreal, Canada, August 26-29, 2015.  
Togo 2/12/2005-2/25/2005 - loyal  
On February 5, 2005, President Gnassingbe Eyadema suffered a heart attack. His son, 
Faure, could not succeed him according to the constitution. However, the high military 
command, led by General Zakari Nandja, swore allegiance to Faure. While a small 
military clique was responsible for the decision, there were no signs any in the military 
disagreed. Protests attempted to prevent Faure from taking power and a continuation of 
the regime but were unsuccessful.  
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Togo 6/12/2012-5/23/2013 - loyal  
Opposition to Faure Gnassingbe developed in April 2012, when several political parties 
and other groups united in a political coalition called the Save Togo Collective (CST). It 
launched protests in June 2012, focused mostly on elections and the use of excessive 
force by security forces. The demonstrators were subject to arrest and some violence, 
with at least one person killed. The government remained in power, though made some 
senior personnel changes which may have indicated tensions within the ruling coalition. 
The security forces as a whole were loyal; this included the military, security services, 
and pro-Eyadema militias, all of which were dominated by the Kabye ethnic group (the 
same as the Gnassingbe family). The army leadership was also personally linked to the 
Gnassingbes. Though there were reported to be rivalries within the military ranks, and a 
coup attempt in 2009, these did not translate into any loyalty shifts.  
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Tonga 5/26/2005-11/17/2006 - loyal  
Protests against the government of Prime Minister Feleti Sevele became violent in 
November 2006. The small Tonga military assisted the police in controlling the situation. 
Australia readied some defense personnel to deploy if needed, but King George Tupou V 
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did not request assistance. Rather, the government conceded to protesters’ demands for 
salary increases, and promised additional reforms.  
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Tunisia 12/17/2010-1/23/2011 – united defections  
Protests began in December 2010 and were quickly too large for the police and other 
security forces to handle. President Ben Ali sent out his elite Presidential Guard and 
armed gangs of thugs, and also ordered the army to deploy troops in support. The army 
first followed Ali’s directions, and focused mostly on protecting infrastructure. Soldiers 
began to talk to the demonstrators and in some cases join them. The Army Chief of Staff 
General Rachid Ammar reportedly ordered his men not to shoot the protesters, and 
warned the police not to either. During this period Ben Ali made a number of 
concessions, but to no avail. When he attempted to declare martial law on January 13, 
2011, Ammar refused. Ben Ali tried to fire Ammar for subordination, but the next day 
fled the country. After, the military fought the Presidential Guard and state militias for 
control of the situation. The military had resented being put under the Presidential 
Guard’s orders in responding to the demonstrations. Ben Ali had personally controlled 
military appointments rather than look to senior military officials.  
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Tunisia 10/12/2013-12/14/2013 – neutral  
Protests led in large part by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the National 
Salvation Front groups ended after the ruling Ennahda party agreed to join the Quartet’s 
national dialogue. Then, the parties accepted a caretaker government of technocrats to 
govern until the 2014 elections. The military was not involved in these events.  
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Tunisia 8/26/2013-1/26/2014 – neutral  
Tensions were high in summer 2013, especially following the July assassination of a 
leader of the Popular Front political alliance. The Popular Front joined with two other 
political party groups, Union for Tunisia and Nidda Tounes, to form the National 
Salvation Front. Together, they opposed Ennahda, the governing party. The anti-Ennahda 
campaign grew in August and came to demand the Constituent Assembly’s dissolution, 
the replacement of the Troika (or alliance) government, and the removal of Ennahda-
appointed officials. The National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four civil society 
organizations, oversaw negotiations, which resulted in the naming of Mehdi Jomaa as 
prime minister in December. He presided over the government until the 2014 elections. 
During the protests, the police engaged in repression. There were rumors that the 
opposition appealed to some military generals to attempt a coup, but the military never 
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Turkey 12/26/2013-5/1/2015 (ongoing) – neutral  
Protests against the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan were met with 
riot police armed with water cannons and tear gas. The unrest followed the December 
2013 arrests of a number of politicians and business people allegedly involved in corrupt 
activities. Erdogan denounced the unrests, saying they were politically motivated, and in 
the process brought criticism upon himself. However, his Justice and Development Party 
won two elections in March, and in August, Erdogan was directly elected president. 
Erdogan set out on a mission to purge the state of those he considered disloyal.  
 
Sources:  
“Freedom in the World 2014: Turkey.” Freedom House. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/turkey.  
“Turkish Police Tear Gas Protesters on Taksim Anniversary.” BBC. May 31, 2014. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27649472.  
 
Uganda 3/9/2011-8/7/2013 - loyal 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The first crackdown against the anti-Yoweri Museveni protest movement took place in 
April and May 2011. Together, the police and army were responsible for hundreds of 
casualties. The protests continued, though having lost momentum. The only other notable 
event involving the military was in January 2013, when Museveni, the defense minister, 
and the chief of defense forces threatened an army coup if the parliament continued to 
challenge the president.  
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Ukraine 12/15/2000-12/26/2004 – fragmented high level  
After nearly four years of popular opposition to the regime, Prime Minister Viktor 
Yanukovych was elected president in a runoff on November 21, 2004. The results were 
immediately disputed and on November 22 opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko 
declared himself president and asked the security forces to support him and the protest 
movement. This created confusion within the rank and file, and fragmentation of the 
military and other forces as the demonstrations continued and grew. There was a 
breakdown in command and control, and many rank and file and middle to upper-middle 
ranks of officers defected. They did not stop the protesters from accessing central Kiev. 
Security force units that might have obeyed repression orders decided against acting 
because other units were likely to refuse. Some regime members urged outgoing 
president Yanukovych-ally Leonid Kuchma to use violent repression against the 
protesters, but he realized he did not have the support of the security forces. On 
November 25, Defense Minister Oleksandr Kuzmek announced the army would not fire 
on the protesters. Generals from other forces made similar statements, and even the 
Interior Ministry said it would defend the people over the regime. On December 1, the 
parliament passed a non-confidence vote against Yanukovych, but neither he nor Kuchma 
recognized it. Shortly after, on December 3, the Supreme Court invalidated the election 
results and called for a revote of the run-off on December 26. Yushchenko won. Overall, 
the military defections were disorganized, with various units rather than the united 
military organization shifting loyalty.  
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Karatnycky, Adrian. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (2005). 
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Ukraine 11/21/2013-2/23/2014 – fragmented high level  
Protests against President Victor Yanukovych began in late November 2013, and his 
government almost immediately sent its special police units (the Berkut) to end them. 
The Berkut used extreme violence, which set off a cycle of escalation. More radical 
segments of the protesters formed self-defense units and engaged in battles with the 
Berkut. On February 20, 2014, during a particularly violent episode, the Berkut killed 
dozens of protesters. The parliament then voted to remove Yanukovych. The army also 
refused to attack the people – following some confusion and intra-force disagreements. 
Yanukovych fired the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, Volodymyr Zamana, 
around February 19, likely because he did not want to use force. Soon after, the new 
Chief, Yuriv Ilyin, and Minister of DefensePavlo Lebedyev prepared to deploy the 
military. On February 21, following the Berkut’s violence, the Armed Forces’ Deputy 
Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yuri Dumansky resigned to protest any military 
involvement. The opposition soon announced the military was supporting it. The Berkut, 
though, remained loyal to Yanukovych. After his ouster, the new government dismantled 
the force.  
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no. 6 (2014): 167-178.  
 
Uruguay 1/18/1984-3/1/1985 – neutral  
Amid ongoing protests, the military regime and opposition political parties negotiated a 
transfer of power. They broke off once but started again in May 1984. In August, the 
participants reached the Club Naval agreement, which stipulated elections for November. 
The protest movement’s demonstrations and strikes were crucial in pressuring the 
military to give up power, and to make more concessions during negotiations. The 
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military was largely united over this period, with the general staff making most of the 
decisions, and no signs of disagreement over them – within the regime, or between the 
regime and military institution.  
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Venezuela 1/11/1958-1/23/1958 – united defections  
President Marcos Perez Jimenez was overthrown on January 23, ending military rule in 
Venezuela. He had been losing military and civilian support throughout 1957, and the 
military opposition developed into two factions: higher ranking officers close to the 
government that tried to pressure Jimenez into reforms, and lower ranking officers who 
organized into a dissident group. The younger officers were particular upset by Jimenez’s 
corruption and reliance on loyalists within the civilian ministry. He also created 
Seguridad Nacional, a counterforce that increased police power over the military. On 
January 1st, the dissidents launched a coup attempt that failed but triggered a crisis within 
Jimenez’s cabinet. On January 9, Jimenez’s ministers forced him to resign. But a few 
days later, on January 13, Jimenez appointed himself Minister of Defense in an attempt to 
stay in power. The opposition (specifically Junta Patriotica, an umbrella organization for 
the political parties) launched a general strike to force Jimenez out. The military had 
decided that in the interests of the military organization Jimenez needed to leave and it 
refused to end the strike. Jimenez resigned, and pressure for democratization forced the 
new military junta to gradually transition.  
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Venezuela 4/11/2002-4/14/2002 – fragmented high level  
During anti-President Hugo Chavez protests on April 11, 2002, the National Guard 
fatally shot a demonstrator. Senior military officers held Chavez responsible, and asked 
for his resignation. The commander of the army, General Vasquez Velasco, in particular, 
stated he would not suppress anti-government demonstrations, and others followed his 
lead. Chavez was ousted by these high ranking officers, but the military overall was 
divided in how to respond (despite most being anti-repression). Events rapidly shifted, 
and a transitional government led by businessman Pedro Carmono took power, 
unconstitutionally. Carmono lost support almost immediately, by grabbing power against 
pro-democracy civil society groups and appointing officers besides those who had helped 
him take over. Anti-coup and pro-Chavez protests developed, and soon pro- Chavez army 
officers such as General Raul Baduel returned Chavez to the presidency. Those who 
staged the coup withdrew their support from the transitional government, understanding 
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they would have to fight the pro-Chavez officers to defend it, and observing the growing 
popular resistance to Carmona. They remained dissatisfied with Chavez’s personal 
involvement in military promotions, however. Overall the military responded to the anti-
coup protest movement with high level shifts that were disunited and disorganized.  
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Venezuela 2/14/2014-5/1/2015 (ongoing) - loyal  
After elections in late December 2013, part of the opposition began to carry out protests 
against what it alleged were irregularities. At first the government of President Nicolas 
Maduro deployed the National Guard and police against the demonstrators, and then it 
started to arm pro-government civilians. In January 2015, as the protests continued, 
Minister of Defense Vladimir Padrino Lopez authorized the military to use deadly force 
against the opposition. Maduro came to power after Hugo Chavez’s death in April 2013 
and followed his reliance on the military.  
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Yemen 1/16/2011-2/27/2012 – united defections  
The first military loyalty shifts occurred on March 18, 2011, when pro-government 
snipers fired on anti-President Ali Abdullha Saleh demonstrators, killing around 50. The 
army, under Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, and its powerful First Armored Division, 
commanded by General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, defected from Saleh. Mohsen declared 
that the army supported the protest movement, and it remained united under his 
command. His decision prompted some defections by officers and rank and file from the 
other security forces, like the Republican Guards. Some joined a recently formed group 
called the Armed Forces Supporting the Peaceful Revolution. The divide between 
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defectors and loyalists in the armed forces led to conflict in May. Violence broke out on 
May 23 between the First Armored Division and the Republican Guards, as well as tribal 
fighters. On June 3, the presidential palace was hit by a bomb, injuring Saleh. He left for 
Saudi Arabia and Vice President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi took over officially, 
though Saleh’s son Summer 2011 saw more violent conflict and more loyalty shifts from 
Saleh’s forces. He had created a number of institutional rivals to the military, including 
the Republican Guards, paramilitary units, and tribal reserves. He also promoted loyal kin 
to positions of control in these organizations. Importantly, the army and specifically the 
First Armored Division commanders were not personally tied to Saleh (and their united 
shift was key to Saleh’s removal from power). After a number of attempts at negotiations 
for a transition, Saleh agreed in August to hold elections in the next few months. Saleh 
returned to Yemen in late September, but left for Saudi Arabia and then the United States 
in November. During these travels he signed onto an agreement brokered by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council where Hadi took full power until elections in February. Hadi won 
these elections.   
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Yugoslavia 6/3/1968-7/2/1968 – neutral  
Students organized into a protest movement sought to overthrow the Communist regime 
of President Josip Broz Tito. Tito repressed the movement, especially the more radical 
factions, using internal security forces. The protests died down without the state pursuing 
a military response.  
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Zambia 6/30/1990-10/31/1991 – neutral  
Opposition had been growing during the election campaign between the ruling United 
National Independence Party and the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. The 
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Kenneth Kaunda government deployed paramilitary forces to maintain order during. 
Protests developed at the end of June because of an increase in the prices of food staples. 
The government used force, and killed 27. On June 30, a few junior officers led by 
Lieutenant Lichembe launched a coup. Thousands of demonstrators celebrated the end of 
the regime, but the rest of the military put down the attempt by the small faction. Kaunda 
remained committed to the referendum scheduled for October 17. During the subsequent 
general elections, the military remained in the barracks and did not interfere with the 
transition. The military and party were deeply integrated; the party had organs in the 
military, and army promotions were made on the basis of party loyalty. Another key force 
was the Department of Military Intelligence.  
 
Sources:  
Andreassen, Bard-Anders, Gisela Geisler, and Arne Tostensen. “Setting a Standard for 
Africa? Lessons from the 1991 Zambian Elections.” Chr. Michelsen Institute Report 5 
(1992).  
Habasonda, Lee M. “The Military, Civil Society, and Democracy in Zambia.” African 
Security Review 11, no. 2 (2002): 6-16.  
Lindemann, Stefan. “Civilian Control of the Military in Tanzania and Zambia: 
Explaining Persistent Exceptionalism.” Crisis States Research Center Working Paper 80 
(2010).  
 
Zambia 5/28/2001-12/27/2001 – neutral  
The ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy campaigned for a change to the 
constitution to allow Frederick Chiluba a third term, after voting him as their nominee in 
the upcoming presidential election. These moves were very unpopular. Chiluba conceded 
when he did not get parliamentary support for the constitutional amendment. The military 
was neutral during the process, remaining on the sidelines. Sources report some in the 
military wanted Chiluba out but they were sure Chiluba would leave through 
constitutional means. Chiluba’s vice president Levy Mwanawasa was elected president in 
December 2001.  
 
Sources:  
Haatobolo, Godfrey Haamweela Nachitumbi. “Civil Control of the Military in Zambia.” 
PhD diss., University of Zambia, 2008.  
Venter, Denis. “Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho.” Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review 19, 





APPENDIX B: CODEBOOK FOR UPDATED AND EXPANDED GWF 
 
What follows is a portion of Jonathan Pinckney’s (2016) codebook, which he generously 
shared with me. I further updated and expanded the data for cases in my dataset he did 
not include.  
Pinckney’s Codebook 
For countries coded as democracies by GWF my first source to check was the V-Dem 
Polyarchy score. If the score had remained more or less the same as in 2010 (less than a 
0.2 decline), I simply coded a democratic regime as continuing through 2015. If there had 
been a decline in the Polyarchy score I then checked the Freedom House reports on the 
country to ascertain the reasons for the declining score. This was typically enough to 
determine whether a democratic breakdown (as defined by the GWF codebook) had 
occurred. I attempted to follow GWF’s coding rules as closely as possible.  
For authoritarian regimes I checked the Archigos dataset to determine whether there had 
been an irregular leader entry or exit from 2010-2015. If no irregular leader change had 
occurred I simply coded the regime as continuing through 2015. If Archigos did code an 
irregular leadership change I checked the Archigos case narratives and other secondary 
sources to determine the nature of the change.  
Honduras: Coded as democratic regime continuing despite coup in 2009 – coupmakers 
did not fundamentally change regime rules, democratic elections (according to GWF 
rules) held in 2010 and 2014.  
Thailand: I code the democratic regime as ending in 2014 with the military coup that 
overthrew Yingluck Shinawatra, and a military regime in 2015.  
Yemen: I code the Saleh regime as ending on 23 November with Saleh’s signing the 
GCC power-transfer agreement. The following Hadi regime I code as provisional because 
Hadi was elected in an unopposed election with a mandate to orchestrate a transition to 
democracy. I code this regime as ending in 2014 with the Houthi takeover of Sana’a and 
subsequent breakout of civil war across Yemen.  
Egypt: I code the “Egypt 52-NA” regime as ending with Mubarak’s resignation on Feb 
11th, 2011. I code the following regime as “provisional.” While it was led by the 
military, it explicitly took power as a temporary measure to lead up to democratic 
elections, and then did in fact allow the elections to occur in 2012 when Mohammed 
Morsi was elected. I code Morsi’s regime as democratic because his election was widely 
considered to be free and fair. I code the beginning of a new regime with the coup that 




Iraq: GWF code Iraq as transitioning from foreign occupation to autocracy in the 
beginning of 2011. I code the subsequent regime as party-personal, reflecting the 
domination both by Shi’a political parties and specifically by Nouri al-Maliki.  
Turkey: I strongly considered Turkey as moving to a personalistic regime during this 
period. However, Freedom House reports that the 2015 election, while certainly 
contentious, was relatively free and fair. It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the 
Erdogan regime’s crackdown on opposition following the 2016 attempted coup mark 
Turkey’s move away from democracy, but it does not appear that this transition occurred 
prior to 2016.  
Tunisia: I code the Ben Ali as ending with Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia on January 14th, 
2011. I code the following regime as provisional, first under Fouad Mebazaa and then 
under the National Constituent Assembly, which was tasked with running the government 
until a constitution could be written and democratic elections held. I code this regime as 
continuing until the presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2014, when I 
code Tunisia as becoming a democracy.  
Madagascar: GWF code the regime of Andry Rajoelina beginning in 2009 as 
personalistic. Rajoelina maintained that his regime was transitional, and did in fact allow 
another candidate to take power in 2014. Thus, I considered coding the regime as 
provisional. However, by a strict reading of GWF’s coding rules, provisional 
governments are only those charged with conducting elections as “part of a transition to 
democracy,” and thus coding the Rajoelina regime as autocratic is closer to their rules. I 
code the regime as failing with the assumption of power by democratically-elected 
president Rajaonarimampianina in January 2014.  
Burundi: GWF code Burundi as a democracy beginning with the election of 2005. I code 
this democratic regime as ending in 2010 because of the widespread electoral fraud and 
intimidation of the opposition that characterized the May-July 2010 elections. This 
follows GWF’s coding rules of an authoritarian regime starting when a leader assumes 
power through an election that is not free and fair (GWF Codebook page 6). I code the 
following regime as a party-personal regime.  
Burkina Faso: I code the Compaore regime in Burkina Faso as ending in October 2014 
with Compaore’s ouster in the 2014 Lwili Revolution. I code the following regime under 
interim president Michel Kafando as provisional – the regime was explicitly set up to 
prepare for democratic elections, which did in fact take place in late 2015. Late 2015 
marks the beginning of a democratic regime. There was an attempted coup in late 2015, 
but the coup failed to ultimately unseat Kafando.  
Ukraine: This is the only place where I directly diverge from a coding by GWF. They 
code Ukraine as democratic from its independence from the Soviet Union in 1992. 
However, by their coding rules autocratic regimes start when an executive achieves 
power through undemocratic means, i.e. elections that are not reasonably competitive. 
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According to experts, the 1999 election of Leonid Kuchma was very far from free and 
fair, and Kuchma subsequently significantly changed the rules for choosing leaders and 
policies, centralizing presidential power. Thus I code Ukraine as autocratic from 1999 to 
2004, when the Orange Revolution defeated Kuchma’s successor. I code Ukraine as 
democratic subsequently. V-Dem shows a precipitous decline in Ukraine’s polyarchy 
score following the Euromaidan protests and ouster of President Yanukovych. I decided 
to code a regime failure event in 2014, considering the dramatic change in rules for 
choosing leaders and policies that took place in the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests. 
However, because Yanukovych’s ouster and a free and fair executive election both took 
place in 2014, the country-years show up as a continuous democratic period.  
Kingma Neu’s Coding 
Bahrain 2011-2015 (2010): monarchy  
From Archigos, al-Khalifa’s entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. Al-
Khalifa was the son of Bahrain’s previous leader. From Polity, Bahrain was a 
nondemocracy.  
 
Chile 1931 (1930): military  
From Archigos, the leader was Ibanez, a military general. From Polity, Chile was a 
nondemocracy.  
Other sources: Chile was a military dictatorship, following military intervention against 
the oligarchy.  
Haring, Clarence H. “The Chilean Revolution of 1931.” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 13, no. 2 (1933): 197-203.  
Vidal, Hernan. “The Gravitation of Narratives of National Identity on Human Rights: The 
Case of Chile.” Hispanic Issues On Line 5, no. 1 (2009).  
 
Djibouti 2011 (2010): party  
From Archigos, Guelleh’s entry into power was regular, and he was still leader. From 
Polity, Djibouti was a nondemocracy.  
Other sources: The first president of Djibouti turned it into a one-party state in 1981. 
Guelleh succeeded him (Gradstein p. 25).  
Gradstein, Mark. “Dictatorship, Transitions, and Development.” Monaster Center for 
Economic Research Discussion Paper 11 (2011). 
  
Guatemala 1944 (1943): personalist  
From Archigos, Ubico’s entry into power was regular, but his exit was irregular. From 
Polity, Guatemala was a nondemocracy.  
Other sources: Guatemala was military dictatorship, but Ubico exercised personal control 
over the military institution (Gleijeses p. 15). The dictatorship was highly personalist 
(Grieb p. 524). Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the 
United States, 1944-1954. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 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Grieb, Kenneth J. “The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of 1944.” The Americas 
32, no. 4 (1976): 524-543.  
 
Guyana 1990-1992 (1989): single-party  
From Archigos, Hoyte’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, 
Guyana was a nondemocracy.  
Other sources: Hoyte was part of the ruling People’s National Congress Party and 
appointed ruler. Under Hoyte, though, the party was not as powerful as previously 
(Griffith p. 269). Yet – it remained the “dominant political force” (Griffith 1991).  
Griffith, Ivelaw L. “The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana.” Journal of 
Interamarican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 2 (1991).  
Griffith, Ivelaw L. “Political Change, Democracy, and Human Rights in Guyana.” Third 
World Quarterly 18, no. 2 (1997): 267-275.  
 
East Timor 2006 (2005): democratic  
From Polity, East Timor was a democracy.  
 
Fiji 1987 (1986): democratic  
From Archigos, Mara’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji 
was a democracy.  
 
Fiji 2000 (1999): democratic  
From Archigos, Rabuka’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, Fiji 
was a democracy.  
 
Maldives 2003-2008 (2002): personalist  
From Archigos, Gayoom’s entry into and exit from power were regular. He was elected 
president. From Polity, Maldives was a nondemocracy. From VDem, there are no 
mentions of a political party or the military.  
Other sources: Gayoom had absolute power (Bonofer p. 438).  
Bonofer, Jacob Ashik. “The Challenges of Democracy in Maldives.” IJSAS 3, no. 2 
(2010): 433- 449.  
 
Maldives 2012 (2011): democratic  
From Archigos, Nasheed’s entry into and exit from power were regular. From Polity, 
Maldives was a nondemocracy. FreedomHouse classified it as “Partly Free”, and 
specifically, an “electoral democracy”.  
 
Maldives 2012-2013 (2011)  






Suriname 1983-1984 (1982): military  
From Archigos, Bouterse’s entry into power was irregular and he was still leader. From 
Polity, Suriname was a nondemocracy. From VDem, Suriname’s head of state was 
appointed by the military.  
Other sources: The military didn’t rule directly but exercised authority over the mostly 
civilian government (Singh p. 71). Bouterse sought to personally control the military, was 
this was not complete by 1983 (p. 80).  
Singh, Chaitram. “Re-Democratization in Guyana and Suriname.” European Review of 
Latin America and Caribbean Studies 84 (2008): 71-85.  
 
Tonga 2005-2006 (2004): monarchy  
Not in Archigos. From Polity, Tonga was a nondemocracy. Based on FreedomHouse, it 






APPENDIX C: CHAPTER THREE 
 
Additional, Unreported Tests 
 
Table 1. Correlation between defections and the defect_sec variable from MEC 
  defections defect_sec 
defections 1 
 defect_sec 0.4957 1 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of EffectiveNumber across regime types 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personalist 34 1.768491 0.6585462 1 3.614155 
Party 31 1.994791 0.5003857 1 3.070187 
Military 17 1.89134 0.6372488 1 3.149361 
Note: This shows that institutional coup-proofing is not exclusive to personalist regimes. 
 
Table 3. Models of defections and other measures of ICP: non-transformed 
EffectiveNumber, its squared term, and a measure of deviation from two armed 
organizations 
EffectiveNumber -0.3460   
 
(1.1720) 









Constant -0.3370 -0.567**  
  (1.2040) (0.2090) 
Observations 94 94 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.004 
AIC 123.975 122.72 
BIC 131.605 127.806 
Standard errors in parentheses 









Table 4. Models of types of loyalty shifts and other measures of ICP 
Low Level         
EffectiveNumber -1.8330 (2.9440) 
  EffNumSQ 0.4730 (0.6770) 
  ENdev 
  
0.2590 (0.9260) 
Constant 0.2600 (2.9560) -1.470** (0.5700) 
     Fragmented 
    EffectiveNumber -1.9450 (2.1540) 
  EffNumSQ 0.5020 (0.4810) 
  ENdev 
  
0.7250 (0.6260) 
Constant 0.6240 (2.2920) -1.446*** (0.4140) 
     United 
    EffectiveNumber 0.6150 (3.4000) 
  EffNumSQ 0.0390 (0.7930) 
  ENdev 
  
0.1540 (0.9480) 




 Pseudo R2 0.013 
 
0.004 
 AIC 240.989 
 
237.125 
 BIC 263.879   252.385   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition 





  (0.1960) 
Observations 111 
Pseudo R2 0.00 
AIC 143.876 
BIC 149.295 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 6. Model of variable for institutionalized opposition (presence of an opposition 
political party) and types of loyalty shifts 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Opposition -0.4900 -0.4390 0.2720 
 
(0.5060) (0.5070) (0.5190) 
Constant -1.061** -0.860* -1.466**  
  (0.3380) (0.3760) (0.4540) 
Observations 111 
  Pseudo R2 0.007 
  AIC 277.239 
  BIC 293.496     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 





  (0.1850) 
Observations 82 
Pseudo R2 0.006 
AIC 105.808 
BIC 110.621 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 8. Model of variable for voluntarily recruited military and types of loyalty shifts 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Recruit -0.7790 -0.4510 -0.8280 
 
(0.7310) (0.6020) (0.8560) 
Constant -0.956** -0.773* -1.312**  
  (0.3300) (0.3310) (0.4590) 
Observations 82 
  Pseudo R2 0.01 
  AIC 206.641 
  BIC 221.081     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
On page 83 of Chapter Three, I report that the interaction between nonviolence and size 
is not significant for defections. I show this below. 
 
Table 9. Model of protester characteristics and defections 
Size -0.8990 (2.8260) 
Nonviolence -1.0530 (1.9920) 
NV x Size 0.6800 (2.9240) 
Dem Level 0.2240 (1.2040) 
Incumbent 0.769** (0.2600) 
GDP per capita 0.2850 (0.1890) 
Soldier Quality  -0.660** (0.2220) 
Coup 1.422* (0.5720) 
Constant -2.2370 (2.7950) 
Observations 94 
 Pseudo R2 0.209 
 AIC 113.329 
 BIC 136.219   
Standard errors in parentheses 








Prior to the 3-way interaction between size, PCP, and ICP in Table 10 of Chapter Three, I 
calculated 2-way interactions between combinations of the coup-proofing variables (ICP 
and PCP) and those related to the protest movement (size and nonviolence). They are 
displayed below. 
 
Table 10. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on ICP 
Size -16.1070 (9.8550) 0.0930 (1.2080) 
ICP -5.5170 (4.8910) 9.992*** (2.4050) 
Size x ICP 12.2800 (7.5330) 
  Nonviolence -0.4670 (0.3430) 
  PCP 1.210** (0.4200) 1.396** (0.4560) 
Dem Level 1.1230 (1.4770) 0.5460 (1.5810) 
Incumbent 1.015** (0.3350) 1.206*** (0.3210) 
GDP per capita 0.857** (0.2950) 0.980** (0.3190) 
Soldier Quality -1.274** (0.4100) -1.403*** (0.4100) 




Nonviolence x ICP 
  
-8.388*** (2.3230) 




 Pseudo R2 0.33 
 
0.38 
 AIC 99.701 
 
93.903 
 BIC 127.199   121.4   
Standard errors in parentheses 


















Table 11. Models of protester characteristics and defections, conditional on PCP 
Size 0.1250 (1.6810) 0.1350 (1.2220) 
ICP 2.405** (0.7740) 2.398** (0.7460) 
PCP 1.1470 (1.6240) 1.0230 (0.6740) 
Size x PCP 0.0540 (2.3540) 
  Nonviolence -0.4650 (0.3270) 
  Dem Level 0.5940 (1.4390) 0.6620 (1.4080) 
Incumbent  0.953** (0.3260) 0.952** (0.3250) 
GDP per capita 0.775** (0.2860) 0.763* (0.2980) 
Soldier Quality  -1.176** (0.3780) -1.165** (0.3850) 




Nonviolence x PCP 
  
0.2110 (0.6000) 




 Pseudo R-squared 0.311 
 
0.312 
 AIC 101.865 
 
101.785 
 BIC 129.363   129.283   
Standard errors in parentheses 






















In Table 10 of the main text, I interact PCP and ICP with size. In Table 12 below, I 
interact PCP and ICP with nonviolence. 
 
Table 12. Models of nonviolence and defections, conditional on coup-proofing 
Size -0.1870 (1.2690) 
Nonviolence 10.411* (4.7340) 
ICP 8.523** (3.2150) 
PCP -9.6770 (8.0730) 
Nonviolence x ICP x PCP -6.6500 (5.8410) 
Nonviolence x ICP  -7.737* (3.2830) 
Nonviolence x PCP 8.8870 (8.2770) 
PCP x ICP 8.1200 (5.6650) 
Dem Level 0.0750 (1.6390) 
Incumbent 1.126*** (0.3220) 
GDP per capita 0.911** (0.3120) 
Soldier Quality  -1.312*** (0.3950) 
Coup 1.676* (0.6580) 
Constant  -17.170** (5.8440) 
Observations 90 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.392 
 AIC 98.442 
 BIC 133.439   
Standard errors in parentheses 


















On page 94 of Chapter Three, I note an absence of results for the interaction between ICP 
and loss. I report this in Table 13 below. 
 
Table 13. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries (ICP) and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Loss 29.829* 15.878** 5.0500  
 
(12.4770) (5.6320) (5.0640) 
PCP 1.984* 2.956** 2.178*   
 
(0.8200) (0.9110) (0.9060) 
Loss x ICP -23.646* -11.994** -3.4800 
 
(10.2240) (3.9630) (3.4140) 
ICP 4.2010  7.349*** 5.965**  
 
(2.3400) (2.1630) (1.8310) 
Dem Level -4.611* -1.8010 1.3000  
 
(2.3520) (5.0060) (3.7150) 
Incumbent 0.2520  2.198* 1.245*   
 
(0.4410) (0.9260) (0.5330) 
GDP per capita 0.0980  2.030* 0.5780  
 
(0.4140) (0.7910) (0.5100) 
Soldier Quality 0.0570  -2.567* -1.4410 
 
(0.7310) (1.0130) (0.8510) 
Coup 1.5260  4.509** 1.3580  
 
(1.4580) (1.4820) (1.3570) 
Constant -10.1460 -23.500* -12.624*   
  (6.1380) (9.1280) (5.2900) 
Observations 94 
  Pseudo R2 0.278 
  AIC 223.129 
  BIC 299.428     
Standard errors in parentheses 









In Tables 14-16, I display the results for the individual probit regressions I summarize in 
footnote 192 of Chapter Three.  
 
Table 14. Tests of H5a-b for low level shifts, controlling for protester characteristics 
Size 4.336** (1.6050) 
Nonviolence -0.3970 (0.3850) 
ICP 0.4380 (0.8690) 
PCP 0.7270 (0.4190) 
Dem Level -2.2710 (1.3140) 
Incumbent  -0.0680 (0.0980) 
GDP per capita -0.1860 (0.2040) 
Soldier Quality 0.3620 (0.2920) 
Coup 0.3860 (0.4740) 
Constant -5.519* (2.5710) 
Observations 90 
 Pseudo R2 0.17 
 AIC 78.674 
 BIC 103.672   
Standard errors in parentheses 






















Table 15. Tests of H5a-b for fragmented high level shifts, controlling for protester 
characteristics 
Size -0.1250 (1.3650) 
Nonviolence -0.3580 (0.3140) 
ICP 1.5510 (0.8600) 
PCP 1.082** (0.3990) 
Dem Level -0.3050 (1.9340) 
Incumbent  1.012* (0.4390) 
GDP per capita 1.089** (0.3490) 
Soldier Quality -1.226** (0.4340) 
Coup 2.274** (0.7280) 
Constant -9.255* (3.7600) 
Observations 90 
 Pseudo R2 0.33 
 AIC 78.407 
 BIC 103.405   
Standard errors in parentheses 

























Table 16. Tests of H5a-b for united defections, controlling for protester characteristics 
Size 0.0250 (1.5700) 
Nonviolence -0.4290 (0.3360) 
ICP 1.729* (0.7520) 
PCP 0.4570 (0.3780) 
Dem Level 0.9760 (1.4910) 
Incumbent  0.366* (0.1650) 
GDP per capita -0.0410 (0.1860) 
Soldier Quality -0.3730 (0.2920) 
Coup -0.0170 (0.6110) 
Constant -3.0030 (2.5900) 
Observations 90 
 Pseudo R2 0.173 
 AIC 84.369 
 BIC 109.367   
Standard errors in parentheses 

























Tables 17-19 show the results for the interactions of other combinations of coup-proofing 
and protest movement variables besides size and ICP as reported in Table 17 of Chapter 
Three. The interaction between nonviolence and ICP is significant on all loyalty shift 
types, but in the opposite direction than expected. The interaction between size and PCP 
is significant on fragmented high level shifts, but the marginal effects at the variables’ 
substantively meaningful values are not significant. 
 
Table 17. Model of interaction between nonviolence and ICP, on loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 10.859** 3.662 3.517 
 
(3.4470) (2.7080) (3.9670) 
Nonviolence 13.228 19.322* 28.131*** 
 
(6.9650) (9.7450) (8.2910) 
ICP 11.751** 19.370** 24.512*** 
 
(4.4320) (6.9440) (6.0920) 
PCP 3.384** 4.043*** 3.241*   
 
(1.0610) (1.2190) (1.2980) 
NV x ICP -10.138* -14.769* -20.66*** 
 
(4.9620) (6.8470) (5.7370) 
Dem Level -4.869 -2.475 1.461 
 
(2.8480) (5.5050) (5.4220) 
Incumbent 0.481 2.549* 1.992*** 
 
(0.3540) (1.1180) (0.5670) 
GDP per capita 0.299 2.592** 1.137 
 
(0.5570) (0.9730) (0.6140) 
Soldier Quality -0.441 -3.152* -2.280*   
 
(0.7920) (1.3080) (0.9940) 
Coup 1.434 5.099** 1.647 
 
(1.0810) (1.9060) (1.9990) 
Constant -26.915** -43.978*** -43.89*** 
  (9.9420) (12.7770) (10.9040) 
Observations 90 
  Pseudo R2 0.354 
  AIC 206.85 
  BIC 289.344     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 18. Model of interaction between size and PCP, on loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 6.984* 0.6090 3.5690 
 
(3.4270) (3.2060) (5.8030) 
Nonviolence -0.9560 -1.0800 -0.9290 
 
(0.8500) (0.8260) (0.8750) 
ICP 2.5940 4.738* 5.645**  
 
(1.9450) (1.8580) (1.9960) 
PCP -4.2070 -3.0690 1.2140 
 
(4.6730) (2.9020) (5.8780) 
Size x PCP 11.0590 10.487* 2.7850 
 
(6.7850) (4.7090) (8.5390) 
Dem Level -5.0780 -2.4630 1.0570 
 
(3.0180) (4.8010) (4.9020) 
Incumbent 0.1970 2.130* 1.312*   
 
(0.2620) (1.0130) (0.5980) 
GDP per capita 0.2420 2.216* 0.7880 
 
(0.5090) (0.9170) (0.6280) 
Soldier Quality -0.3070 -2.701* -1.7450 
 
(0.7350) (1.1940) (0.9690) 
Coup 1.7080 4.970** 1.6370 
 
(0.9590) (1.7430) (1.5100) 
Constant -9.5790 -19.028* -13.4510 
  (6.7640) (7.9870) (7.1430) 
Observations 90 
  Pseudo R2 0.317 
  AIC 215.111 
  BIC 297.605     
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 19. Model of interaction between nonviolence and PCP, on loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 10.395** 3.659 3.012 
 
(3.3330) (2.6240) (3.7920) 
Nonviolence -0.369 -0.995 -1.285 
 
(1.1930) (0.9100) (1.2900) 
ICP 3.068 5.581** 5.516**  
 
(1.8620) (2.1310) (1.7540) 
PCP 3.831* 3.770* 2.248 
 
(1.7840) (1.5850) (1.7140) 
NV x PCP -1.053 -0.249 0.48 
 
(1.8410) (1.4680) (1.5950) 
Dem Level -4.946 -2.729 1.341 
 
(2.9160) (4.5800) (4.7410) 
Incumbent 0.12 2.110* 1.252*   
 
(0.2840) (0.9990) (0.5590) 
GDP per capita 0.19 2.240* 0.66 
 
(0.4760) (0.9090) (0.5720) 
Soldier Quality -0.231 -2.737* -1.611 
 
(0.6930) (1.2010) (0.8950) 
Coup 1.616 4.957** 1.466 
 
(0.9010) (1.6760) (1.5060) 
Constant  -12.890* -22.097* -12.353*   
  (6.2720) (8.7020) (5.8120) 
Observations 90 
  Pseudo R2 0.309 
  AIC 216.829 
  BIC 299.323     
Standard errors in parentheses 









I interact size and ICP in Table 17 of Chapter Three. The interaction term on low level 
shifts is negative and statistically significant. I summarize what that means substantively 
in the text, and show the marginal effects in Figure 1 below. Few are significant, but the 
predicted probability of low level shifts increases to .75 with large protests and no 
counterforces. 
 













All Reported Tests Without Controls 
Table 20. Models of coup-proofing and defections 
  H1-H1a   Interaction   
ICP 0.9220 (0.5930) -0.1720 (0.6890) 
PCP 0.596* (0.2780) -2.6410 (1.6820) 
PCP x ICP 
  
2.390* (1.1990) 




 Pseudo R2 0.044 
 
0.07 
 AIC 121.456 
 
120.293 
 BIC 129.149   130.55   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 21. Models of other regime types and defections 
  H1b   
Party Regime -0.5810 (0.3280) 
Mil Regime 0.1030 (0.3450) 
ICP 0.7460 (0.6130) 
Constant -1.3400 (0.8880) 
Observations 96 
 Pseudo R2 0.043 
 AIC 123.593 
 BIC 133.851   
Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 22. Models of protester characteristics and defections, controlling for and 
conditional on coup-proofing 
  H2   Interaction   
Size 0.9690 (1.1180) -7.4070 (8.5870) 
Nonviolence -0.1280 (0.2760) -0.1610 (0.2810) 
PCP 0.657* (0.3030) -4.2100 (10.7860) 




Size x ICP 
  
5.8270 (6.0730) 
Size x PCP 
  
2.6990 (16.0740) 
PCP x ICP 
  
2.9970 (8.0480) 




 Pseudo R2 0.048 
 
0.076 
 AIC 121.873 
 
126.62 
 BIC 134.482   149.316   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 23. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing 
  Loss   Interaction   
Loss 0.2000 (0.4460) 2.3910 (2.6620) 
ICP 0.9200 (0.5800) 0.0300 (0.8530) 




Loss x ICP 
  
-2.1330 (1.7870) 
Loss x PCP 
  
-2.3580 (4.5950) 
ICP x PCP 
  
2.1510 (1.4160) 




 Pseudo R2 0.046 
 
0.09 
 AIC 123.253 
 
125.949 
 BIC 133.511   146.464   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 24. Models of ongoing conflict and defections 








 Pseudo R2 0.002 
 
0.022 
 AIC 139.086 
 
141.531 




Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 25. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United 
PCP 1.0590 (0.6600) 0.8440 (0.6340) 1.716** (0.6140) 
ICP 0.8830 (1.6220) 0.7800 (1.3330) 2.938* (1.2910) 
Constant -2.9600 (2.4230) -2.4560 (1.9950) -6.116** (2.0190) 
Observations 96 
     Pseudo R2 0.045 
     AIC 236.25 
     BIC 259.329           
Standard errors in parentheses 




















Table 26. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    




(1.2410) (1.2590) (0.9950) 
PCP 0.9320 0.6940 1.347*   
 
(0.6520) (0.6780) (0.6640) 
Loss x PCP 14.466*** 14.693*** 28.610*** 
 
(1.6020) (1.7310) (1.2960) 
ICP 0.9100 0.7950 2.916*   
 
(1.5950) (1.3460) (1.3730) 
Constant -3.0470 -2.4790 -5.977**  
  (2.3270) (2.0120) (2.1030) 
Observations 96 
  Pseudo R2 0.069 
  AIC 242.848 
  BIC 281.313     
Standard errors in parentheses 























Table 27. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-
proofing 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 9.741** 4.0850 2.9730 
 
(3.0910) (2.6730) (3.0250) 
Nonviolence -0.8320 -0.2810 -0.5290 
 
(0.7940) (0.6410) (0.5970) 
ICP 1.6150 0.5640 2.816*   
 
(1.6230) (1.4740) (1.4350) 
PCP 2.174** 1.2700 2.074**  
 
(0.7210) (0.7320) (0.6520) 
Constant -10.58*** -4.7250 -7.576*   
  (2.9680) (3.4950) (3.3050) 
Observations 92 
  Pseudo R2 0.104 
  AIC 227.819 
  BIC 265.646     
Standard errors in parentheses 
























Table 28. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 48.438* 9.3560 -15.1150 
 
(18.9150) (15.8370) (18.3620) 
Nonviolence -0.8100 -0.2820 -0.6550 
 
(0.7860) (0.6400) (0.6290) 
ICP 21.797* 3.1680 -5.7040 
 
(9.0780) (7.4510) (8.6790) 
PCP 2.403*** 1.3080 1.987**  
 
(0.7120) (0.7550) (0.6790) 
Size x ICP -27.843* -3.8470 13.0040 
 
(13.1110) (11.1150) (13.2690) 
Constant -38.896** -8.3020 4.3350 
  (13.5620) (10.9490) (12.0510) 
Observations 92 
  Pseudo R2 0.123 
  AIC 229.682 
  BIC 275.074 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 






















All Reported Tests Including Democracies 
 
Table 29. Models of coup-proofing and defections 
  H1-H1a Interaction 
ICP 1.498** 1.0940 
 
(0.5500) (0.6940) 
PCP 0.4720 -0.9720 
 
(0.2710) (1.3760) 
Dem Level 0.8870 0.9070 
 
(0.9370) (0.9310) 
Incumbent 0.1880 0.1760 
 
(0.1190) (0.1200) 
GDP per capita 0.2410 0.2500 
 
(0.1750) (0.1740) 
Soldier Quality -0.643** -0.653**  
 
(0.2120) (0.2100) 
Coup 0.2840 0.2450 
 
(0.3740) (0.3570) 





Constant -0.5150 0.1610 
  (1.5080) (1.6850) 
Observations 128 128 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.116 
AIC 163.524 164.669 
BIC 186.34 190.337 
Standard errors in parentheses 














Table 30. Models of other regime types and defections 
  H1b 
Party Regime -0.977**  
 
(0.3600) 
Military Regime -0.3620 
 
(0.3910) 
ICP 1.532**  
 
(0.5420) 






GDP per capita 0.2610 
 
(0.1790) 







  (1.6100) 
Observations 128 
Pseudo R2 0.147 
AIC 159.552 
BIC 185.221 
Standard errors in parentheses 















Table 31. Models of protester characteristics and defections, with coup-proofing 
  H2 Interaction 
Size 1.7770 -9.9010 
 
(1.0900) (8.6150) 
Nonviolence  -0.479* -0.508*   
 
(0.2420) (0.2490) 
PCP 0.5610 2.1880 
 
(0.3050) (8.1440) 
ICP 1.254* -4.5630 
 
(0.5750) (4.1000) 
Dem Level 1.0800 1.1960 
 
(0.9170) (0.9230) 
Incumbent 0.1940 0.1760 
 
(0.1180) (0.1210) 
GDP per capita 0.2040 0.2770 
 
(0.1850) (0.1850) 
Soldier Quality  -0.696** -0.721**  
 
(0.2300) (0.2320) 
Coup 0.3590 0.4380 
 
(0.3840) (0.3790) 




















Constant -0.3960 7.6160 
  (1.6960) (6.0240) 
Observations 121 121 
Pseudo R2 0.155 0.182 
AIC 153.962 157.803 
BIC 181.92 196.944 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.05, ** 
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p<.01, *** p<.001 
Table 32. Models of loss and defections, controlling for and conditional on coup-proofing 
  Loss Interaction 
Loss 0.3350 -0.2330 
 
(0.3890) (2.3540) 
ICP 1.458** 1.0260 
 
(0.5480) (0.7950) 
PCP 0.4610 -0.8660 
 
(0.2700) (1.5770) 
Dem Level 0.9390 0.9440 
 
(0.9440) (0.9310) 
Incumbent 0.1980 0.1800 
 
(0.1250) (0.1230) 
GDP per capita 0.2300 0.2450 
 
(0.1740) (0.1830) 
Soldier Quality -0.635** -0.641**  
 
(0.2110) (0.2140) 
Coup 0.2910 0.2670 
 
(0.3670) (0.3560) 




















Constant -0.5690 0.1330 
  (1.5440) (1.8010) 
Observations 128 128 
Pseudo R2 0.115 0.125 
AIC 164.828 171.321 
BIC 190.496 208.397 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 33. Models of ongoing conflict and defections 
Conflict 0.2500   
 
(0.2660) 
 Dem Level 0.9100 0.9100 
 
(0.7700) (0.7650) 
Incumbent 0.1770 0.1720 
 
(0.1010) (0.1010) 
GDP per capita 0.0870 0.0780 
 
(0.1370) (0.1340) 
Soldier Quality -0.362** -0.363**  
 
(0.1340) (0.1310) 








Constant 0.4150 0.5150 
  (1.3000) (1.2980) 
Observations 139 139 
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.068 
AIC 183.718 183.333 
BIC 204.259 203.874 
Standard errors in parentheses 


















Table 34. Models of coup-proofing and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
PCP 1.449* 1.478* 0.9710 
 
(0.6600) (0.6420) (0.5770) 
ICP 0.8870 4.205** 2.3620 
 
(1.4560) (1.3340) (1.2870) 
Dem Level -1.1480 3.6460 0.7920 
 
(2.1180) (1.9050) (1.7420) 
Incumbent 0.1590 1.272** 0.1830 
 
(0.1680) (0.4490) (0.2340) 
GDP per capita 0.2800 1.505** -0.1420 
 
(0.3280) (0.5370) (0.3660) 
Soldier Quality -0.0130 -2.126*** -0.4540 
 
(0.6100) (0.5780) (0.4950) 
Coup 1.3600 2.249* 0.2100 
 
(0.7670) (0.9030) (1.0690) 
Constant -6.2410 -11.699* -1.3250 
  (4.1960) (5.5150) (2.6920) 
Observations 128 
  Pseudo R2 0.144 
  AIC 310.515 
  BIC 378.963     
Standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 35. Model of loss by coup-proofed militaries and loyalty shift types 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Loss 0.1900 -0.3740 0.6710 
 
(0.9840) (1.1050) (0.9670) 
PCP 1.289* 1.418* 0.7610 
 
(0.6430) (0.6790) (0.6300) 
Loss x PCP 13.963*** 13.570*** 14.145*** 
 
(1.4110) (1.5040) (1.2010) 
ICP 0.8210 4.194** 1.9600 
 
(1.4530) (1.3470) (1.3110) 
Dem Level -0.9040 3.6620 1.0360 
 
(2.0800) (1.9040) (1.7390) 
Incumbent 0.1630 1.272** 0.1930 
 
(0.1720) (0.4490) (0.2420) 
GDP per capita 0.2250 1.513** -0.1890 
 
(0.3290) (0.5580) (0.3540) 
Soldier Quality 0.0220 -2.136*** -0.4130 
 
(0.6160) (0.6020) (0.5020) 
Coup 1.3810 2.271* 0.2940 
 
(0.7390) (0.9000) (1.0270) 
Constant -6.1700 -11.649* -1.0010 
  (4.1620) (5.4000) (2.7650) 
Observations 128 
  Pseudo R2 0.159 
  AIC 317.904 
  BIC 403.465     
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 36. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, controlling for coup-
proofing 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 6.856* 4.7150 4.2510 
 
(3.2620) (2.5590) (2.4980) 
Nonviolence -0.8110 -0.7140 -1.222* 
 
(0.7170) (0.6230) (0.5370) 
ICP 1.2910 4.066** 1.9780 
 
(1.4720) (1.4060) (1.4080) 
PCP 2.053** 1.804** 1.2960 
 
(0.7450) (0.6530) (0.6770) 
Dem Level -0.2820 3.9270 1.1800 
 
(2.1380) (2.0170) (1.8470) 
Incumbent 0.1100 1.201* 0.2110 
 
(0.1400) (0.5000) (0.2320) 
GDP per capita 0.1130 1.389* -0.1810 
 
(0.3760) (0.5590) (0.3960) 
Soldier Quality -0.1660 -2.202*** -0.6810 
 
(0.5990) (0.6640) (0.5880) 
Coup 0.8050 2.171* 0.2570 
 
(0.7360) (1.0450) (1.0090) 
Constant -8.2030 -12.075* -0.8550 
  (4.9120) (5.4240) (3.1730) 
Observations 121 
  Pseudo R2 0.193 
  AIC 296.109 
  BIC 379.982     
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 37. Model of protester characteristics and loyalty shift types, conditional on ICP 
  Low Level Fragmented United    
Size 15.6650 -16.5380 -13.1990 
 
(19.2070) (12.3320) (14.9680) 
Nonviolence -0.7250 -0.7080 -1.200* 
 
(0.7540) (0.6270) (0.5430) 
ICP 5.8300 -6.0790 -6.1890 
 
(9.9110) (5.8600) (6.5730) 
PCP 2.005** 1.845** 1.3050 
 
(0.7310) (0.6730) (0.6880) 
Size x ICP -6.3510 15.7870 12.9500 
 
(14.4450) (9.0150) (10.5780) 
Dem Level -0.2610 4.402* 1.3420 
 
(2.1500) (1.9960) (1.8990) 
Incumbent 0.0940 1.247* 0.2050 
 
(0.1380) (0.4960) (0.2410) 
GDP per capita 0.0520 1.495* -0.1360 
 
(0.3910) (0.5850) (0.3990) 
Soldier Quality -0.1620 -2.260*** -0.6840 
 
(0.5900) (0.6860) (0.6010) 
Coup 0.6320 2.472* 0.3040 
 
(0.7390) (1.0170) (1.0480) 
Constant -14.0000 0.6860 9.7820 
  (12.1500) (9.3180) (9.2650) 
Observations 121 
  Pseudo R2 0.204 
  AIC 298.893 
  BIC 391.154     
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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APPENDIX D: QCA 
 
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
Table 1. Full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
PCP 68 35 103 
NV 31 72 103 
OPP 43 57 100 
LOSS 92 11 103 
VIOL 71 32 103 
 
Table 2. Reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
PCP 34 24 58 
NV 18 40 58 
OPP 21 36 57 
LOSS 51 7 58 
VIOL 37 21 58 
 
Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Table 3. Full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
Defections 69 34 103 
Low Level 89 14 103 
Fragmented 85 18 103 
United 87 16 103 
 
Table 4. Reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
Defections 43 15 58 
Low Level 50 8 58 
Fragmented 63 8 71 
United 48 10 58 
(Note: There are more observations for Fragmented because I do not drop cases that have 




Summary Statistics for ICP and SIZE, Calibrated for Different Outcomes 
Table 5. Defections outcome, full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
ICP 57 39 96 
SIZE 61 38 99 
 
Table 6. Defections outcome, reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
ICP 31 24 55 
SIZE 40 17 57 
 
Table 7. Low level outcome, full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Mean Std Dev Min Max Total 
ICP 
  
0.48370 0.30227 0 1 96 
SIZE 44 55         99 
 
Table 8. Low level outcome, reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Mean Std Dev Min Max Total 
ICP 
  
0.51245 0.27448 0 1 55 
SIZE 28 29         57 
 
Table 9. Fragmented outcome, full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
ICP 70 26 96 
SIZE 44 55 99 
 
Table 10. Fragmented outcome, reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
COUP 58 10 68 
ICP 45 20 65 
PCP 42 27 69 
LOSS 61 8 69 
SIZE 33 35 68 
NV 22 47 69 
VIOL 44 25 69 
OPP 21 46 67 
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Table 11. United defections outcome, full dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
ICP 70 26 96 
SIZE 61 38 99 
 
Table 12. United defections outcome, reduced dataset 
Variable 0 1 Total 
ICP 41 14 55 
SIZE 40 17 57 
 
 381 
APPENDIX E: CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Additional Summary Statistics 
Table 1 includes summary statistics of the determinants of type shift included in Tables 7 
and 8 of Chapter Five.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of additional independent variables 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
ICP 89 1.385059 0.2129828 1 1.901093 
Size 89 0.6628707 0.1195083 0.3780322 0.9207059 
  0 1       
PCP 57 32 
   Coup 74 15       
 
Robustness Checks with Other Measures of Democracy 
Table 2. type shift and democratization measured as dempost5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Neutral 0.3450 -0.3500 -0.3270 
 
(0.3590) (0.4090) (0.3770) 
Low Level 0.4150 0.1070 0.0940 
 
(0.4490) (0.6950) (0.5420) 
Fragmented 1.365** 1.0430 0.8690 
 
(0.4500) (0.8400) (0.5380) 
United 0.6380 0.4070 0.1590 
 
(0.3720) (0.6250) (0.4870) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.085** 0.1140 0.105*   
 
(0.0310) (0.0590) (0.0440) 
Success 
 
0.979* 1.149**  
  
(0.4260) (0.3650) 






















































Constant -0.3100 3.0480 -4.5680 
  (0.3330) (3.9000) (2.7830) 
Observations 110 67 101 
Pseudo R2 0.0997 0.3517 0.3318 
AIC 147.676 93.432 123.228 
BIC 163.879 130.911 162.455 
Standard errors in parentheses 


















Table 3. type shift and democratization (measured as dempost5), with determinants of 
type shift 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 0.0940 (0.4360) 0.2040 (0.3750) 
Low Level 0.1930 (0.6660) -0.0930 (0.6090) 
Fragmented 0.6100 (0.5610) 1.342* (0.5350) 
United -0.0350 (0.5820) 0.7210 (0.5160) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.135*** (0.0380) 0.127** (0.0410) 
ICP 0.8140 (0.9790) 0.7170 (0.9740) 
PCP 1.331* (0.5700) 1.0920 (0.5580) 
Size -0.1600 (1.5300) 0.7430 (1.4950) 
Coup -0.4820 (0.4240) -0.5250 (0.4190) 
Success 1.430*** (0.3340) 
  GDP per capita 0.539* (0.2610) 0.3720 (0.2180) 
Area  0.0020 (0.1860) 0.0160 (0.1620) 
Cold War 0.4620 (0.4490) 0.5390 (0.4160) 
Asia 1.811* (0.7810) 1.760* (0.7440) 
Americas 2.707** (0.9830) 2.943*** (0.8840) 
Africa 0.2620 (0.7770) 0.2950 (0.7230) 
Europe 1.6870 (0.9300) 1.874* (0.8210) 
FSU -0.8290 (0.7970) -0.2980 (0.8210) 




 Pseudo R2 0.426 
 
0.3363 
 AIC 108.81 
 
117.879 
 BIC 156.094   162.675   
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 4. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (dempost5) 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Pr(Fragmented) -0.4720 (0.5760) 0.1420 (0.5800) 
Success 1.223*** (0.3180) 
  Area -0.0380 (0.1460) -0.0010 (0.1460) 
Cold War 0.4470 (0.4130) 0.4590 (0.3520) 
Asia 0.9050 (0.6210) 0.8800 (0.5850) 
Americas 1.3830 (0.7480) 1.715* (0.7190) 
Africa -0.3590 (0.6160) 0.0650 (0.5860) 
Europe 0.9910 (0.8070) 1.2920 (0.7340) 
FSU -0.2090 (0.6740) 0.2190 (0.7140) 




 Pseudo R2 0.2294 
 
0.1122 
 AIC 113.973 
 
126.261 
 BIC 138.747   148.557   
Standard errors in parentheses 
























Table 5. type shift and democratization measured as V-Dempost5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Neutral 0.129* -0.0520 0.0120 
 
(0.0520) (0.0720) (0.0530) 
Low Level -0.0310 -0.0600 -0.0620 
 
(0.0700) (0.1130) (0.0710) 
Fragmented 0.194* 0.0150 0.0590 
 
(0.0780) (0.0960) (0.0800) 
United 0.1280 -0.0170 0.0290 
 
(0.0700) (0.0940) (0.0660) 
Dem Level (V-Dem) 0.3330 -0.0550 -0.0160 
 
(0.1870) (0.3050) (0.2170) 
Success 
 
0.219** 0.179**  
  
(0.0770) (0.0570) 
GDP per capita 
 


















































Constant 0.274*** -0.3490 -0.6180 
 
 386 
  (0.0700) (0.4930) (0.3410) 
Observations 97 56 88 
R2 0.148 0.493 0.52 
AIC -7.217 -6.972 -36.655 
BIC 8.231 27.459 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 6. type shift and democratization (V-Dempost5), with determinants of type shift 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 0.0300 (0.0500) 0.0630 (0.0540) 
Low Level -0.0420 (0.0820) -0.0620 (0.0910) 
Fragmented 0.0180 (0.0690) 0.1190 (0.0810) 
United 0.0010 (0.0830) 0.0870 (0.0900) 
Dem Level (V-Dem) 0.1840 (0.1820) 0.2250 (0.2060) 
ICP 0.0250 (0.0920) 0.0040 (0.1040) 
PCP 0.0960 (0.0510) 0.0980 (0.0540) 
Size 0.1140 (0.1980) 0.2420 (0.2160) 
Coup -0.0520 (0.0540) -0.0670 (0.0510) 
Success 0.172*** (0.0470) 
  GDP per capita 0.091** (0.0320) 0.085* (0.0340) 
Area  -0.0070 (0.0200) 0.0010 (0.0210) 
Cold War 0.1000 (0.0590) 0.1170 (0.0670) 
Asia -0.0850 (0.1020) -0.1320 (0.0990) 
Americas 0.0770 (0.1000) 0.0880 (0.1020) 
Africa -0.1400 (0.0990) -0.1560 (0.0980) 
FSU  -0.260* (0.1020) -0.258* (0.1260) 
MENA  -0.297* (0.1120) -0.368** (0.1130) 




 R2 0.61 
 
0.534 
 AIC -40.001 
 
-28.376 
 BIC 4.283   13.577   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 7. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (V-Dempost5) 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Pr(Fragmented) -0.0160 (0.0640) 0.0700 (0.0810) 
Success 0.202*** (0.0490) 
  Area -0.0070 (0.0250) 0.0050 (0.0280) 
Cold War 0.1080 (0.0560) 0.1150 (0.0620) 
Asia 0.0940 (0.0740) 0.0350 (0.0870) 
Americas 0.307** (0.1000) 0.321** (0.1140) 
Africa 0.0150 (0.0520) 0.0370 (0.0750) 
Europe 0.338*** (0.0850) 0.345*** (0.0920) 
MENA -0.0420 (0.0880) -0.1280 (0.1070) 




 R2 0.487 
 
0.347 
 AIC -35.07 
 
-18.783 
 BIC -11.763   2.194   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 8. type shift and democratization measured as V-Demchange5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Neutral 0.118* -0.1070 0.0150 
 
(0.0530) (0.0660) (0.0590) 
Low Level -0.0060 -0.0560 -0.0390 
 
(0.0690) (0.1050) (0.0660) 
Fragmented 0.211** 0.0520 0.0970 
 
(0.0760) (0.0950) (0.0830) 
United 0.0860 -0.0270 0.0140 
 
(0.0750) (0.0870) (0.0730) 
Dem Level (V-Dem)  -0.479** -0.841** -0.775*** 
 
(0.1770) (0.2610) (0.2210) 
Success 
 
0.178* 0.157*   
  
(0.0670) (0.0600) 






















































Constant 0.228** -0.5790 -0.6160 
  (0.0670) (0.4230) (0.3110) 
Observations 97 56 88 
R-squared 0.175 0.607 0.535 
AIC -7.179 -15.38 -33.247 
BIC 8.27 19.051 3.913 
Standard errors in parentheses 













Table 9. type shift and democratization (measured as V-Demchange5), with determinants 
of type shift 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 0.0160 (0.0510) 0.0480 (0.0510) 
Low Level -0.0020 (0.0740) -0.0220 (0.0820) 
Fragmented 0.0410 (0.0740) 0.1390 (0.0830) 
United -0.0010 (0.0850) 0.0830 (0.0890) 
Dem Level (V-Dem)  -0.673*** (0.1780) -0.634** (0.1990) 
ICP -0.0170 (0.1070) -0.0370 (0.1170) 
PCP 0.0720 (0.0530) 0.0740 (0.0550) 
Size 0.0360 (0.1850) 0.1600 (0.2060) 
Coup 0.0080 (0.0460) -0.0060 (0.0510) 
Success 0.167*** (0.0470) 
  GDP per capita 0.092*** (0.0250) 0.086** (0.0290) 
Area  -0.0080 (0.0190) 0.0000 (0.0200) 
Cold War 0.0920 (0.0580) 0.1090 (0.0640) 
Asia -0.0970 (0.0850) -0.1420 (0.0880) 
Americas 0.0220 (0.0940) 0.0320 (0.0960) 
Africa  -0.190* (0.0900) -0.206* (0.0890) 
FSU  -0.265** (0.0950) -0.264* (0.1160) 
MENA  -0.302* (0.1150) -0.371** (0.1150) 




 R2 0.651 
 
0.585 
 AIC -41.594 
 
-30.444 
 BIC 2.69   11.509   
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 10. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (V-Demchange5) 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Pr(Fragmented) 0.1020 (0.0650) 0.177* (0.0780) 
Success 0.175** (0.0510) 
  Area -0.0030 (0.0210) 0.0070 (0.0240) 
Cold War 0.0070 (0.0570) 0.0140 (0.0580) 
Asia 0.0980 (0.0570) 0.0480 (0.0710) 
Americas 0.296** (0.0920) 0.308** (0.1010) 
Africa -0.0190 (0.0470) 0.0000 (0.0650) 
Europe 0.359*** (0.0780) 0.365*** (0.0820) 
MENA -0.0030 (0.0830) -0.0780 (0.1000) 




 R2 0.53 
 
0.433 
 AIC -36.148 
 
-23.943 
 BIC -12.841   -2.966   
Standard errors in parentheses 














Reported Tests with Democratic Cases Included 
Table 11. type shift and democratization measured as politypost5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Neutral 1.6060 0.7320 0.9440 
 
(1.1430) (1.2320) (1.1340) 
Low Level 0.2570 -0.2830 -1.0120 
 
(1.8610) (1.9470) (1.5680) 
Fragmented 4.911*** 2.9400 3.100*   
 
(1.4090) (1.7830) (1.5190) 
United 0.9560 -1.6320 -0.5990 
 
(1.5310) (2.1920) (1.8320) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.408*** 0.1810 0.305**  
 
(0.0820) (0.1310) (0.0940) 
Success 
 
1.8700 2.699*   
  
(1.1740) (1.1170) 


























































   
(2.1790) 
Constant 1.7080 6.5410 2.2730 
  (0.9520) (7.3790) (7.3140) 
Observations 146 100 137 
R2 0.236 0.305 0.376 
AIC 908.286 607.703 833.151 
BIC 926.188 651.991 876.95 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 12. type shift and democratization measured as politychange5 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3    
Neutral 1.6060 0.7320 0.9440 
 
(1.1430) (1.2320) (1.1340) 
Low Level 0.2570 -0.2830 -1.0120 
 
(1.8610) (1.9470) (1.5680) 
Fragmented 4.911*** 2.9400 3.100*   
 
(1.4090) (1.7830) (1.5190) 
United 0.9560 -1.6320 -0.5990 
 
(1.5310) (2.1920) (1.8320) 
Dem Level (Polity)  -0.592*** -0.819*** -0.695*** 
 
(0.0820) (0.1310) (0.0940) 
Success 
 
1.8700 2.699*   
  
(1.1740) (1.1170) 


























































   
(2.1790) 
Constant 1.7080 6.5410 2.2730 
  (0.9520) (7.3790) (7.3140) 
Observations 146 100 137 
R2 0.382 0.606 0.529 
AIC 908.286 607.703 833.151 
BIC 926.188 651.991 876.95 
Standard errors in parentheses 






















Table 13. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 1.5470 (1.3440) 1.5470 (1.3440) 
Low Level -1.4130 (1.7220) -1.4130 (1.7220) 
Fragmented 2.2210 (1.4650) 2.2210 (1.4650) 
United -1.5930 (2.0870) -1.5930 (2.0870) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.316** (0.1090) -0.684*** (0.1090) 
ICP -0.4570 (2.3130) -0.4570 (2.3130) 
PCP 2.1250 (1.1490) 2.1250 (1.1490) 
Size 2.6730 (4.9600) 2.6730 (4.9600) 
Coup 0.9160 (1.2890) 0.9160 (1.2890) 
Success 2.937** (1.0050) 2.937** (1.0050) 
GDP per capita 0.2330 (0.6050) 0.2330 (0.6050) 
Area  -0.3040 (0.4920) -0.3040 (0.4920) 
Cold War 1.2550 (1.4450) 1.2550 (1.4450) 
Asia -2.3900 (1.6950) -2.3900 (1.6950) 
Americas -0.3250 (2.5510) -0.3250 (2.5510) 
Africa  -5.088* (2.0430) -5.088* (2.0430) 
FSU  -4.589* (2.1600) -4.589* (2.1600) 
MENA  -5.847* (2.5500) -5.847* (2.5500) 




 R2 0.397 
 
0.601 
 AIC 728.135 
 
728.135 
 BIC 781.097   781.097   
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 14. type shift and democratization, with determinants of type shift and no success 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Neutral 2.1130 (1.3350) 2.1130 (1.3350) 
Low Level -0.9410 (1.7110) -0.9410 (1.7110) 
Fragmented 4.124** (1.3490) 4.124** (1.3490) 
United 0.4950 (1.8680) 0.4950 (1.8680) 
Dem Level (Polity) 0.305** (0.1110) -0.695*** (0.1110) 
ICP -0.7150 (2.4040) -0.7150 (2.4040) 
PCP 1.7220 (1.1450) 1.7220 (1.1450) 
Size 3.5720 (5.2120) 3.5720 (5.2120) 
Coup 0.6250 (1.2810) 0.6250 (1.2810) 
GDP per capita 0.1160 (0.6350) 0.1160 (0.6350) 
Area  -0.3560 (0.5230) -0.3560 (0.5230) 
Cold War 1.5530 (1.6030) 1.5530 (1.6030) 
Asia -2.8890 (1.6900) -2.8890 (1.6900) 
Americas -0.2880 (2.6520) -0.2880 (2.6520) 
Africa  -5.459** (2.0000) -5.459** (2.0000) 
FSU  -4.874* (2.3660) -4.874* (2.3660) 
MENA  -6.787* (2.6330) -6.787* (2.6330) 




 R-squared 0.354 
 
0.573 
 AIC 734.341 
 
734.341 
 BIC 784.516   784.516   
Standard errors in parentheses 














Table 15. Second stage model, instrument and democratization (politychange5) 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Pr(Fragmented) 9.586*** (2.4040) 10.376*** (2.4400) 
Success 2.3870 (1.2250) 
  Area -0.0620 (0.4150) -0.0980 (0.4440) 
Cold War -0.7630 (1.4710) -0.6350 (1.5570) 
Asia -4.912** (1.5820) -5.141** (1.7770) 
Americas -2.8070 (2.4310) -2.4810 (2.5760) 
Africa -5.133* (1.9680) -5.047* (2.1770) 
FSU -7.371*** (2.0500) -7.573** (2.4070) 
MENA -7.522*** (2.0490) -8.067*** (2.2850) 




 R2 0.31 
 
0.283 
 AIC 764.956 
 
767.52 
 BIC 792.663   792.456   
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
